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I. Inter-religious dialogue:  
the current state of affairs 
Inter-religious dialogue and discussions of the relations among the world’s 
religions have become such pervasive topics in the past decades that one may 
be forgiven for thinking that it has always been thus: men and women of goodwill 
from the various faiths that constitute the rainbow of religious experience in our 
world seeking one another out to discover what binds them and, sometimes, to 
work together against the ills that sometimes seem poised to destroy, if not the 
world, then at least the human component in it. 
It is true that individual religious thinkers through the centuries have often 
pondered issues of one Truth against another, or against others, and the 
meaning of the existence of those so-called Truths in light of revelation of one 
type or another. That has not, however, been a primary activity of any religious 
organisation until quite recently. 
Of the religions still extant, Christians of virtually all hues have been more 
concerned with their Gospel-inspired mission of saving the souls of the world -- a 
mission that they have interpreted as replacing wrong belief with Christianity -- 
than with exploring any common Truths they share with the objects of their 
rescue efforts. 
Muslims, too, have shared this missionary passion since their revelation of 
1400 years ago, working hard right up to the beginning of the modern era and, 
perhaps with renewed vigour, starting again in the new millennium to try to 
expand the House of Islam at the expense of the House of War. 
Jews, on the other hand, have spent much of the past two millennia trying to 
draw as little attention to themselves as possible, theologically, preferring survival 
in a largely hostile, largely European, world. 
Hinduism has on the whole had much less difficulty with questions of the 
existence of other religions, having accounted for them in its theology, while 
Buddhists, according to some, appear to have avoided the issue entirely by 
dispensing with what virtually all other religions consider central: the presence 
and/or existence of a deity or pluriform godhead, and some form of personal or 
social relationship with that deity or godhead. 
Increasingly, though, with the passing of the years, peoples with vastly 
differing views of the Ultimate Reality have come to live more closely together, 
both in time and space, and have been forced, if only for reasons of good 
neighbourliness, to explore the faiths around them with a more open mind. With 
increasing frequency, starting slowly and building steadily to the almost Babel-like 
proportions seen today, discussions have been taking place at a host of levels, 
The limits of an ethic-centric 
 2 
from local religious community groups and individuals, to the halls of academe 
and the corridors of political power and the organisations of worship of the 
various faiths.  
As one might expect from a interaction with so many participants from so 
many perspectives, until quite recently there was never much of a consensus as 
to what the purpose or aims of the dialogue, as it came to be known, might be. 
For some, it was simply a way to end hostilities between the faiths. For others, 
the formation of a common front against godless atheists and sinners. Others still 
longed for the creation of a power for good in the world, the religious united 
against poverty, war, human suffering in all its manifestations. And others, a very 
small minority, looked forward to the creation, one way or another, of a single 
Religion, a single Faith, that would unite humanity in a single worshipping mass. 
Some noteworthy fringe movements to the contrary notwithstanding, the latter 
objective has had the least success. It has simply not proved possible or even 
desirable for most believers from whatever faith to simply admit that they and all 
who preceded them have been in such grievous error that much of what they 
believe should be tossed aside and a new belief, comprising some of what they 
believe and some of what others believe, should be adopted. 
The other objectives, however, have had significantly more success. There 
are instances of Muslims, Christians, Jews and Hindus, for example, making 
common cause on issues of public morality. The number of religious 
organisations, whether churches, mosques or temples, who have united in 
projects to relieve suffering caused by war, poverty and disease is truly 
remarkable. 
The successful projects, however, give the lie to the claim that what is going 
on here is ‘dialogue’, at least according to one definition of that term. In order to 
work together, the various religions are indeed engaged in deep discussion to 
dispel misconceptions held by others about them and to have their own 
misconceptions dispelled, but the discussions they are having do not as a rule go 
to the heart of what the religions believe is the core of their faith with the objective 
of incorporating what they learn into a new Truth, which is what a dialogue by 
definition should do. 
The dialogue appears to have stranded in an ethical cul-de-sac, concentrating 
on matters of this world, this humanity and questions not so much of theology but 
of ethics. 
The humanity of the participants and those they seek to help has become the 
touchstone against which all is being measured. To be sure, the assumption is 
made that the desire to cease fighting, to help the poor, to cure the ills that 
plague the world, are based in the participants’ faith and their God-given 
responsibility for Creation, but as recent developments have shown, that may not 
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be an absolutely essential requirement to achieve the stated goals of that 
cooperation.  
For all the bad press Communism has received over the past hundred years, 
sincere communists, for all their atheism, are genuinely concerned for the welfare 
of their fellow man. Humanists, too, are no less concerned about reducing the 
horrors of war than religious people are (and sometimes more). Trade unionists, 
basing their activities on the benefits of collective action, can be just as effective 
in improving the lot of their fellow citizens as a battalion of believers. 
To achieve the stated objectives of the modern inter-religious dialogue, 
therefore, it appears not even to be necessary to participate in it. The issues are 
ethical and not per se religious or theological. Even what may be the most 
publicised and well-known dialogue initiative by religious people, the Declaration 
Toward a Global Ethic, shows its bias in its very title. That does not mean that 
believers should not participate in discussions of ethical matters, but they should 
not be confused with theologically driven inter-religious dialogue as such. 
Inasmuch as the dialogue seems to have developed a focus on the ethical 
then, it is not unreasonable for a theologian to ask whether there is a theological 
purpose to the dialogue, and if so, what that purpose might be. 
That is the driving thought behind this dissertation and one that will inform all 
of the research that follows. 
It is quite possible that the research will show that there is no theological use 
for inter-religious dialogue as it is being conducted today. Should that prove to be 
the case, it does not necessarily follow that it is therefore useless and should be 
abandoned. 
In the first place, those of us who have made religion and theology our study 
will continue to find it interesting to discuss both the content and the meaning of 
other faiths with our colleagues from those faiths. In addition, it does constitute 
another peaceful point of human contact, and all of those are to be cherished. We 
would, however, be forced to consider that, while not without its uses, the current 
dialogue is, theologically speaking, of peripheral interest only, if of any interest at 
all, to the core business of what our faiths are about, whatever that may mean 
and however diverse those ‘core businesses’ might be. 
This study is made up of several components. 
The first part will look at the development of dialogue in the modern: what it is, 
how it came to be and how it is perceived. From that will arise several models of 
dialogue as exemplified by some of the dialogues being held today. That will 
include an analysis of dialogue, as such. Those models will then be compared to 
try to determine whether there are any common elements that may assist.  
The second part looks at the historical development of views of other religions 
by Christian thinkers through the centuries and the relations between and among 
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them. The main focus is on the development of Christian thought. That approach 
reflects to a certain extent my own background: I know the development and the 
writers of Christianity better than the development and writers of other faiths. A 
second reason for beginning from the perspective of the Christian historical 
development is that, all of its colonial baggage notwithstanding, Christianity can 
be said to have played a driving role, if not the driving role, in getting inter-
religious dialogue started and in keeping it going.  
The first part concludes with an examination of a study of multi-faith 
communities in situ to see how they have dealt with some of the issues that have 
been encountered thus far. The end of the second part will try to answer the 
original question posed: what is the theological use of inter-religious dialogue? 
In the third part, I shall propose a way of increasing the theological component 
of dialogue and look at the consequences of doing so. 
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II. Inter-religious dialogue in the modern era: an 
overview 
Some would argue that inter-religious dialogue, far from being a creation of the 
modern era, is something that religions and their adherents have long been 
involved in, in sometimes-heated albeit informal discussion with one another. In 
keeping with the general project of modernity, however, that reasoning continues, 
the discussion has now—at first slowly and then with increasing speed—become 
formalised, institutionalised and globalised, with an increasing number of 
participants and scope of activity. 
While that point of view proceeds from a very loose definition of what dialogue 
is and what it is intended to achieve, we can accept it at one level, that there 
have long been discussions among believers from different belief systems as to 
how they relate to one another in the Divine scheme. The nature of this work, 
however, prevents it from presenting an exhaustive history of the development of 
the dialogue and the motivations of all or even many of its participants. I shall 
therefore attempt only to capture some of the milestones that have characterised 
and influenced the dialogue, in the full realisation that others may choose other 
moments and that the dialogue has never had and may never enjoy unanimity of 
purpose or method among all its active or potential participants. 
From a Christian perspective, the internal reflection on questions that are still 
crucial to the discussion being carried out today have always been closely related 
to the question of mission, of carrying the message of Christ’s saving grace to the 
unsaved. 
For many hundreds of years, the question of dialogue and relations with other 
faiths was principally an academic one. Roman and post-Roman Europe had 
been nominally Christianised, and the pagan holdouts were considered solely as 
rearguard elements of an already defeated opponent that needed only to be 
ultimately weeded out. Heretical movements, and especially those that posed a 
numerical threat, such as the Cathars and Albigensians, were considered 
rebellious factions that endangered the saving message (and the power) of the 
Church and their destruction was elevated to the level of a Crusade.1 In neither 
                                            
1  Commemorated, among other ways, in a cheerful little religious-pop song of 1963 entitled 
Dominique, by the Belgian so-called Singing Nun, Soeur Sourire, in which she recalls that 
“Dominique, notre Pere, combattit les Albigeois”. Soeur Sourire, “Dominique” in Entre Les 
Etoiles, (Philips LP 33 t. 8.719), 1963. That crusade is also credited with being the inspiration of 
the now-infamous saying Caedite eos! Novit enim Dominus qui sunt eius" (Kill them all! The 
Lord will know his own.), attributed to Papal envoy, Abbot Arnaud-Amaury. 
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case, was there any consideration given to entering into a discussion of equals. 
The presence of a substantial and unconvertible Jewish population within a 
Catholic and Orthodox Europe, on the one hand, and, later, the forces of Islam 
across virtually the whole of the southern frontier, on the other, did provide some 
cause for some thinkers to consider the place of these faiths in the divine plan.  
The explosion of exploration, conquest and colonisation by Europeans of the 
Americas, Asia and Africa at the end of the 15th and beginning of the 16th 
centuries and the missionary activity that accompanied it, however, must be 
considered as the beginning of a new religious paradigm for the Europeans, 
brought on by the realisation that the God of Abraham—of the Christians, Jews 
and Muslims—for the first time in a millennium would again have to contend with 
faiths that knew Him not and nations and peoples that had apparently fared well 
without that knowledge. 
Coincidental with—but not separate from—that paradigm shift, philosophers, 
scientists and theologians in Europe had begun to undermine many of the 
assumptions on which the church had relied. Propelled by the findings of a new 
breed of natural scientists, the Aristotelian worldview so staunchly defended by 
the Church, was being demolished. The Reformers of the 16th and later centuries 
– Luther, Calvin, Zwingli, etc. -- had turned their backs on the heretofore-
unquestioned authority of Rome. Enlightenment rationalists such as Immanuel 
Kant, Voltaire and the Deists were undermining the validity of Church’s 
inspiration.  
To greater and lesser degrees, institutionalised doubt and a willingness to 
question and to re-examine First Principles had become the order of the day. 
While all that was going on internally, however, the contemplation on the 
relationships among the religions and the theological importance of non-Christian 
religions was taking place in the background as far as the vast majority of 
believers were concerned. Relatively few of them met or had any contact with 
members of other faith communities. 
This began to change in the course of the 19th century, when a very few 
university faculties, stirred on by the new science of anthropology,2 began 
offering courses in comparative religion. These were essentially 
phenomenological exercises, detailing the external rites and practices, with some 
little attention paid to the qualitative aspects of the belief systems themselves. 
Only slowly did a widespread attitude develop that these belief systems could be 
                                            
2  Nelson, John K. 1990. The Anthropology of Religion. A Field Statement for the Department of 
Anthropology, University of California, Berkeley 
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positively examined and compared with or contrasted to their Christian 
counterparts. 
The World’s Parliament of Religions 1893 
To commemorate the 400th anniversary of the ‘discovery’ of the ‘New World’ by 
Christopher Columbus, the United States planned the World’s Columbian 
Exhibition for 1893 as a bold and brash celebration and display of all the best in 
business, invention, science and industry of that era.3 
To counterbalance that materialistic vision, a Chicago lay-member of the 
Swedenborgian Church, Charles Carroll Bonney proposed a series of non-
materialistic international congresses in keeping with his idea that “[s]omething 
higher and nobler (…) is demanded by the enlightened and progressive spirit of 
the age.”4 
Religion was but one of twenty congresses held simultaneous with the 
Exhibition,5 but it was arguably the one with the deepest and most lasting impact. 
The religious congress, eventually known as the World’s Parliament of 
Religions, was scheduled as 17-day event in the autumn of 1893, concurrent with 
the Columbian Exhibition. For its time and our own, its ambitions were grand: “to 
unite all Religion (capitals his. DS) against all irreligion…to present to the world 
[…] the substantial unity of many religions in the good deeds of the religious life. 
[…Where the religions could present] their common aims and common grounds 
of union. […To secure] the coming unity of mankind, in the service of God and 
man.”6 
Bonney’s intentions as revealed by the above statements in a preliminary 
report to the Exhibition, are remarkable not only for what they reveal about how 
far he at least had come in his considerations of other faiths, but also for what 
they reveal about how far or how little the discussion has progressed since. 
Bonney recognises that Religion in many of its forms can form common cause 
against irreligion. This implies, of course, that they have something in common 
which irreligion does not share. Second, he first looks to outward signs, “good 
deeds of the religious life,” or in other words, ethical conduct. Third, Bonney sees 
that Religion has common aims, though he doesn’t specify what those are, and—
the signal danger for those for whom syncretism is the danger lurking behind 
much of what passes for dialogue today—common grounds of union. 
                                            
3  Seager, Richard Hughes, (ed.), The Dawn of Religious Pluralism: Voices from the World’s 
Parliament of Religions, 1893 (La Salle, Il: Open Court), 1993, p. 3 
4  Seager, Religious Pluralism, pp 3-4. 
5  Ibid. 
6  Ibid., p. 5. 
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None of these three points would be out of place in any discussion of inter-
faith dialogue today, though the emphasis and order would probably shift 
depending on the nature of the particular dialogue and the participants. 
In many respects, the 1893 Parliament must be considered a success. There 
were participants from many religions, from many countries (though 
representatives were predominantly from the United States). It had many 
successful spin-offs:  
• Academic -- an increasing number of universities added history of religion or 
comparative religion to their offerings following the Congress; 
• inter-faith -- many organisations today, including the International 
Association of Religious Freedom, The World Congress of Faiths, and 
others owe their philosophical beginnings, if not their organisational ones, to 
the Congress; 
• Christian ecumenical  -- following on the Congress, the first steps were 
taken that would eventually lead to the seminal 1910 Edinburgh Conference 
on World Mission; the World Council of Churches and its ecumenical and 
missiological activities are the most lasting contemporary expressions of 
that. 
That the Parliament essentially disappeared off virtually everybody’s radar 
until almost its centenary is not necessarily a sign of failure. It had a purpose that 
it fulfilled and it led to other initiatives that are still bearing fruit today. In any case, 
it was a first step on a path that is far from ending. 
Signs of the time 
In addition to the materialistic challenges that the first World’s Parliament of 
Religions was intended to face, a substantial philosophical change as regards 
religion was taking place at about the same time. 
First among these might be considered the development of the historical-
critical method (including form criticism, literary criticism, and others) of Biblical 
inter-religious dialogue 
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studies. With its origins with Richard Simon in 1678,7 historical-criticism attempts 
to apply scientific principles to matters Biblical.8  
 At the time of the World’s Parliament, historical-critical studies had led to the 
development of the History of Religions School in Germany, which denied any 
special status for religion in general and Christianity in particular, subjecting it to 
the same historical examination as all other subjects. A major result of the School 
was the publication of The Absoluteness of Christianity by Ernst Troeltsch in 
which the very idea of claims to absoluteness of Christianity or any religion on the 
basis of human knowledge and analysis was disputed.9 It might well be, 
according to Troeltsch, that there is an absolute religion, but the evidence of it in 
the earthly realm of his time and the whole of history until then was not available. 
The arrival on the scene of Paul Ricoeur’s three so-called “Masters of Suspicion” 
– Karl Marx, Sigmund Freud, and Friederich Nietzsche -- who posited ulterior 
motives and origins for Christianity and religion, and the acceptance of those 
ideas among first, the intellectual and later the general population in the West, 
also contributed greatly to the weakening in many people’s minds of Christianity’s 
claims and an openness to positive views towards other religions. 
1910 Edinburgh Conference on World Mission 
Growing directly out of the 1893 Parliament, but delayed due to the complexities 
of organisation, the 1910 Edinburgh Conference was a conscious attempt to deal 
with the problem of Christian mission in a religiously plural world. It has become 
accepted as marking the beginning of the modern ecumenical movement, as it 
was one of the first times that delegates from missionary societies of many 
                                            
7  McCarthy, John F., “Two views of historical criticism”, in Living Tradition: Organ of the Roman 
Theological Forum, No. 77, September, 1998. Simon was a Catholic priest and is called the 
father of historical-criticism. His two major works are Critical history of the Old Testament and 
Critical History of the New Testament (Histoire critique du Vieux Testament (1678) and Histoire 
Critique du texte du Nouveau Testament (1689) respectively) His work, however, was placed on 
the Vatican’s Index of Prohibited Books, he was expelled from l’Oratoire, a group of priests 
occupied with training seminarians, and use of the method was discouraged. Much of the work 
that followed in the field was non- or even anti-Catholic until relatively recent times. 
8  While this current work clearly lacks the scope to examine this development in depth, it may 
cautiously be proposed that without historical-critical studies, Christianity would not have 
developed whatever openness it now displays towards other faiths, especially as regards the 
examination of commonalities of origin and intention with Christianity. 
9  Troeltsch, Ernst, The absoluteness of Christianity and the history of religions, David Reid 
(trans.), third edition (Richmond, VA.,: John Knox Press) 1971. I have discussed Troeltsch 
extensively in my Master’s thesis (Suchard, Derek, Faith without Borders? An inquiry into the 
limits of theological pluralism, Prof.Dr.Th.Witvliet en A. Hoekema (supervisors), 100: 
SCR.51.nr.5 (University of Amsterdam) 2000. 
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different churches united in their goal of “the evangelisation of the world in that 
generation.”10 
The conference spoke of the Christian encounter with other religious traditions 
as being of “the same order as the meeting of the New Testament church with 
Greco-Roman culture, demanding fundamental shifts in Christian self-
understanding and theology. The evangelistic thrust of the conference, therefore, 
was predominant in the overall Edinburgh message.”11 
A marketing executive in a major corporation might be tempted to characterise 
the conference as a competitive analysis and a seminar on how to position 
Christianity in various markets with the express aim of increasing market share. 
As described in a contemporary newspaper report, the “missionary specialists” 
had largely gathered “to exchange views on the ways and means of executing 
the Lord’s command to preach the gospel to the whole creation.” 
The emphasis of one day’s seminars, for example, was “The Missionary 
Message in Relation to Non-Christian Religions”, which was described as “a 
liv[ing] question to every thoughtful person” 
This is certainly a far-cry from, in fact is the antithesis of, most of what passes 
for inter-religious dialogue at the beginning of the 21st century. 
The speakers on that day were primarily concerned with marketing issues: 
how to make the Christian message palatable to members of other faiths, 
whether Chinese, Hindu, animist or Muslim. The question of benefits or insights 
that could be reciprocated was completely foreign to the delegates. 12 
For all its one-sidedness, the Conference did achieve much that is still bearing 
fruit today in inter-faith dialogue. It was the absolute assurance of the participants 
that they could and should learn as much as possible about the other faiths. That 
they did it in order that Christianity might better shine would today in many circles 
be roundly criticised, but for the time, it was a revolutionary approach that until 
then had been only adopted individually by missionaries in the field. In 1910, it 
was elevated to a formal methodology, though its results could not have been 
predicted. 
The Christian Message in a non-Christian World 
In 1928, a second Missionary Conference was held, in Jerusalem, where the 
topic of rising secularism dominated the agenda. Charles Bonney of the 1893 
                                            
10 “Interfaith Dialogue (Dialogue, Interfaith)” entry from the Dictionary of the Ecumenical Movement 
published jointly by the World Council of Churches and Wm. Eerdmans (1991). 
11  Ibid. 
12  Morrison, Charles Clayton, “The World Missionary Conference, 1910”, in Christian Century, July 
4-11, 1984, p. 660, (reprinted from the July 7, 1910, issue)  
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World’s Parliament would certainly have been no stranger here, as delegates 
unanimously accepted a closing document in which the positive values of other 
religions were affirmed and a closing of religious ranks against the unreligious 
was called for.13 
The apparent unanimity, however, was deceptive, and led to an increasing 
split among the missionaries. This split came to a head just prior to the 1938 
World Conference in Tambaram, India. A report edited by W.E. Hocking was 
“critical of the exclusive attitude of Christians towards other faiths and claimed 
that the challenge to the Christian faith came not from other faiths, but from anti-
religious and secular movements.”14  
This report was the cause of much dispute and led to Dutch missionary 
Hendrik Kraemer, at the time working in the Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia), 
being asked to write “a book on the biblical and theological basis of the Christian 
attitude to other faiths.”15  
As the study book for the conference, Kraemer’s Christian Message in a non-
Christian World had a lasting effect far beyond the conference. 
The Dictionary of the Ecumenical Movement records that  
Kraemer, following Karl Barth, insisted that the biblical faith, 
based on God's encounter with humankind, is radically 
different from all other forms of religious faith. Admitting that 
God's will shines through, albeit in a broken way, in the all-too-
human attempts to know God in all religious life, Kraemer 
maintained that the only true way to know the revealed will of 
God is by responding to the divine intervention in history in 
Christ. Both Barth and Kraemer emphasised the uniqueness of 
the revelation in Christ and considered Christianity as a 
religion to be as human as any other. But neither could avoid 
giving, at least by implication, a unique place to Christianity in 
so far as it had become the vehicle through which this 
unmatched revelation of God is lived and proclaimed.”16 
Kraemer’s book was influential both in Tambaram and beyond, but never 
enjoyed unanimity. There were many dissenting voices who could not find 
themselves in Kraemer’s view that “that the gospel was in discontinuity with other 
religious traditions.”17  
                                            
13  “Interfaith Dialogue” 
14  Ibid. 
15  Ibid. 
16  “Interfaith Dialogue”. 
17  Ibid. 
The limits of an ethic-centric 
 12 
The conclusion of the conference, while slightly favouring Kraemer’s view, did 
record that "Christians are not agreed on the revelatory character of other 
religious traditions. It also noted that it was "a matter urgently demanding thought 
and united study" within the ecumenical movement. 18  
World Congress of Faiths 
It will be noted that, with some exception possibly being made for the 1893 
Parliament, all of the activity within the organised Church up to that point had 
primarily involved talking about rather than with other faiths. In short, there was 
no dialogue. This does not mean that no formalised dialogue was taking place, 
only that it was largely outside the boundaries of institutionalised Christianity, in 
the hands of some smaller organisations, such as the World Congress of Faiths. 
The World Congress of Faiths grew out of a Religions of Empire conference 
held in London, England in 1924, and was intended to bring together 
representatives of all the faiths under the sway of the then British Empire.19 It 
may be considered unique in that presenters talking about a particular belief were 
expected to actually be adherents of it, rather than having a scientist or 
theologian interpreting it for the audience.20 A major motivation for the conference 
was the need for the different faiths to be able to achieve a modus vivendi. Only 
one-sixth of them, for example, were Christian. “Of the Empire’s 460 million 
people, about 210 million were Hindus, about 100 million were Muslims and 
about 12 million were Buddhists.”21 
Four years before the Tambaram conference, English Christian mystic Francis 
Younghusband began preparations for a World Congress of Faiths. This was to 
be an actual event to take place 3-8 July, 1936, as well as an ongoing 
organisation. Younghusband’s purpose was not, he said, to formulate “another 
eclectic religion (…) [but to] help members of all faiths to become aware of the 
universal experience that had been his.”22 
Younghusband wanted to meet at a mystical level, transcending institutions 
and dogma. His motives, however, and the motives of the organisation which 
hardily survives under the World Congress of Faiths name, were not always well 
accepted by the outside. The Archbishop of Canterbury at the time of the first 
World Congress of Faiths in 1936, Cosmo Gordon Lang, says he declined an 
                                            
18  Ibid. 
19  Braybrooke, Marcus, A wider vision: A history of the World Congress of Faiths, (Oxford: 
Oneworld Publications) 1996, p. 9 
20  Ibid., p. 11 
21  Ibid. 
22  Ibid., p. 32 
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invitation to take part personally in the conference “for the reason that this might 
be taken to imply that I thought that Christianity was only one of many religions in 
spite of being as I believed the true religion based upon Divine Revelation.”23 
The Second World War put the WCF’s grand ambitions of a truly international 
congress on hold. That, coupled with the fear of many outsiders especially in 
organised Christianity that the WCF was actually a syncretist movement, may 
have prevented it from achieving the stature and influence of other groups, such 
as the World Council of Churches, for example. The WCF has not been entirely 
without influence, however. In the 1990s, Archbishop Runcie of the Church of 
England did speak at a WCF event, and the focus of the WCF has shifted from 
“transcendent unity to valued diversity.” Many of its guiding principles, however, 
appear to me to have been taken over by the WCC and others, which may make 
the WCF redundant as a separate body. 
Religion as unbelief: Karl Barth and Church Dogmatics 
As we have seen, the organised Christian churches did not entirely embrace the 
apparent increasing confluence of religions as the 20th century progressed. 
There was a very strong group that held fast to the uniqueness of Christianity, 
despite the efforts of Ernst Troelstch and the History of Religions School to 
demonstrate that that uniqueness and absolutivity was nowhere inherently 
apparent. 
The challenge that that presented was taken up by Swiss Reformed 
theologian Karl Barth when he published the German text of Volume 1, Part 2 of 
his magnum opus, Church Dogmatics in 1938. 
That book, which deals at great length with the doctrine of the Word of God, 
devotes a not inconsiderable part to the question raised by Troeltsch et al, in 
dealing with three issues that are relevant to this study: 
1. What is religion? 
2. What is the significance of the elements that Christianity shares with other 
religions? 
3. What is the source of the Truth of Christianity against the untruth of other 
religions? 
Barth makes a clear opposition between the Revelation of God and human 
religion, based on two principal points. In the first place, Revelation is God 
reaching out to humanity while religion is humanity reaching out to try to find God: 
“[R]eligion is clearly seen to be a human attempt to anticipate 
what God in His Revelation wills to do and does do. It is the 
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attempted replacement of the divine work by a human 
manufacture. The divine reality offered and manifested to us in 
revelation is replaced by a concept of God arbitrarily and 
wilfully evolved by man.”24  
As such, it is an acknowledgement of unbelief, in that it does not rely on the 
Revelation of God, which “encounters man on the presupposition and in 
confirmation of the fact that man’s attempt to know God from [man’s] own 
standpoint is wholly and entirely futile.”25 If man “really can know God, [that] 
capacity rests upon the fact that he really does know Him, because God has 
offered and manifested Himself to [man].”26  
That applies to Christianity as well as to other religions, Barth states, and it is 
possible to have a Christian religion of unbelief. That occurs, inter alia, when the 
Bible, for example, is seen to be a book of religion. For although “it is a Law, that 
is, an order and command and direction for the new life of the people and 
children of God (…) [i]t is not a book of religion. From first to last it is the 
proclamation of the justifying and sanctifying grace of God.”27  
It is, however, incontestably true that Christianity shares common elements 
with other religions in form, belief and practice, and that is not a surprise: 
“The religion of man is always conditioned absolutely by the 
way in which the starry heaven above and the moral law within 
have spoken to the individual. It is, therefore, conditioned by 
nature and climate, by blood and soil, by the economic, 
cultural, political, in short the historical circumstances in which 
he lives. ”28  
Religion, therefore – all religion – is “never true in itself and as such.”29 That is 
as true for Christianity as for all other religions. Christianity, too, “stands under 
the judgement that religion is unbelief, and that is it not acquitted by an inward 
worthiness, but only by the Grace of God.”30 And that judgement applies to all 
external forms, all human activity related to God.  
                                            
24  Barth, Karl, Church Dogmatics, Volume 1, The Doctrine of the Word of God, Part 2, G.W. 
Bromley and T.F. Torrance (eds.), G.T. Thomson and Harold Knight (trans.), (London: T&T 
Clark International),  2004, p. 302. 
25  Ibid., p. 301. 
26  Ibid. 
27  Ibid., p. 312 
28  Ibid., p. 316. 
29  Ibid., p. 325 
30  Ibid., p. 327 
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There are other religions which appear to approach Christianity in some ways, 
Barth refers most favourably to the Buddhist Pure Land Sect and the True Sect of 
the Pure Land, which approach the Protestant view of unmerited justification 
most closely,31 but that is deceptive, and because it lies outside the Revelation of 
God, is as much unbelief as all other religions. 
For Barth, Christianity and all other human religions, in and of themselves, 
must be seen as earthly manifestations that, through no merit of their own, are 
either bathed in the divine sunlight or cast into the shadow when that light does 
not fall. They cannot by themselves determine where that light will fall, cannot 
move themselves into the light, or out of it.32  
Does Christianity have any “right” to a claim as the “true religion” then? Yes, 
but not because of anything it does. Only because God elected it, and did not 
elect any other, although He could have done. When a Christian elects God, 
therefore, it is only an acknowledgement of an election by God that has already 
taken place. And inasmuch as God did not elect any other religion, Christianity 
may be said to be the True Religion, not in pride or boasting, but in total humility 
and powerlessness.33 
The Second World War 
Of the two world wars of the 20th century, the First World War is often cited as the 
more important theological event, leading as it did to interbellum nihilism on the 
one hand and to what some have called the revitalisation of Protestant theology 
that began with the publication of Barth’s Letter to the Romans.34 Be that as it 
may, the Second World War is, in my opinion, more significant as regards the 
inter-faith dialogue. With a speed that would have otherwise taken decades to 
achieve, the realisation that Hitler’s and the National-Socialists’ intention and 
attempt to eliminate the Jewish people owed a great deal to the Christian 
churches’ attitudes towards the Jews over 1500 years, the mainstream churches, 
almost as a bloc, assumed – to greater and lesser degrees and with significant 
regional differences -- an unaccustomed humility as regards dealings with the 
Jews in particular and non-Christian religions in general.  
The support of the ‘Christian’ West – Europe and North America – for the re-
establishment of the State of Israel, owed a significant debt to the guilt felt at the 
unintended complicity in Hitler’s plan. 
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32  Ibid., p. 353. 
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34  First edition in 1918. 
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The period between the wars, which saw the rise of Fascism and Nazism 
throughout Europe, and the increasing isolation of Europe’s Jewish communities, 
also saw the first stirrings of a positive shift in Christian attitudes towards 
Christianity’s “beloved brother.”35  
In 1924, the Presbyterian Church of England, for example, established a sub-
committee that issued a conclusion downplaying the urgency of converting the 
Jews and encouraging mutual cooperation.36 
In 1928, the National Conference of Christians and Jews was established in 
the United States, “[d]riven by a rise in xenophobia, a strengthened Ku Klux Klan, 
anti-Catholicism, and anti-Semitism…prominent leaders for the Christian and 
Jewish communities (…) came together to form a human relations organisation 
dedicated to addressing the  nation's inter-group problems: The National 
Conference of Jews and Christians for the Advancement of Justice, Amity and 
Peace.”37 38 
All these initiatives notwithstanding, it was the Second World War, and the 
years immediately preceding it, and especially beginning with Kristalnacht in 
1938,39 that saw a sea change in Christian-Jewish relations. In 1941,40 the 
Council of Christians and Jews was formed in England, “against all forms of 
discrimination and (…) to promote ‘the fundamental ethical teachings which are 
common to Judaism and Christianity.’ ”41 
                                            
35  From a letter from Pope John Paul II to Catholic Priest Romuald-Jakub Weksler-Waszkinel. 
Quoted in Cohen, Roger, “For a Priest and for Poland, a Tangled Identity.” In The New York 
Times on the Web, 10 October 1999.  The priest had discovered at the age of 35 that he had 
been born to a Jewish mother but given to a Catholic Polish woman to raise. He chose the 
priesthood of his own volition. His name is a combination of his original Jewish name and his 
adopted Catholic name. 
36  Braybrooke, Marcus, Children of One God: A History of the Council of Christians and Jews, 
(London, England and Portland, U.S.A.: Vallentine Mitchell) 1991, p. 1-2. 
37  National Conference for Community and Justice web site: 
http://www.nccj.org/nccj3.nsf/htmlmedia/history.htm, (3 February 2003). The organisation 
changed its name in the 1990s from the National Conference of Christians and Jews to “better 
reflect its mission to build whole and inclusive communities. The historic name confused many, 
who believed that NCCJ was an interfaith organisation.[T]he new name is not a change in 
vision, but rather an affirmation of our abiding commitment to embrace the diversity of our 
nation.”  
38  Note: When Internet references are no longer available on the web sites cited, they can be 
found on The Internet Archive by entering the URL as shown in the reference. The Internet 
Archive web site is: http://www.waybackmachine.org/. 
39  Braybrooke, Children. p. 7 
40  Coincidental with, though they couldn’t have known it at the time, the proclamation of “The Final 
Solution to the Jewish Question” by the National-Socialists. 
41  Braybrooke, Children. p. 11. 
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During the Nazi period and the war itself, the active and passive complicity of 
the German and other European churches42 with the Axis anti-Semitic campaign 
became all too obvious and slowly the realisation built that the Church’s attitude 
through the centuries had contributed significantly to the attitudes that had made 
the Final Solution possible, if not inevitable. Many churches have subsequently 
apologised for their part in the anti-Semitic culture, though it would be a far cry to 
say that Europe, especially, is free of anti-Semitic and racist tendencies. 
Decolonisation and migration 
After more than 400 years of European colonisation of Africa, Asia and the 
Americas, the second half of the 20th century saw the dissolution of those 
empires in one-tenth of that time. Small island outposts remain, but essentially, 
national self-determination has become the order of the day. This has curiously 
not led to the splendid isolation of the former colonisers, but rather to the 
acceleration of multi-cultural, multi-faith communities as thousands of citizens of 
the former colonies migrated to the former seat of empire, bringing their faiths – 
previously known only to those who had been sent out as servants of empire – 
with them and forcing previously homogeneous societies to quickly adapt to 
mosques and temples and customs that challenged many of the assumptions on 
which their previous missionary efforts had been based. For Europeans and 
North Americans, familiarity with the Other no longer came through the 
interpretation of world travellers, but through daily dealings with Hindus, Muslims, 
Sikhs, etc.  
The colonisation wave of the 1950s and 1960s was followed in Europe in the 
1970s and later by the “guest worker” wave, when Western Europe went in 
search of workers to perform those jobs that Western Europeans would not do at 
the lower end of the socio-economic scale. Those workers, largely rural males, 
then brought their families43—first wives and children, later parents and extended 
family members—and, against the intention of the original program, stayed. 
These Turks, Moroccans, Palestinians, etc., became visible minorities who 
slowly, and not yet entirely, are integrating into the fabric of European society. 
                                            
42  This is not intended in any way to denigrate the efforts of the so-called Confessing Churches in 
Germany, which actively opposed the Nazi program and hundreds of whose clerical and lay 
members were arrested, sent to concentration camps and killed. See, De Corneille, Roland, 
Christians and Jews: The Tragic Past and the Hopeful Future, (New York: Harper ChapelBooks) 
1966, p 16-58. 
43  In the Western-European context, Switzerland is the exception, with very strict rules about 
repatriation and employment of family members for guest workers. 
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The pool of newcomers expanded even further beginning in the 1980s and 
1990s with the development of a structural stream of refugees, both real and 
economic, from non-Christian countries, adding to the numbers of those who are 
adding to the inter-cultural and inter-religious mix of Western Europe. 
A new-found national humility by the former European powers and a need for 
these different groups to co-exist peacefully, led first the politically correct, then 
the population in general to accept that peoples of different faith were not only not 
necessarily evil, but quite demonstrably as moral and ethical as “we” ourselves.  
The positive effects this has had on dialogue as currently conducted cannot be 
overstated. For now dialogue is not only about countries and groups far away, but 
about good relations with neighbours, which adds a serious element of urgency 
to the process. 
“All that is true and holy” 
For a missionary religion, which Christianity certainly is, dialogue is a puzzle. If 
one has the truth, after all, then it is one’s duty to proclaim it. How then can one 
have a dialogue of equals? For the Roman Catholic Church, the answer is that 
inter-religious dialogue, “is part of the Church's evangelizing mission.” 44 
Notwithstanding that position, the Church has made some serious openings to 
other faiths, creating some creative solutions to approaching dialogue. 
One of the most creative, and simultaneously one of the most problematic, 
has been the recognition, expressed in the Vatican II document Nostra Aetate 
that “[t]he Catholic Church rejects nothing of what is true and holy in [other] 
religions (…) which (…) often reflect a ray of that truth which enlightens all 
men.”45 This was not a declaration of relativism, however. Christ remains the 
revealed truth and it is the duty of the Church to continue to proclaim that truth. It 
has made it possible, however, for the Church to engage in dialogue on 
something more closely resembling equal ground.  
It made it possible to consider non-Christians and their religions in terms other 
than as the damned. 
A second important concept that gained authority as a result of Vatican II, that 
of anonymous Christianity, is the brainchild of Catholic theologian Karl Rahner. 
"Anonymous Christianity means that a person lives in the 
grace of God and attains salvation outside of explicitly 
                                            
44  See, Dominus Jesus.On the unicity and salvific universality of Jesus Christ and the Church, 
published by the Congregration for the Doctrine of the Faith, (6 August, 2000) 
45  Nostra Aetate, in Francesco Gioia (ed.), Interreligious Dialogue: The official teaching of the 
Catholic Church (1963-1995), (Boston: Pauline Books & Media), English edition, 1997, p. 38. 
Nostra Aetate was promulgated in 1965. 
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constituted Christianity… Let us say, a Buddhist monk… who, 
because he follows his conscience, attains salvation and lives 
in the grace of God; of him I must say that he is an anonymous 
Christian; if not, I would have to presuppose that there is a 
genuine path to salvation that really attains that goal, but that 
simply has nothing to do with Jesus Christ. But I cannot do 
that. And so, if I hold if everyone depends upon Jesus Christ 
for salvation, and if at the same time I hold that many live in 
the world who have not expressly recognised Jesus Christ, 
then there remains in my opinion nothing else but to take up 
this postulate of an anonymous Christianity."46 
Originally formulated in Rahner’s Theological Investigations, anonymous 
Christianity recently received even greater weight, when Dominus Jesus was 
promulgated in 2000, with such statements as: “Therefore, the sacred books of 
other religions, which in actual fact direct and nourish the existence of their 
followers, receive from the mystery of Christ the elements of goodness and grace 
which they contain.”47 And further: “(…), the salvific action of Jesus Christ, with 
and through his Spirit, extends beyond the visible boundaries of the Church to all 
humanity. Speaking of the paschal mystery, in which Christ even now associates 
the believer to himself in a living manner in the Spirit and gives him the hope of 
resurrection, the Council states: “All this holds true not only for Christians but also 
for all men of good will in whose hearts grace is active invisibly. For since Christ 
died for all, and since all men are in fact called to one and the same destiny, 
which is divine, we must hold that the Holy Spirit offers to all the possibility of 
being made partners, in a way known to God, in the paschal mystery”.48 
The idea of anonymous Christianity, while elegant in resolving the difficulties 
inherent in a pluralistic constellation of religions, has not been particularly well 
received outside the Church, and has critics within it as well. 
Non-Christians find that it has a triumphalist air…that regardless of what they 
themselves say, they can at heart be anonymous Christians without their 
knowledge or consent. This seems again to be putting dialogue, as currently 
constituted, at a level of theological second place, as it doesn’t, in fact, much 
matter, what one believes: anonymous Christianity is at work anyway. 
                                            
46  Rahner, Karl, Karl Rahner in Dialogue: Conversations and Interviews 1965-1982 (New York: 
Crossroad), 1986.  p. 15.  
47  Dominus Jesus.On the unicity and salvific universality of Jesus Christ and the Church, I, 
published by the Congregration for the Doctrine of the Faith, (6 August, 2000) 
48  Ibid., II. 
The limits of an ethic-centric 
 20 
On the other hand, some Catholic critics49 find anonymous Christianity an 
offence to the dogma of extra ecclesiam nulla salus, which in its starkest form 
states: 
“[The Holy Roman Church] … firmly believes, professes and 
preaches that ‘no one remaining outside the Catholic Church, 
not only pagans,’  but also Jews, and heretics, and 
schismatics, can ever become partakers of eternal life; but that 
they will go into the ‘eternal fire prepared for the devil, and its 
angels," (Mt. 25:41) unless before the end of their life they are 
joined (aggregati) to it. For union with the body of the Church is 
of so great importance that the sacraments of the Church are 
helpful to salvation only to those remaining in it; and fasts, 
almsgiving, other works of piety and the exercises of a militant 
Christian life bear eternal reward for them alone. ‘And no one 
can be saved, no matter how much alms one has given, even 
if shedding one’s blood for the name of Christ, unless one 
remains in the bosom of the Catholic Church.’50    
World Council of Churches 
The World Council of Churches, a largely Protestant body born in 1947 at a 
General Assembly in Amsterdam, the Netherlands, was originally about crossing 
doctrinal divides among Churches. In 1961, mission took on a more important 
role with the integration of the International Missionary Council (IMC), which had 
earlier been so crucial in the development of philosophies underlying dialogue 
with the conferences at Edinburgh, Jerusalem and Tambaram (see above). (The 
IMC had been invited to join when the organisation was being planned in 1938, 
but at Tambaram the decision was taken to continue as a separate body.)  
The integration of the IMC into the WCC also gave more prominence to the 
issues that the IMC had debated so strongly internally since Edinburgh in 1910 
as regards the proper relationship towards other religions. It was not immediately 
resolved, as a history of the development of inter-religious dialogue by the WCC 
                                            
49  The conservative Roman Catholic organisation, In Hoc Signo Vinces, for example, believes that 
‘anonymous Christianity’ is “tantamount to heresy…As St. Thomas Aquinus pointed out in his 
Summa Theologica, an unknown cannot be loved. A man who does not know God, who does 
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January 2005.  
50  Extract from “Decree for the Copts at the General Council of Florence”, 1442. Cited in Jacques 
Dupuis, S.J., Toward a Christian Theology of Religious Pluralism, (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books),  
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attests. At the WCC’s Fifth Assembly, held in Nairobi in 1975, which was 
attended for the first time by “five persons of other [unspecified] faiths”51 the sub-
unit on interfaith dialogue presented its first report to the assembly. It became 
apparent that the question of dialogue continued to be divisive: “some felt that 
dialogue would lead to the kind of syncretism so feared at the 1928 Jerusalem 
meeting. Others wanted to defend the uniqueness and finality of the revelation in 
Christ and feared that the dialogue enterprise compromised that faith. Still others 
saw in interfaith dialogue a threat to mission, which they saw as fundamental to 
the being of the church itself.” 
Voices from Asia “defended dialogue as the most appropriate way for the 
church to live in a pluralistic world.” 
The sub-unit’s report was sent back to the drafting group which met the 
assemblies concerns with the addition of a new preamble.52 
Those divisions are still at work today, but much progress has been made at 
the WCC and in individual churches in formalising dialogue situations and in 
creating guidelines for it. 
World’s Parliament of Religions 1993 
Despite widespread press coverage at the time, the World’s Parliament of 
Religions in 1893 disappeared almost without a trace for almost a century after it 
was held. The official proceedings, which were published shortly after the 
Parliament “promptly disappeared into the stacks of university libraries.”53 
As its centenary approached, the Parliament was ‘rediscovered’ and a Second 
Parliament of Religions was scheduled, also for Chicago, in 1993. 
The 1993 event, in contrast with its century-earlier predecessor, was not 
associated with any celebration of Columbus’s discovery or any other event, and 
some commentators have expressed the feeling that it was in fact a collection of 
Parliaments rather than just one.54 
While participation was much broader in 1993 than it had been a century 
earlier, many of the goals were similar: to exchange information about one 
another’s beliefs, to allow the Other to express his beliefs freely with no one 
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feeling obliged to accept or refute them. In that, it shared many of the 
characteristics of inter-faith meetings that followed up to the present day. 
Though it is still, after less than a decade, too early to tell what the total 
influence of the second parliament will be, one result of it seems likely to have a 
very long and influential life ahead of it: The Global Ethic. 
The Declaration Toward a Global Ethic, drafted by Swiss Catholic Theologian 
Hans Küng and signed – adopted seems too strong a word as the signatories 
signed as individuals and not as organisations – by 143 attendees, is designed to 
present to the world an ethic that can be applied to many of the world’s problems. 
In the section entitled Principles, the Declaration states: 
“Hundreds of millions of human beings on our planet 
increasingly suffer from unemployment, poverty, hunger, and 
the destruction of their families. Hope for a lasting peace 
among nations slips away from us. There are tensions 
between the sexes and generations. Children die, kill, and are 
killed. More and more countries are shaken by corruption in 
politics and business. It is increasingly difficult to live together 
peacefully in our cities because of social, racial, and ethnic 
conflicts, the abuse of drugs, organised crime, and even 
anarchy. Even neighbours often live in fear of one another. Our 
planet continues to be ruthlessly plundered. A collapse of the 
ecosystem threatens us. 
Time and again we see leaders and members of religions 
incite aggression, fanaticism, hate, and xenophobia - even 
inspire and legitimise violent and bloody conflicts. Religion 
often is misused for purely power-political goals, including war. 
We are filled with disgust.  
We condemn these blights and declare that they need not be. 
An ethic already exists within the religious teachings of the 
world which can counter the global distress. Of course this 
ethic provides no direct solution for all the immense problems 
of the world, but it does supply the moral foundation for a 
better individual and global order: A vision which can lead 
women and men away from despair, and society away from 
chaos. 
We are persons who have committed ourselves to the 
precepts and practices of the world's religions. We confirm that 
there is already a consensus among the religions which can be 
the basis for a global ethic - a minimal fundamental consensus 
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concerning binding values, irrevocable standards, and 
fundamental moral attitudes” 
The Introduction, written by an editorial team of the 1993 Parliament of the 
World’s Religions and originally intended as a press release, covers it briefly: 
“We are women and men who have embraced the precepts 
and practices of the world's religions: 
• We affirm that a common set of core values is found in the 
teachings of the religions, and that these form the basis of a 
global ethic.  
• We affirm that this truth is already known, but yet to be lived 
in heart and action.  
• We affirm that there is an irrevocable, unconditional norm for 
all areas of life, for families and communities, for races, 
nations, and religions. There already exist ancient guidelines 
for human behaviour which are found in the teachings of the 
religions of the world and which are the condition for a 
sustainable world order.” 
The organisers of the 1893 Parliament would have been proud and would 
certainly have been able to find themselves in this declaration: it is a practical 
expression of the common values of the religions, finding common ground on 
which to work together to remedy the ills of this world. 
And, as the Declaration covers only those ethical principles which are 
common to religions, there was still plenty of room for the different believers to 
have joint action while retaining their individual beliefs. This is the hallmark of 
Dialogue today, as we shall see further. 
State of play 
Starting in the second half of the 20th century, and carrying on as the 21st 
century opens, dialogue has grown to become a standard feature of modern 
religious life and study. The Catholic Church has its Secretariat for Relations with 
Other Religions, the WCC its team for inter-religious relations and dialogue. 
Other churches, temples, synagogues and mosques are involved at various 
levels with dialogue in one or more of the four distinct areas of dialogue identified 
by the WCC: 
• the dialogue of life 
the interaction of believers of different faiths in day-to-day life situations 
• bi-lateral or multi-lateral dialogues 
formal meetings between representatives of faith communities 
• academic dialogues 
among academics of different faith traditions 
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• spiritual dialogue 
where believers come together to participate in faith situations. 
 
The WCC has published Guidelines on Dialogue with People of Living Faiths 
and Ideologies, noting that there are still many questions remaining, including:  
What is the relation between the universal creative/redemptive 
activity of God towards all humankind and the particular 
creative/redemptive activity of God in the history of Israel and 
in the person and work of Jesus Christ? 
Are Christians to speak of God's work in the lives of all men 
and women only in tentative terms of hope that they may 
experience something of Him, or more positively in terms of 
God's self-disclosure to people of living faiths and ideologies 
and in the struggle of human life? 
How are Christians to find from the Bible criteria in their 
approach to people of other faiths and ideologies, recognising, 
as they must, the authority accorded to the Bible by Christians 
of all centuries, particular questions concerning the authority of 
the Old Testament for the Christian Church, and the fact that 
the partners in dialogue have other starting points and 
resources, both in holy books and traditions of teaching? 
What is the biblical view and Christian experience of the 
operation of the Holy Spirit, and is it right and helpful to 
understand the work of God outside the Church in terms of the 
doctrine of the Holy Spirit? 
Christians should approach dialogue, however 
• with repentance, because they know how easily they 
misconstrue God's revelation in Jesus Christ, betraying it in 
their actions and posturing as the owners of God's truth 
rather than, as in fact they are, the undeserving recipients 
of grace; 
• with humility, because they so often perceive in people of 
other faiths and ideologies a spirituality, dedication, 
compassion and a wisdom which should forbid them 
making judgements about others as though from a position 
of superiority; in particular they should avoid using ideas 
such as "anonymous Christians", "the Christian presence", 
"the unknown Christ", in ways not intended by those who 
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proposed them for theological purposes or in ways 
prejudicial to the self-understanding of Christians and 
others; 
• with joy, because it is not themselves they preach; it is 
Jesus Christ, perceived by many people of living faiths and 
ideologies as prophet, holy one, teacher, example; but 
confessed by Christians as Lord and Saviour, Himself the 
faithful witness and the coming one (Rev. 1.5-7); 
• with integrity, because they do not enter into dialogue with 
others except in this penitent and humble joyfulness in the 
Lord Jesus Christ, making clear to others their own 
experience and witness, even as they seek to hear from 
others their expressions of deepest conviction and insight. 
All these would mean an openness and exposure, the 
capacity to be wounded which we see in the example of 
our Lord Jesus Christ and which we sum up in the word 
vulnerability. 
The WCC notes, however, that dialogue cannot easily be defined. Its mission, 
however, is somewhat more clear: 
Dialogue (…) is a fundamental part of Christian service within 
community. In dialogue Christians actively respond to the 
command to "love God and your neighbour as yourself". As an 
expression of love engagement in dialogue testifies to the love 
experienced in Christ. It is a joyful affirmation of life against 
chaos, and a participation with all who are allies of life in 
seeking the provisional goals of a better human community. 
Thus "dialogue in community" is not a secret weapon in the 
armoury of an aggressive Christian militancy. Rather it is a 
means of living our faith in Christ in service of community with 
one's neighbours. 
 
Whether this is sufficient, theologically, will be looked at in some depth further. 
In fact, what we see is that since the 1893 Parliament, after more than a 
century of discussion and debate, positions have not changed very much. The 
discussion has certainly become more formalised, a wealth of information has 
been exchanged and much misinformation has been falsified, especially at the 
level of the church, synagogue, mosque and temple-goer. 
I believe, however that the discussion has gone as far as it can under the 
current terms of engagement and that we are collectively now starting to repeat 
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ourselves in a circular discussion that, so far, offers little prospect of moving 
beyond this point. 
Whether this must remain so will be discussed at length further. 
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III. Stating the problem 
Prior to beginning in earnest and without prejudice to any eventual answer I might 
arrive at in my research, I formulated what I believed then might be some 
possible solutions to the question I had posed, which was simply: 
What is the theological purpose of the current inter-religious dialogue? 
A ‘theological purpose’ is defined as a purpose that goes to the heart of a 
faith, rather than dealing with secondary issues, regardless of how important and 
worthy of pursuit in their own right they may be.  
To compound the matter even more, however, any answer would also have to 
go to the heart of the faiths of multiple participants, preferably all of the legitimate 
participants,55 if it were to stand a chance of being accepted as a satisfactory 
answer. 
Briefly stated, the answers include: 
1. None 
2. Helping all believers to realise that there is no true faith (i.e. all faiths 
are equally wrong) 
3. Helping believers of other faiths to recognise the one true faith 
4. Helping believers to realise that the different faiths are components of 
the one true faith  
5. Helping believers to recognise that there is no current faith that 
qualifies as the one true faith but that mankind is collectively en route 
to it and the dialogue is part of the journey (open-ended, see 6, below) 
6. Helping to bring about the creation of a single world faith (close-
ended, see 5, above) 
7. Other, not yet formulated or discovered56 
 
Below, I shall address each of these hypothetical answers in turn, testing them 
against the stated and implied objectives of major players in the modern inter-
religious dialogue. 
1. None 
                                            
55  Some illegitimate participants, which I have discussed at length elsewhere, include, but are not 
limited to satanists, Cargo Cult-like belief systems, beliefs such as those espoused by the 
Heaven’s Gate community (because they have postponed dealing with theological issues), 
which posit extra-terrestrials as the source of humanity’s idea of the Creator and others. 
56  Other potential outcomes of dialogue within the confines and with all the limitations of the 
dialogue as currently practised have been formulated by others. See, for example, Kozlovic, 
Anton Karl, “Seven Logical Consequences of Interreligious Dialoguing: A Taxonomy of Praxis 
Possibilities” in Marburg Journal of Religion, Volume 8, Number 1, September 2003. 
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Although the concept of nothing tends to receive a generally negative 
reception in this proactive, positive, forward-thrusting world, it may actually be 
a positive answer. It may very well be possible that the current inter-religious 
dialogue has no relation to the core business of religions today. It may be 
restricted to dealing with the secondary issues, with the participants agreeing 
to suspend the core dialogue as such and to concentrate on the secondary 
issues (from a theological point of view) that unite them. 
 
2. Helping all believers to realise that there is no single True faith (i.e. all 
faiths are in error to greater or lesser degrees).  
Under this scenario, all extant belief systems are equally flawed. Whether that 
means that there might ever be a single True faith or that we are destined to 
persist in ignorance is a question that this solution would have to then deal 
with. 
 
3. Helping believers of other faiths to recognise the one True faith 
The implication of this is that dialogue is ‘mission’ as it has traditionally been 
viewed, and the participants are mutually trying to convert one another. The 
powers of persuasion – or divine revelation – that this would require have 
been lacking or absent these past several millennia and I see no reason why 
that situation should change now.. 
 
4. Helping believers to realise that the different faiths are components of 
the One True Faith  
This would require at least some of the faiths and/or believers to accept that 
they have been in error and the adherents of one faith to stand fast in the 
face of the same type of criticism that others are giving to them. A corollary to 
this possible answer, and one that is quite often heard is that dialogue serves 
to help believers of other faiths be better Hindus, Muslims, Christians, Jews, 
etc., etc. The assumption here is that there is value in the Other’s faith that 
we should help them to hold on to and develop. 
 
5. Helping believers to recognise that there is no current faith that 
qualifies as the One True Faith but that mankind is collectively en route 
to it and the dialogue is part of the journey (open-ended, see 6, below) 
Ernst Troeltsch57 supported this position to a certain degree, seeing even in 
Christianity a belief that had quite a long way to go before reaching its final 
form, at which point it would converge with all the other religions in an 
Orwellian ‘all religions are equal but some religions are more equal than 
others’ formulation. New Age adherents are particular supporters of this 
perspective. In an interview for a paper during my Master’s period, one 
                                            
57  Cf. Troeltsch, The absoluteness of Christianity and the history of religions  
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influential Dutch New Age figure, Ronald-Jan Heijn suggested the image of 
being on Jesus’ way, but riding in Buddha’s vehicle.58 One might also think in 
this regard of the Unitarian Universalist Association. 
 
6. Helping to bring about the creation of a single world faith (close-ended, 
see 5, above) 
In this scenario, the participants in the dialogue become or are made aware 
that they are inadequate, as in scenario 5, but that the end is in sight, and 
that everyone should contribute to achieving it. Ba’hai might serve as an 
example of this scenario. 
 
7. Other, not yet formulated or discovered 
Self-explanatory. 
 
To attempt to answer the question of whether any of these possible answers is 
acceptable as an explanation of the theological purpose or use of inter-religious 
dialogue, I shall look at each one through the prism of the World Council of 
Churches guidelines on dialogue. Not because I necessarily privilege those 
above other organisations’ or individuals’ guidelines, but because any acceptable 
answer has to be applicable to all the participants, including the WCC. If it cannot 
apply to them,, then it is, by definition, irrelevant regardless of whether it applies 
to anyone else. 
The first and seventh I shall leave to the end as they may justifiably be 
considered to be two sides of the same coin, a coin that need only come into play 
if the other options have been exhausted. 
The second answer states that the theological objective would be to help all 
believers understand that there is no single True Faith, that all are in error. 
Articles 12 and 13 of the World Council’s Ecumenical considerations for 
dialogue and relations with people of other religions, quickly rules this option out: 
12. As witnesses, we approach inter-religious relations and 
dialogue in commitment to our faith. At the heart of Christian 
belief is faith in the triune God. We affirm that God, the Father, 
is creator and sustainer of all creation. We hold the life, death 
and resurrection of Jesus Christ as the centre of God's 
redeeming work for us and for the world. The Holy Spirit 
confirms us in this faith, renewing our lives and leading us into 
all truth.  
                                            
58  Hinayana: the vehicle of individual liberation; Mahayana: the vehicle of universal salvation; 
Vajrayana: the vehicle of tantra.  
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13. We are convinced that we have been called to witness in 
the world to God's healing and reconciling work in Christ. We 
do this humbly acknowledging that we are not fully aware of 
the ways in which God's redeeming work will be brought to its 
completion. We now see only dimly, as in a mirror, for we now 
know only in part and do not have the full knowledge of what 
God has in store (cf. 1 Cor. 13.12-13).  
Clearly, adherents of this position cannot accept that their faith is ‘wrong’ in 
the meaning of the formulation of this possible option, thereby ruling it out. 
 
In possible solution number three, dialogue participants would be trying to help 
those whom they are in dialogue with to realise the one True Faith, in this case 
Christianity. 
Article 17 of the Guidelines states that  
Salvation belongs to God. We therefore dare not stand in 
judgement of others. While witnessing to our own faith, we 
seek to understand the ways in which God intends to bring 
God's purposes to their fulfilment.  
Those in dialogue according to the WCC’s principles, then, are not actively 
engaged in conversion or proselytising activities as such. And further, in Article 
23: 
In dialogue we strive towards mutual respect. Dialogue 
partners are responsible for hearing and listening to the self-
understanding of each other's faith. Trust and confidence 
comes from allowing partners to define themselves, refraining 
from proselytism, and providing an opportunity for mutual 
questioning, and if appropriate justified criticism. (italics mine. 
DS) Such practices promote an informed understanding of 
each other, which becomes the basis for all other relationships.  
In option four, dialogue participants are helping one another to see that all 
faiths are part of a single larger Faith, in this case, Christianity. This would be the 
‘invisible Christianity’ and ‘anonymous Christians’ that have so enraged some 
non-Christians in recent years. 
Hinduism, in this option, is filled with Christians and all that is good in 
Hinduism is a sub-set, or weak echo of what there already is in Christianity. So, 
too, with Islam, albeit with perhaps a different sub-set. 
Article 14 of the WCC’s Guidelines, however, closes this door to us: 
Many Christians have found it difficult to make sense of, or 
relate creatively to, the reality of other religious traditions. 
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However, as Christians, we believe that the Spirit of God is at 
work in ways beyond our understanding (cf. John 3. 8). The 
activity of the Spirit is beyond our definitions, descriptions and 
limitations. We should seek to discern the Spirit's presence 
where there is "love, joy, peace, patience, kindness, goodness, 
faithfulness, gentleness, and self-control" (Gal. 5. 22-23). The 
Spirit of God is groaning with our spirit. The Spirit is at work to 
bring about the redemption of the whole created order (Rom. 
8. 18 - 27).  
And in Article 18: 
Dialogue must be a process of mutual empowerment, not a 
negotiation between parties who have conflicting interests and 
claims. Rather than being bound by the constraints of power 
relations, partners in dialogue should be empowered to join in 
a common pursuit of justice, peace and constructive action for 
the good of all people.  
In option five, all the participants agree that, while there is no single true Faith 
yet, there is one in reality and we are all en route to it together. 
Here, the same objection as applied to option two again makes itself felt. The 
WCC member churches do not believe that there is no single true Faith. Even if 
there may be more, (see option four, above), Christianity in their view is True. 
Perhaps, not fully, as we “see through a glass darkly,” but True nonetheless. 
And finally, in option six, the participants are all working towards the 
realisation of a single universal, True Faith. 
All the reasons that have negated the previous options combine to render this 
one ineffective as a possible theological motivation for inter-religious dialogue as 
it is currently being conducted. 
Before I return to consider the possibilities offered by options 1 and 7, I would 
like to digress slightly to consider an aspect of the dialogue that has so far, both 
here and elsewhere, received remarkably little comment as regards inter-religious 
dialogue: the religious aspect. 
One of the most-often cited motivations for engaging in inter-religious dialogue 
is to lessen tensions between and among religious groups and to work together 
to improve the world. 
This familiarisation dialogue, in which the participants try to learn more about 
one another and so prevent problems has several problems associated with it, 
not least of which is that it appears to be remarkably ineffective. Not only have we 
had the disappointing example of the Catholics and Protestants of Northern 
Ireland for the past forty years, more recently we have the ten-year long conflict 
in the Balkans, where Catholics, Orthodox and Muslims have set about one 
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another with remarkable frequency and intensity. And Israel and Palestine, now 
in its sixth decade of discord with few signs of easing tensions. 
More broadly, we have many Muslim organisations threatening violence and 
actually carrying it out (as of this writing, most recently in Madrid in March 2004 
with nearly 200 fatalities) against what the perpetrators claim is a Christian-
Zionist Crusader conspiracy. 
It is also unclear to me whether in this familiarisation dialogue A is trying to let 
B get to know him so that B won’t attack A or whether A is trying to get to know B 
so that A won’t attack B. 
Regardless of which is the case, the logic behind both is flawed. 
If A is trying to let B get to know him so that B won’t attack A, the implication is 
that it is B’s ignorance that is causing the trouble. The dialogue is then trying to 
remove B’s ignorance. The implication here is that if B’s prejudices were correct, 
B would be justified in attacking A. If A is trying to get know B so that A won’t 
attack B, the implication is that there is something about B that, if it were true, 
would justify A attacking him. The purpose of the dialogue then is to establish that 
that aspect is lacking, thereby removing A’s justification for attacking him. 
Whatever else they may be, neither of those motivations may be said to be 
theological in origin, and can therefore not serve as an answer to our query. 
A further complicating factor is the uncertainty of the ‘religious’ element of 
inter-religious dialogue. 
Whether operating from a sincerely felt desire to end conflict among the 
adherents of the various religions, or wanting to promote better conduct based on 
principles explicitly arising from the faiths they profess, the dialogue itself is not 
about addressing core issues of the religions with an intention to modify them in a 
substantive way. That may be justification for holding a dialogue on those 
secondary issues (see below) among religions or among believers from different 
religions, but then it becomes a dialogue by religions and not a religious 
dialogue.59 
In other words, an inter-religious dialogue must be constrained by some 
element of content to faith-based organisations or individuals. With its current 
focus on simply finding out what the Others believe, learning to work together on 
mundane projects, and learning that the Others are not the demons we may have 
believed, the dialogue does not meet this criterion sufficiently. 
Furthermore, all of these elements combine to create a negative motivation for 
a dialogue that is not about fundamental issues. We are talking among ourselves 
                                            
59  See also Smart, Ninian, Dimensions of the Sacred: An Anatomy of the World’s Beliefs, (Berkley: 
University of California Press), 1996. 
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in order to not kill one another and to work together to reduce war, pollution, 
poverty, human rights violations, etc. 
These are all goals worth striving for, but they also contain within them the 
seed of the potential destruction of the dialogue. If the dialogue were ever to get 
to the stage where the religions had exchanged all possible information about 
one another, had decided that the Others were valuable human beings whose 
beliefs did not justify killing and/or converting then, had ended poverty, pollution, 
etc., there would be no further reason to carry on the dialogue. 
On the basis of the above, and in consideration of the stated and observed 
motivations for the modern inter-religious dialogue, I come to the conclusion that 
either options number 1 or 7 are the only choices left open to us: 
Either there is no theological purpose of inter-religious dialogue and we should 
simply accept that and get on with our lives, continuing the mundane dialogue 
between and among the different faiths in the limited context that we have grown 
accustomed to, or there is a theological purpose, but it has not yet been 
formulated and brought into active play. That is a separate, but related, issue 
from whether it should be brought into play. That will form part of the discussion 
of the next part of this investigation. 
 
Secondary issues and the concept of husbandry 
In this chapter, I have referred several times to ‘ secondary issues.’ That merits 
some further explanation. 
‘Secondary’ is often logically interpreted as signifying ‘less value than 
“primary”,’ but for my purposes that is only partly true. I use ‘secondary’ to refer to 
issues which, however important, do not speak to the stated ultimate goal of a 
faith. They may be important as expressions of values which the faith calls for 
and elicits from believers, but carrying them out is not the primary goal of the 
religion. 
As an example, the oft-stated goal of Christianity is the salvation of each 
individual human soul so that it can be and will be reunited with God in Heaven, 
rather than being damned for eternity.  Once someone has become a Christian, 
there are some behaviours and attitudes which will be expected, based on the 
statements of Jesus in the Gospels, often as further worked out in the Epistles, 
by the Church Fathers and in proclamations by the Church. These include loving 
those who hate you, no divorce, no fornication, honesty in dealings with others, 
and others. 
Similar statements may also be made in respect of Islam. One of the Five 
Pillars of Islam, for example, is giving to charity to help those who are less able to 
help themselves. 
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Another important element is the question of good husbandry based on the 
Creation stories of Genesis, and specifically Genesis 1: 26-28.  
26 Then God said, "Let us make man in our image, in our 
likeness, and let them rule over the fish of the sea and the 
birds of the air, over the livestock, over all the earth, [a] and 
over all the creatures that move along the ground."  
27 So God created man in his own image, in the image of God 
he created him; male and female he created them.  
28 God blessed them and said to them, "Be fruitful and 
increase in number; fill the earth and subdue it. Rule over the 
fish of the sea and the birds of the air and over every living 
creature that moves on the ground."  
 
This has been interpreted as giving humanity the responsibility to tend the 
world as a garden or farm, to ensure that the environment is sustained and can 
sustain the people who have been placed here.60 This God-given duty, however, 
is not often seen as the primary purpose of the creation of humanity, either in a 
Jewish or Christian context, but as an assignment to be carried out.  Not an 
unimportant assignment, to be sure, but also not the principle purpose. In fact, 
the Christian should believe that this Earthly system will eventually pass away, to 
be replaced by a New Earth.61 In that regard, while the need to care for the poor 
and the environment, to put an end to hostilities, etc., are a logical result of the 
values that the religious will adopt when they become Christians, and can be 
seen as a fulfilment of a Divine assignment, they are secondary when seen 
against the backdrop of the ultimate purpose of, for example, Christianity. That 
does not mean that they are not important or that they should be abandoned, but 
the primary purpose of the Faith is something else.  
 
                                            
60  See, for example, Boersma, Jan J., Thora en Stoa over mens en natuur. Een bijdrage aan het 
mileudebat over duurzaamheid en kwaliteit. (Baarn, Netherlands: Uitgeverij G.F. Callenbach 
b.v.), 1997. 
61 cf. Romans 8:20–22, 2 Peter 3:13, Revelation 21:1, Hebrews 1:10–12 
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IV. Models of dialogue 
As with every discussion, it will be important for what follows to first set a 
paradigm, a hermeneutic framework in order for the reader to be clear about my 
assumptions and starting points. That may even be more than usually critical in 
the meta-discussion that we are here engaged in about dialogue. 
Any inter-religious dialogue model with ambitions for completeness will be 
based on a combination of several components. 
First, there will be a starting point based on the, for want to a better word, 
political relations among the religions prior to the commencement of the dialogue. 
Second, the mutual perception of the religions, their intrinsic value and their 
participation in the Truth will be an important consideration. 
Third, the motivation for wanting to enter into dialogue, either to achieve a 
particular goal or to forestall a particular eventuality. 
Fourth, the immediate objective that the participants hope to achieve. 
And finally, the form the dialogue is to take. 
The third and fourth points may seem interchangeable, but in fact, they are 
not. 
One’s motivation for entering into dialogue, for example, might be to prevent 
the outbreak of hostilities among adherents of the different groups. An associated 
objective, on the other hand, might very well be, inter alia, achieving regular 
meetings of adherents to keep lines of communication open. An alternative 
objective might be to develop ongoing study groups to increase and maintain 
mutual familiarity over time.  
In the following section, I shall look at the way various theorists have looked at 
each of these components. I shall then try to determine whether the writers we 
have heretofore looked at can be placed within a model based on a mix of those 
components. 
 
1. Starting points: Inter-religious relations 
Before dialogue can begin, the participants must have arrived at a particular 
place in terms of attitude. That attitude will reflect basic attitudes and intentions of 
both institutions and individuals towards one another. 
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Spanish theologian Raimon Panikkar62 has identified five positions which will 
determine the nature and set the tone of the communication between and among 
faiths: 
• isolation and ignorance 
• indifference and contempt 
• rejection and conquest 
• co-existence and communication 
• appropriation and dialogue 
In a condition of isolation and ignorance, the faiths will know little or nothing of 
one another, but will also have little interaction because of their mutual isolation. 
In this situation, no dialogue is possible. 
When in contact, but in a condition of indifference and contempt, religious 
adherents will be convinced of their own faith’s – and perhaps their own individual 
– superiority. Social intercourse, however, may be peaceful, thanks to the 
element of indifference: the members of one group simply can’t be bothered to 
worry about the Other. 
In an environment of rejection and conquest, adherents do care about the 
Other, but only as an object to be crushed and, if possible, eliminated. 
Religions in a condition of co-existence and communication will already have 
made some contacts and have reached a point where they are capable of having 
relations that do not involve destroying, eliminating or subjugating the other.  
And finally, those who have achieved a state of appropriation and dialogue, 
have reached a degree of unity, at least in terms of their relations with one 
another. Their social intercourse may be said to be the equivalent of being 
members of the same group, albeit with different beliefs and opinions. 
In my view, these stages do not necessarily represent an ascending 
chronological progression and, as we shall see in the discussion below of the  
case in India,  it is quite possible to move from a condition of co-existence to one 
of rejection and conquest. 
 
2. Mutual perception: the view of the Other 
The second component to the dialogue model is based on the view of the 
Other. I think it would not be unreasonable to say that modern discussions of 
inter-religious dialogue have as a starting point that there are three categories 
                                            
62  Panikkar, Raimon, El Diálogo Indispensable: Paz entre las religiones, (Barcelona: Ediciones 
Peninsula), 2003, p 24. It is interesting to note that the Spanish title, which translates directly 
into English as “The Indispensable Dialogue: Peace among the religions” differs slightly from 
the original Italian title, which translates into English as: “The indispensable encounter: Dialogue 
of the religions.” 
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which all forms of dialogue must seriously address at some point, regardless of 
any other principles that guide them: whether the dialogue is inclusivist, 
exclusivist and syncretist.  
The inclusivist position, represented strongly if not led by such writers as John 
Hick and Paul Knitter, sees in “all”63 religions a part of the truth that is withheld 
from mere mortals.64 All paths are therefore equally valid. Or, more to the point: 
all paths are equally invalid. While making that distinction – valid vs. not valid – 
may appear to be unnecessary sophistry, it is, in fact, quite important for the 
inclusivist discussion as it is carried out. If I take the position that my religion is as 
valid, i.e. true, as yours, I actually require no input from you. The dialogue, 
therefore, while it may be interesting and even engaging, is essentially 
unnecessary. If, on the other hand, I take the position that both of our religions 
are equally invalid, i.e. untrue, because they are incomplete for whatever reason, 
then I am beholden to engage with you in the pursuit for the Truth that we both 
seek. That removes or at least reduces the arrogant posturing the would be 
required if I were trying to convince you of the superiority of the path I follow. And 
that also characterises the inclusivist dialogue of today, in which each participant 
non-judgementally listens to the positions of the Other. 
Much has been written and said about how dialogues are to be conducted 
according to the inclusivist model. The principles may be encapsulated in 
formalised systems, such as Leonard Swidler’s “Dialogue Decalogue,”65 Paul 
Knitter’s “How to Dialogue,”66 and the guidelines drawn up by the World Council 
of Churches. 
                                            
63  The use of ‘all’—which goes back farther than Troeltsch et al—is, in my opinion, highly 
contentious. What is usually meant is ‘all major’ religions, including the Abrahamic religions, 
major Asian religions and philosophies (such as Confucianism), and increasingly, African tribal 
religions and some of the New Age religions. What is usually not included are such things as 
Satanism, Norse neo-pagan belief systems and some others. I have discussed this difficulty at 
some length in Suchard, D, Faith without Borders. 
64  Some authors make a distinction between ‘inclusivist’, in which Christians accept “the salvic 
richness of other faiths, but then views this richness as the result of Christ’s redemptive work” 
and pluralist, which, from a Christian perspective, “moves away from insistence on the 
superiority or finality of Christ and Christianity towards a recognition of the independent validity 
of other ways.”  See for example, John Hick and Paul F. Knitter, The Myth of Christian 
Uniqueness. Toward a pluralistic theology of religions, (Maryknoll: Orbis Books), Seventh 
Edition, 1998, p. viii. For my purposes, ‘inclusivist’ has the meaning of Knitter’s ‘pluralist’.  
65 Swidler, Leonard, Dialogue Decalogue, in The Journal of Ecumenical Studies, 20:1 (1984).  
66  Knitter, Paul, John B. Cobb, Jr., Monika Hellwig and Leonard Swidler, Death or Dialogue: From 
the Age of Monologue to the Age of Dialogue. (Philadelphia: Trinity International), 1990. 
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Many of the formalised systems have elements in common with those 
encapsulated in Swidler’s Dialogue Decalogue. An abridged version is shown 
below. 
First commandment: The primary purpose of dialogue is to 
learn, that is, to change and grow in the perception and 
understanding of reality, and then to act accordingly.  
Second commandment: Inter-religious, inter-ideological 
dialogue must be a two-sided project - within each religious or 
ideological community and between religious or ideological 
communities.  
Third commandment: Each participant must come to the 
dialogue with complete honesty and sincerity.  
Fourth commandment: In inter-religious, inter-ideological 
dialogue we must not compare our ideals with our partner's 
practice, but rather our ideals with our partner's ideals, our 
practice with our partner's practice.  
Fifth commandment: Each partner must define 
himself…Conversely, the interpreted must be able to recognise 
herself in the interpretation.  
Sixth commandment: Each participant must come to the 
dialogue with no hard-and-fast assumptions as to where the 
points of disagreement are.  
Seventh commandment: Dialogue can take place only 
between equals…Both must come to learn from each other.  
Eighth commandment: Dialogue can take place only on the 
basis of mutual trust.  
Ninth commandment: Persons entering into inter-religious, 
interideological dialogue must be at least minimally self-critical 
of both themselves and their own religious or ideological 
traditions.  
Tenth commandment: Each participant eventually must 
attempt to experience the partner's religion or ideology "from 
within"; for a religion or ideology is not merely something of the 
head, but also of the spirit, heart, and "whole being," individual 
and communal. 
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In Christianity, the exclusivist position, which fairly describes the position of 
the Roman Catholic Church, many Fundamentalist67 churches, and others, 
believes that whatever value one may find in other religions, it has the highest, if 
not the only, truth. Only through the one faith can one achieve salvation, paradise 
or unification with God. The exclusivist position is also well represented in Islam. 
It has a negative side, which is used to justify the acts of independent terrorists, 
such as Al-Qa’ida, the Muslim Brotherhood and others, and of some state 
activities, including prohibition of proselytisation in Muslim countries and support 
of anti-Western groups. On its positive side, it itself proselytises to extend the 
reach of the House of Islam. 
The most concise exclusivist statement may well be that included in the 
Roman Catholic Catechism: 
39. In defending the ability of human reason to know God, the 
Church is expressing her confidence in the possibility of 
speaking about him to all men and with all men, and therefore 
of dialogue with other religions, with philosophy and science, 
as well as with unbelievers and atheists.  
When linked with the statement in the Decree for the (see above, p. 20), it 
becomes clear that, although what ‘dialogue’ itself may be is not set out in the 
catechism, it is about conveying the Church’s view of God to others. That is also 
reinforced in a Papal encyclical, Ecclesium Suam, where dialogue is defined as 
part of the mission to communicate the gospel to everyone, because “[i]n order to 
share Christ with the world, the Church must first meet the world and talk with it.” 
Less clear is whether the Church has anything to learn about God from other 
religions. That point is taken up in other documents. In Nostra Aetate, for 
example, the question is dealt with at more length: 
From ancient times down to the present, there is found among 
various peoples a certain perception of that hidden power 
which hovers over the course of things and over the events of 
human history; at times some indeed have come to the 
recognition of a Supreme Being, or even of a Father. This 
perception and recognition penetrates their lives with a 
profound religious sense.  
                                            
67  I use the term Fundamentalist (with capital) here and further to distinguish between those 
churches who have developed according to their vision of being “fundamental in doctrine” and 
those Christians, Jews, Muslims and others who are simply labelled fundamentalist by 
outsiders, regardless of their own beliefs.  
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Religions, however, that are bound up with an advanced 
culture have struggled to answer the same questions by 
means of more refined concepts and a more developed 
language. Thus in Hinduism, men contemplate the divine 
mystery and express it through an inexhaustible abundance of 
myths and through searching philosophical inquiry. They seek 
freedom from the anguish of our human condition either 
through ascetical practices or profound meditation or a flight to 
God with love and trust. Again, Buddhism, in its various forms, 
realises the radical insufficiency of this changeable world; it 
teaches a way by which men, in a devout and confident spirit, 
may be able either to acquire the state of perfect liberation, or 
attain, by their own efforts or through higher help, supreme 
illumination. Likewise, other religions found everywhere try to 
counter the restlessness of the human heart, each in its own 
manner, by proposing "ways," comprising teachings, rules of 
life, and sacred rites. The Catholic Church rejects nothing that 
is true and holy in these religions. She regards with sincere 
reverence those ways of conduct and of life, those precepts 
and teachings which, though differing in many aspects from 
the ones she holds and sets forth, nonetheless often reflect a 
ray of that Truth which enlightens all men. Indeed, she 
proclaims, and ever must proclaim Christ "the way, the truth, 
and the life" (John 14:6), in whom men may find the fullness of 
religious life, in whom God has reconciled all things to Himself.  
 Nostra Aetate,68 
There may, thus, be something in other faiths, but it is only a reflection of the 
ray of Truth. The Church must proclaim “Christ (…) in whom men may find the 
fullness of religious life, in whom God has reconciled all things to Himself.”69 
This point was made even more strongly by Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger,70 
Prefect of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, in an address during the 
meeting of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith with the presidents of 
the Doctrinal Commissions of the Bishops’ Conferences of Latin America, held in 
Guadalajara, Mexico, in May 1996. 
                                            
68  Gioia, Francesco (Ed.), Interreligious Dialogue. The official teaching of the Catholic Church 
(1963-1995),  (Boston: Pauline Books and Media), pp. 37-38. 
69  Ibid. 
70  Now Pope Benedict XVI 
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The presentation, entitled “Relativism: The Central Problem for Faith Today,” 
can be seen equally as an attack on and a defence against, the relativism 
represented by the inclusivist position, especially as represented by the American 
Presbyterian John Hick and the former Catholic priest Paul Knitter. 
On the other hand, the notion of dialogue – which has 
maintained a position of significant importance in the Platonic 
and Christian tradition-changes meaning and becomes both 
the quintessence of the relativist creed and the antithesis of 
conversion and the mission. In the relativist meaning, to 
dialogue means to put one’s own position, i.e., one’s faith, on 
the same level as the convictions  
of others without recognising in principle more truth in it than 
that which is attributed to the opinion of the others. Only if I 
suppose in principle that the other can be as right, or more 
right than I, can an authentic dialogue take place. 
According to this concept, dialogue must be an exchange 
between positions which have fundamentally the same rank 
and therefore are mutually relative. Only in this way will the 
maximum cooperation and integration between the different 
religions be achieved. The relativist dissolution of Christology, 
and even more of ecclesiology, thus becomes a central 
commandment of religion. To return to Hick’s thinking, faith in 
the divinity of one concrete person, as he tell us, leads to 
fanaticism and particularism, to the dissociation between faith 
and love, and it is precisely this which must be overcome. 
 
Against that relativism, Cardinal Ratzinger places the incarnate God, the 
Jesus of both history and faith: 
In man there is an inextinguishable yearning for the infinite. 
None of the answers attempted are sufficient. Only the God 
himself who became finite in order to open our finiteness and 
lead us to the breadth of his infiniteness responds to the 
question of our being. For this reason, the Christian faith finds 
man today too. Our task is to serve the faith with a humble 
spirit and the whole strength of our heart and understanding. 
 
Note: “Only the God himself who became finite.” 
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The syncretistic position, for which the late German theologian Dorothee Sölle 
can be considered a proponent at a mystical level,71 and the Ba’hai at an 
operational level, considers that every religion is but pars pro toto and, effectively 
indistinguishable: there is, in fact, only one reality which underlies all religion and 
that should also be reflected in practice. 
Syncretism is anathema to adherents of both the inclusivist and exclusivist 
positions, though for different reasons. For the latter, it is a mirror image: 
everything is backwards. For the former, it represents a conclusion they are not 
willing or able to draw, intent as they are in allowing all participants to remain firm 
in their own traditions and while helping others to grow stronger in theirs. 
Syncretism is increasingly common, both in the advanced societies of the 
West and in Asia and Africa, as well. When South American descendants of the 
aboriginal peoples combine the Spirit of the Mountain with Satan, when Filipinos 
mix Catholicism with visits to pay respects to their ancestors, when clergy such 
as Bishop Milingo in Zambia blend Christianity with “animistic practices and 
paraphernalia,”72 they represent what Church members fear and Church critics 
claim has always been part of Church practice.73 
One’s perception of other religions, one’s theology of pluralism, is crucial to 
the discussion of the inter-religious dialogue, for that will determine how one 
approaches the dialogue. Academically, discussion has sorted itself along three 
basic—though not always clearly demarcated—lines: inclusivism, exclusivism, 
and syncretism. 
There are other dialogue paradigms, of course.  
A widely used typology (…) distinguishes four forms in 
particular: dialogue of life, where people naturally relate 
together across religious boundaries in the course of their daily 
living; social dialogue, where people of various faiths 
collaborate with one another in the cause of peace and justice; 
intellectual dialogue, developing a dialogue which can explore 
different beliefs and their claims to truth; and spiritual dialogue, 
where people open themselves to the force of one another's 
                                            
71  See Sölle, Dorothee, Mystiek en Verzet:’Gij stil geschreeuw’, Harmina van der Vinne (trans.), 
(Baarn, Netherlands: Uitgeverij Ten Have), 1998. 
72  See Mahiaini, Wanyeki, “Shouldn't the boot be on the other foot? OR Isn't it time for the African 
church to teach rather than to be taught? (and certainly not by the pagan West!)” in 
http://www.philipproject.org.uk/justification.htm, (7 February 2004).  
73  Such as the absorption by the Church in England of pagan holy oak trees, as shown by the 
many Holy Oak and Holyoke churches, and virtually all of the modern European and North 
American Christmas celebration. Ironically, one of Raimon Panikkar’s (see above) most 
influential lectures, on Blessed Simplicity, were delivered at Holyoke, Massachusetts, in 1980. 
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religious experiences. In addition to these four, we were 
privileged to witness what might be described as a fifth form of 
dialogue: the sharing of the cultural and artistic expressions of 
different traditions.74  
Notwithstanding the existence of other dialogue paradigms, I have elected to 
follow the inclusivist-exclusivist-sycretist paradigm as being the source of the 
greatest concern or hope among participants. That is because they go right to the 
heart of the dialogue as dialogue and will determine the breaking point, if there is 
to be one. An exclusivist ‘dialogue’ can only go so far before the participants 
agree that they have reached the end of fruitful discussion. An inclusivist one will 
go farther, and a syncretist farther still, but perhaps farther than the participants 
are willing to go. 
Each of these positions has its difficulties as far as dialogue is concerned.  
At the current state of the debate, the inclusivist position is almost entirely 
concerned with what I have termed theologically secondary issues, and those in 
a negative fashion. To wit: in order to reduce poverty, protect the environment, 
promote women’s liberation, prevent nuclear destruction, we have to collectively 
recognise that all paths are equal and enter into discussion on that basis.75  
The exclusivist position, as stated clearly by the Catholic Church, the self-
named Christian Fundamentalists and others, rejects what it perceives as 
relativism by the inclusivists, and affirms that its position is the correct one above 
all others. From the perspective of dialogue, this must a priori lead to failure to 
dialogue on matters theological, though contact on the secondary issues is still 
possible.76 
The much less popular syncretistic position, finds its problems as regards 
dialogue in the fact that virtually no religion wants to be considered just a part of a 
greater whole, which would mean diluting its own messages. Dialogue with a 
syncretistic agenda has, since the time of the first World’s Parliament of 
                                            
74  “Report of a regional consultation of the Network for Inter-Faith concerns in the Anglican 
Communion (NIFCON),” held at United Theological College, Bangalore, 2003 
75  For a clear illustration of this range of positions, see Hick, John and Paul F. Knitter, The Myth of 
Christian Uniqueness: Towards a Pluralistic Theology of Religions, (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis 
Books) 1998. 
76  For a clear outline of one version of this position see, Cardinal Ratzinger Relativism: The 
Central Problem for Faith Today, (http://www.ewtn.com/library/CURIA/RATZRELA.HTM 
(December 2001) (Cardinal Ratzinger, Prefect of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, 
gave this address during the meeting of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith with the 
presidents of the Doctrinal Commissions of the Bishops’ Conferences of Latin America, held in 
Guadalajara, Mexico, in May 1996. Following the publication of Dominus Jesu in 2000, Cardinal 
Ratzinger and others were often in the news defending what many thought was a position 
untenable in these times. 
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Religions, not been possible at an institutional level, nor do I feel that it is likely to 
be any time soon.  
After more than a century of discussion and debate, the basic range of 
positions has not changed very much.. 
I believe, however that the discussion has gone as far as it can under the 
current terms of engagement and that we are collectively now starting to repeat 
ourselves in a circular discussion that, so far, offers little prospect of moving 
beyond this point. 
Whether this must remain so will be discussed at length further. 
 
3. Motivation: why dialogue 
By motivation, I mean the impetus for even considering dialogue. The situation 
at the time of writing, post-11 September 2001, wars involving (primarily) Western 
forces and Muslim regular and irregular forces in Afghanistan, Iraq and 
elsewhere, increasing anti-Semitism in Europe, provides one of the clearest 
motivations in many years for many people: to stop wars and save lives. 
Major motivators for many authors writing before and after 11 September 2001 
also include the sad state of planet Earth environmentally, the inequitable 
distribution of resources among the world’s peoples, the need for equal rights for 
women, the threat of nuclear or other extinction level event. 
 
4. What do we want to achieve: Objectives 
The fourth important part of a dialogue is its objective: why do I want to 
achieve? 
A number of authors have formulated objectives for dialogue in general and 
for inter-religious dialogue in particular. For the World Council of Churches, for 
example, “Dialogue (…) is a fundamental part of Christian service within 
community. In dialogue Christians actively respond to the command to ‘love God 
and your neighbour as yourself’. As an expression of love engagement in 
dialogue testifies to the love experienced in Christ.“77 Dialogue, then, is another 
way of presenting the message of Jesus. Furthermore, it “can be recognised as a 
welcome way of obedience to the commandment of the Decalogue: ‘You shall not 
bear false witness against your neighbour’. Dialogue helps us not to disfigure the 
image of our neighbours of different faiths and ideologies.”78 
Seen from that perspective, dialogue is a way to de-demonise the Other and, 
one may hope, to be de-demonised in the Other’s eyes. 
                                            
77  World Council of Churches, Guidelines for Dialogue 
78 Ibid. 
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The Dialogue and Witness (2003) course at Viriginia Theological Seminary 
(United States), in its Models of Dialogue module, identified three potential 
objectives. 
Socratic dialogue – purpose is to lead someone from 
darkness to life: “I will communicate the truth to you through 
dialogue”. Appears to be the least tolerant or humane. It is 
actually the most humane because it takes the dialogue 
partner seriously and believes that there is an actual truth to be 
found and that with reason it will be found. Everyone is guided 
by a moral truth, not necessarily the right one.  
Personalist – goal is not to persuade someone you have the 
truth, Goal is mutual understanding. Not encounter ideas, goal 
to encounter the mystery of the Other. Buber made most 
popular with book I and Thou. Not dream of converting. Would 
be very rude to do this. Goal of this type of dialogue is to 
encounter the mystery of the person, not the truth of their 
ideas. We are formed by democracy and tend to take the 
presuppositions of wider society to our personal truths. None 
of us is resolved. This form of dialogue is empty. Doesn't say 
anything about you. Your commitments are part of who you 
are.  
Pragmatic – goal is not to persuade someone of the truth or to 
encounter the mystery of the person. Goal is to just get along. 
Only kind of dialogue possible (that) becomes manipulative. 79  
 
Forms of dialogue 
Based on a number of factors including the four components already 
discussed above, but also including such things as the level of the dialogue— 
academic, institutional, national, municipal, neighbourhood or personal, dialogue 
can take a number of forms. 
At the most informal level, it could consist of Muslim and Jewish neighbours 
getting together for coffee and chat. 
At its most formal level, we get to such things as the Council for the 
Parliament of the World Religions. 
In between those two extremes, there are such things as conferences, 
seminars, inter-faith prayer groups, etc., etc. 
                                            
79  http://www.vts.edu/2003/Spring Semester 2002/CCE/comparative Christian ethics Feb 
1491.htm (No longer available; not archived in The Internet Archive). 
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A number of dialogue form models will serve to illustrate. Drawn up by Joseph 
Phelps,80 and presented by the Conflict Research Consortium, University of 
Colorado, these models are intended to deal with specific issues, and, though not 
all are specifically directed at inter-religious dialogue, they offer some useful 
points for that dialogue. 
The Public Conversation Project (PCP) 
This model stems from the approach used by family therapists. 
Representatives of the two sides of the conflict spend the 
evening together. After dinner, they sit in a circle with their 
opponents and answer questions about how they got involved 
in the conflict, what the main issues are and what concerns 
them about their own positions. Then they ask each other 
questions and at the end reflect on their experience of 
participating in the dialogue. There is no pressure to come up 
with solutions or proposals for action. The goal of this dialogue 
is to allow people to talk from their personal experience, rather 
than argue in favour of their positions. 
Common Ground Network for Life and Choice (CGN) 
This model has the goal of helping fighting groups to find 
common ground. First, a steering committee consisting of 
representatives of the two sides meets to discuss possible 
common issues and prepare for a dialogue workshop. Next, a 
few volunteers are trained by someone from CGN to be small-
group facilitators. The workshop itself takes a whole day. 
Participants meet in a large group and introduce themselves 
and their positions on the issue. After that, participants talk 
about their personal experience with the issue in small groups. 
They take true or false test on their beliefs and then try to 
answer the same questions from the position of the opponent. 
This helps to identify similarities, differences and 
misperceptions of the parties about each other. 
The Paired Congregations  
This model brings together two churches to discuss issues of 
mutual concern. The process consists of four two-hour 
sessions dedicated to (1) setting the ground rules and 
exploring why participants are interested in the issue, (2) 
identifying different perspectives on the problem, (3) 
                                            
80  Phelps, Joseph. "Some Contemporary Dialogue Models." MCS Conciliation Quarterly. Spring 
1996. Pp. 9-10. 
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approaching the issue from the position of faith, (4) suggesting 
an action plan for dealing with conflict created by differences in 
views.  
The Interfaith Health Program  
This model (…) unites people of faith on the basis of ethics of 
caring for the poor, sick and needy. It believes that bringing 
them together to do practical work will make them to talk to 
each other. Dialogue becomes a secondary issue, developing 
in the context of practical work for God.  
The four models shown above all have their counterparts in inter-religious 
dialogue, though in somewhat different forms. The first three, the Public 
Conversation Project, the Common Ground Network for Life and Choice, and the 
Paired Congregations, most closely resemble the various formalised styles of 
inter-religious dialogues held at academic and institutional levels. The first two, in 
addition, also refer to groups that are in conflict. The primary difference, though, 
is in the setting of an agenda with, in some instances, plans for resolving divisive 
or troubling issues.  
The fourth model, the Interfaith Health Programme, is characteristic of many 
inter-religious programmes at local levels, when different faith communities come 
together to deal with local problems, without necessarily making faith issues 
central to the activity. Bonding occurs through common action. 
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V. Applying the models 
Having developed some principles by which inter-religious dialogues can be 
modelled, it would greatly simplify matters if those principles could be applied to 
the current inter-religious dialogue to help us advance our inquiry into the 
theological purpose of that dialogue. 
One should actually speak of inter-religious dialogues—plural—for they are 
legion. Within academia, there are books and numerous periodicals which 
regularly feature scholarly articles dealing with inter-religious dialogue. Not to 
speak of the conferences, seminars and other gatherings that scholars and 
researchers participate in. 
Then there are supra-institutional dialogues, such as the Council for a 
Parliament of World Religions, where adherents but not official representatives of 
many of the world’s faiths meet for non-binding discussions. 
More formally, there are the various dialogues conducted by the official 
religious institutions, i.e. churches, synagogues, temples, etc. The dialogues that 
the World Council of Churches members participate in can also be brought under 
this heading, even though each member church, such as the Church of England 
and the Lutherans, may and does also conduct its own dialogue activities. 
On a local level, individual churches, synagogues, mosques and temples, as 
well as individuals in neighbourhood or work settings can engage in dialogue, 
either through local multi-faith organisations or bilaterally. 
Before proceeding, therefore, it will be necessary to examine the various types 
of dialogue as we did we the authors in the first section, and see whether one can 
speak of an inter-religious dialogue. 
In this chapter, then, I want to look at the types of dialogue exemplified by 
a. The World Council of Churches (Geneva, Switzerland) 
b. The Council for a Parliament of World Religions (Chicago, USA) 
c. The Royal Institute of Inter-Faith Studies (Amman, Jordan) 
d. The Edward B. Brueggeman Center for Dialogue (Xavier University, 
Cincinnati, USA) 
 
The World Council of Churches (WCC) 
As discussed in Chapter I, the World Council of Churches has a long record of 
service in inter-religious dialogue, going back to its formation shortly after World 
War II when internal discussions on inter-religious dialogue that had begun at the 
World Missionary Conferences (Edinburgh, 1910 and Jerusalem, 1928) were 
continued at the Amsterdam and Evanston WCC Assemblies and beyond. Those 
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discussions led to the so-called Ajaltoun Memorandum, which led to the creation 
of a new WCC sub-unit concerned with Dialogue with People of Living Faiths and 
Ideologies in 1971. The work on inter-religious dialogue became increasingly 
formalised and organised within the WCC and in 1979, the first “Guidelines on 
Dialogue with People of Living Faiths and Ideologies” was published. 
Those guidelines were revised in 2002, and reissued as “Ecumenical 
Considerations for Dialogue and Relations with People of other Religions.” 
An important element in the Ecumenical Considerations is the motivation 
behind dialogue: why do the participants engage in it? 
Paragraphs 5-9 outline the motivation clearly and, but for one exception in 
formulation, the motivation would be recognised by all the writers we looked at in 
the first section: in the face of increased interaction due to refugee streams and 
economically motivated migration, believers of different religions encounter one 
another more frequently, sometimes in “tension and fear”,81 with the development 
of “communal tensions,”82 in “conflict and violence”83 and in “polarisation.”84 
Applying Panikkar’s list, then, (see page 36) we find an apparent conflict: are 
the societies in conflict or in dialogue? Most likely a combination, with some 
engaging in dialogue to mitigate the conflict of some others. 
The WCC recognises, however, that Christianity contains within itself inherent 
anti-dialogic elements, most notably the core belief in the triune God, including 
the belief that “the life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ (is) the centre of 
God's redeeming work for us and for the world.”85 This need not be limiting for a 
particular type of dialogue, however, inasmuch as  
“(…) we are not fully aware of the ways in which God's 
redeeming work will be brought to its completion. We now see 
only dimly, as in a mirror, for we now know only in part and do 
not have the full knowledge of what God has in store (cf. 1 Cor. 
13.12-13).  
“14. Many Christians have found it difficult to make sense of, or 
relate creatively to, the reality of other religious traditions. 
However, as Christians we believe that the Spirit of God is at 
work in ways beyond our understanding (cf. John 3. 8). The 
                                            
81  “Ecumenical considerations for dialogue and relations with people of other religions”, http:// 
www.wcc-coe.org/wcc/what/interreligious/glines-e.html (2002), Paragraph 5. 
82  Ibid., paragraph 6. 
83  Ibid., paragraph 7. 
84  Ibid., paragraph 8. 
85  Ibid., paragraph 12. 
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activity of the Spirit is beyond our definitions, descriptions and 
limitations. We should seek to discern the Spirit's presence 
where there is "love, joy, peace, patience, kindness, goodness, 
faithfulness, gentleness, and self-control" (Gal. 5. 22-23). The 
Spirit of God is groaning with our spirit. The Spirit is at work to 
bring about the redemption of the whole created order (Rom. 
8. 18 - 27).”86  
Such an attitude precludes triumphalist proselytisation, and creates space for 
one’s dialogue partners to come with their spiritual contributions. One must then 
inquire as to the purpose of such a dialogue, if conversion is not the objective. 
As discussed above, an important element in the dialogue as proposed and 
practised by the WCC is the reduction of social conflicts, tensions, communal 
discord, etc. 
A second, equally important objective is to create relationships that allow 
members of different groups as well as different organisations themselves, to 
participate in dealing with “public issues of moral concern.”87 In order to do so 
effectively, the different religious faiths must “discern their common values, 
decide to what extent they can express themselves with one voice, and discuss 
how they can avoid being manipulated by political forces.”88 
Both of those objectives speak to the ethical rather than the theological 
objectives or purposes of the dialogue. That tone continues in Paragraphs 18-26 
of the Guidelines, which outline the theoretical bases for dialogue. 
Dialogue is 
• A process of mutual empowerment 
• Inspiration to grow in faith 
• An affirmation of hope and life 
• Not an end in itself 
• A means of building bridges of respect and understanding 
• A way to nurture relationships 
• Context-based 
• A striving for mutual respect 
• Cooperative and collaborative 
• Inclusive. 
                                            
86  Ibid., paragraphs 13-14. 
87  Ibid., paragraph 9. 
88  Ibid. 
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And the objective: “(To build) bonds of relationship with those considered ‘the 
other’ is the goal of all dialogues.”89 Neither conversion nor the creation of a new 
religious paradigm is the purpose, therefore. 
The WCC identifies three types of dialogue processes: 
“(…) The most common, multi-lateral and bi-lateral 
dialogues, are where representative groups of people come 
together to discuss a subject relevant to the communities 
concerned. The relationship of religion to the family, to 
education, to the state, etc. has been one subject of discussion 
encouraged by the WCC between Christians and Muslims in 
recent years (bi-lateral dialogue). On the other hand, a multi-
lateral dialogue in India dealt with the theme of "Religious 
Identity in a Multi-Faith Society"; its main aim was to deal with 
the problem of increased violence between religious factions in 
India. In addition to clarifying points of differences, such 
dialogues hope to facilitate the building up of trust and 
openness between religious groups.  
A second type of organized dialogue could be called 
academic dialogue where exponents of different religious 
faiths meet and discuss the theological/philosophical bases of 
their traditions. Here genuine attempts are made to arrive at a 
common appreciation of the way in which each religious 
tradition has sought to explain and approach reality. These 
dialogues help in breaking down prejudices and 
misconceptions accumulated over centuries. They enrich, 
enlarge, challenge and correct the way some religions have 
understood and approached religious life in other traditions.  
Yet another form of dialogue may be described as spiritual 
dialogue. Here believers attempt to meet each other, as it 
were, in the "cave of the heart". They expose themselves to 
each other's spiritual and worship life. Often such dialogues 
take the form of participating in the prayer or mediation 
practices of others. This type of dialogue remains controversial 
because Christians are not agreed on whether it is possible to 
participate in the spiritual life of their neighbours without 
compromising their own faith. “90 
                                            
89  Ibid., paragraph 21. 
90 See http://www.wcc-coe.org/wcc/what/ interreligious/glines-e.html 
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The WCC also has a periodical devoted to inter-religious dialogue in its 
various facets. Current Dialogue, published by the WCC’s Office on Inter-
religious Relations, contains contributions from members of a wide range of 
religious faiths and perspectives. Its contributors primarily include academics and 
clerics and the tone of the articles is uniformly pro-dialogue. 
A quick glance at the contents of the July 2003 issue shows the kinds of 
articles that may be expected in any issue. 
• The Future of Inter-religious Youth Education in the U.S. 
[T]he attacks of September 11 [2001, DS] have underscored the need 
for inter-religious youth education. (…) Given the dramatic nature of 
9/11, the conclusions that youth have drawn about ‘the other’ are not to 
be underestimated. 
• Jews, Muslims and Peace 
With ongoing violence sapping the spirits of Israelis and Palestinians, 
and with the Iraq war generating shock waves throughout the Middle 
East, we call on our fellow Jews and Muslims to join forces with 
concerned Christians to transcend this cycle of death and destruction. 
Jews and Muslims should be spiritual allies, not adversaries. 
• Inter-religious Dialogue, Conflict and Reconciliation 
Differences [among the religions, DS] may be there, but since we are 
each on different paths up the mountain, or on different spokes of a 
wheel, there is no reason for these to lead to conflict. (…) Doctrine is 
better avoided as we search rather for a common ethic, as well as a 
common spirituality. 
• Opportunities and Challenges for Muslim Peacebuilding after 
September 11 
(…)[T]he dramatic turn of events triggered by the attacks on the United 
States on September 11, 2001 has ironically led to an unprecedented 
interests among Americans in Islam and Muslims. (…) The critical 
challenge, however, facing inter-religious advocates is how to sustain 
and transform this renewed inter-religious solidarity and energy into a 
powerful grassroots inter-religious movement for peace and justice. 
• Christian-Muslim Realities: Historical Realities and Today’s 
Relationships 
It is not uncommon to see people rushing to explain terrorist violence in 
the light of what they perceive to be distinctive about Islam. Thus, they 
fail to see that such violence is not grounded in traditional Islamic 
values. 
• Jewish-Christian Dialogue can enrich Christian Hermeneutics 
Dialogue demands the intellectual, moral and, at the limit, religious 
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ability to struggle to hear another and to respond – to respond critically 
and even suspiciously when necessary, but only in dialogical 
relationship to a real, not a projected, other. 
• Understanding Oneself [sic] through the Other 
The Jewish-Christian dialogue has been described as a path for Jews 
and Christians to go from pogrom to peace, from Shoah to shalom, from 
Holocaust to hesed. While this may be shorthand language and the 
Jewish-Christian dialogue certainly addresses more than a tragic past, it 
is true that the Holocaust, the Shoah, more than anything else 
prompted Jews and Christians to examine deeply engrained [sic] roots 
of mistrust, hatred and fear that culminated in one of the worst evils in 
human history. 
• Religious Minority Liaison and Information Centre Religious Freedom 
and the Rights of the Individual Charter of Good Conduct 
The one common thread running through all these articles, and in the vast 
majority of articles in other issues of Current Dialogue is the need for the de-
demonisation of the Other and the need to get along and to cooperate with one 
another in this world, regardless of the Other’s religious orientation.  
 
Council for a Parliament of the World’s Religions (CPWR) 
The revival of the Parliament of the World’s Religions in 1993 to celebrate the 
centenary of the first Parliament of Religions in 1893 led to the creation of the 
Council with a much more clearly and narrowly defined mission than its 
predecessor a hundred years previously.  
The modern Council’s mission is 
“(…) [to] cultivate harmony between the world's religious and 
spiritual communities and foster their engagement with the 
world and its other guiding institutions in order to achieve a 
peaceful, just, and sustainable world.” 91 
Because 
“We live in a world of difference. Yet, we are interdependent. 
Nowhere is learning to live with difference more important than 
religion. Too often, religion is misused as an instrument for 
division and injustice, betraying the very ideals and teachings 
that lie at the heart of each of the world's great traditions. At 
the same time, religious and spiritual traditions shape the lives 
of billions in wise and wonderful ways. They gather people in 
                                            
91  Cf. http://www.cpwr.org/ (2004) 
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communities of shared beliefs and practices. When these 
diverse communities work in harmony for the common good, 
there is hope that the world can be transformed.” 92  
The methodology that CPWR uses, which implements the  ‘co-existence and 
communication’ aspects of Panikkar’s relational list, involves “dialogue and 
nurturing relationships among people of difference.”93 This has resulted in “a 
framework for expressing many visions of a just, peaceful and sustainable future 
(and) [i]n the process, religious and spiritual communities have discovered a 
shared commitment to ethical principles. This shared commitment has opened 
the way for a new era of cooperative action among the world's religious and 
spiritual communities as well as with the world's other guiding institutions. The 
well-being of the Earth and all life depends on such a collaboration.”94  
CPWR’s goals are expressed practically in a host of programmes, ranging 
from awarding the Paul Carus Award for Inter-religious Understanding to 
providing a forum for peace activists to come together in The Goldin Institute for 
International Partnership and Peace to running the InterFaith Service House 
residence for believers of different faiths to running the quadrennial Parliament of 
World Religions and the associated Parliament Academy academic credit 
programme. 
Although its motivation is formulated negatively, as a reaction to division and 
hatred, CPWR has a positively formulated vision: 
“The vision of the Council for a Parliament of the World's 
Religions is of a just, peaceful and sustainable world in which: 
The Earth and all life are cherished, protected, healed 
and restored  
Religious and cultural fears and hatreds are replaced 
with understanding and respect  
People everywhere come to know and care for their 
neighbours  
The richness of human and religious diversity is woven 
into the fabric of communal, civil, societal and global life  
                                            
92  http://www.cpwr.org/what/what.htm (2004) 
93  Ibid. 
94  Ibid. 
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The world's most powerful and influential institutions 
move beyond narrow self-interest to realise the common 
good  
Religious and spiritual communities live in harmony and 
contribute to a better world from their riches of wisdom 
and compassion  
All people commit to living out their highest values and 
aspirations”95  
That positive vision notwithstanding, the keynote document promulgated by 
the CPWR is the Declaration of a Global Ethic. Composed under the leadership 
of Dr. Hans Küng, and published during the 1993 Parliament of World Religions, 
the Declaration begins: 
“The world is in agony. The agony is so pervasive and urgent 
that we are compelled to name its manifestations so that the 
depth of this pain may be made clear.  
Peace eludes us ... the planet is being destroyed ... neighbours 
live in fear ... women and men are estranged from each other 
... children die!  
This is abhorrent [emphasis theirs. DS] 
We condemn the abuses of Earth's ecosystems.  
We condemn the poverty that stifles life's potential; the hunger 
that weakens the human body, the economic disparities that 
threaten so many families with ruin.  
We condemn the social disarray of the nations; the disregard 
for justice which pushes citizens to the margin; the anarchy 
overtaking our communities; and the insane death of children 
from violence. In particular we condemn aggression and hatred 
in the name of religion.”96 
The solution identified and endorsed by this group of believers for dealing with 
this litany of complaints, however, is an ethical and not a theological declaration. 
The Global Ethic, in fact, contains not a single reference to a deity, a revealed 
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96  Küng, Hans (Ed.), Declaration Toward a Global Ethic, Global Ethic Foundation for inter-cultural 
and inter-religious research, education, encounter (1993), p. 2 
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Truth, a transcendent reality, or any of the several and various attributes common 
to religions. At one level, that is to be expected…the Declaration is not an attempt 
to syncretise a new belief, but rather an effort to find a modus vivendi for the 
inhabitants of the Earth involving sustainable development of people and the 
environment. 
The Royal Institute of Inter-Faith Studies 
The Royal Institute for Inter-Faith Studies, based in Amman, Jordan, was 
established in 1994 under the patronage of Prince El Hassan bin Talal, brother to 
the then-king of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Hussein, and uncle to the 
current king, Abdullah. 
When it was founded, the focus of the Institute was to provide “a venue in the 
Arab world for the interdisciplinary study and rational discussion of religion and 
religious issues, with particular reference to Christianity in Arab and Islamic 
society.”97 
RIIFS was originally intended “to serve as a centre for the study of Christian 
and Jewish traditions in the Arab/Islamic world and for the enhancement of 
understanding of regional diversity with a view to lessening Middle Eastern 
tensions. Initially focusing on religion, religious diversity and the Middle East, the 
Institute has broadened its scope to encompass the interdisciplinary study of 
cultural interaction world-wide.”98 
More recently the focus has expanded to “include all issues pertaining to 
religious, cultural and civilisational diversity, regionally and globally.”99 
Reflecting its academic nature, the principal vehicle for RIIFS publications (in 
its English-language programme) is the semi-annual Bulletin. 
The Bulletin has mirrored the shift in the Institute’s focus. A glance at the table 
of contents from the first issue (Spring 1999) show an overwhelming emphasis on 
religious issues. 
Abdul-Rahim Abu Husayn. Duwayhi as a Historian of Ottoman 
Syria  
Zayde G. Antrim. Renegotiating Islam: The Reception of al-
Ashmawi's Al-Islam al-Siyasi in the Egyptian Press  
Gerald Obermeyer. Civilization and Religion in Ancient South 
Arabia  
                                            
97  http://www.riifs.org/purpose/purpose.htm (2004) 
98  HRH Prince El Hassan bin Talal, Lessening Tensions in a Tumultuous World: The Royal 
Institute for Inter-Faith Studies, in Forced Migration Review Number 13, (June 2002),. P. 47 
http://www.fmreview.org/FMRpdfs/FMR13/fmr13.18.pdf (2004). 
99  Ibid. 
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L. Michael Spath. Riccoldo da Monte Croce: Medieval Pilgrim 
and Traveller to the Heart of Islam  
Articles from the Conference on Religion and Community: 
Crosscultural Patterns of Coexistence in Contemporary 
Society 
Gerald Obermeyer. Introduction  
Klaus-Peter Köpping. Collective Identity and the Discourse on 
Cultural Hegemony in Japanese Syncretism 
John Crook. The Struggle for Political Representation in 
Ladakh 
John A. Saliba. Understanding New Religious Sects in 
America: The Search for Community 
Seteney Shami. Islam in the Post-Soviet Space: Imaginative 
Geographies of the Caucasus and Central Asia  
 
More recently, however, articles of a religious nature have taken a more 
modest position among other articles. The Spring/Summer 2003 issue of the 
Bulletin consisted entirely of papers from the conference on health and social 
justice. The Fall/Winter 2002 issue did have more religiously oriented articles, but 
not overwhelmingly so. 
Essay 
Michael C. Hudson. Information Technology, International 
Politics and Political Change in the Arab World 
 
Articles 
S. Nomanul Haq. Greek Alchemy or Shi`i Metaphysics? A 
Preliminary Statement Concerning Jabir ibn Hayyan's zahir 
and batin 
Jan Nederveen Pieterse. Fault Lines of Transnationalism: 
Borders Matter 
Axel Havemann. Historiography in 20th-Century Lebanon: 
Between Confessional Identity and National Coalescence 
 
RIIFS also has an Arabic-language programme, with a quarterly publication, 
Al-Nashra. Al-Nashra focuses on inter-religious issues particularly between Islam 
and Christianity in a Middle East context. 
An analysis of the Bulletin articles appears to show two things. First, that the 
inter-religious focus of the Institute seems to be aimed at the de-demonisation of 
the Other, especially Islam, by trying to show what Islam really is. Second, that 
there are cultures and civilisations involved that affect and are affected by 
religions. 
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Whether the decision to shift the focus from the religious to the inter-cultural or 
inter-civilisational pre- or post-dates the publication of Samuel Huntington’s The 
Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order is beside the point. It is, 
however, worth noting the similarity between the visions of RIIFS and Huntington: 
“In the modern world, religion is a central, perhaps the (italics 
Huntington’s. DS) central force that motivates and mobilises 
people. (…) The Cold War division of humanity is over. The 
more fundamental divisions of humanity in terms of ethnicity, 
religions and civilisations remain and spawn new conflicts.”100 
It will be interesting to see in the future whether RIIFS continues further along 
the path it has most recently gone down, leaving religion slowly behind as cultural 
and civilisational issues are given prominence. Should that occur, then yet 
another commentator would have ignored the crucial role that religion plays in 
modern society, as Huntington correctly reminds us. 
The Edward B. Brueggeman Center for Dialogue 
The Edward B. Brueggeman Center for Dialogue, associated with the Roman 
Catholic institution Xavier University of Cincinnati, Ohio, USA, is named after 
Edward Brueggeman, S.J., former chairman of Xavier's department of theology 
and a leading figure in the mid-western United States for interfaith cooperation. 
Brueggeman hosted a regional television programme, ‘Dialog’ which ran for more 
than 20 years. 
The Center that bears his name is relatively young, having had its inaugural 
event in 2000. It positions itself as a centre for dialogue in opposition to the model 
of polemical monologue that the media-dominated modern Western world offers. 
Proceeding on the basis of principles stated by Hans Kung and the Parliament 
of World Religions (“There will be no peace in the world until there is peace 
among the religions and there will be no peace among the religions until there is 
dialogue among the religions.”101), the Center sees its mission as fostering 
dialogue in order to resolve many of the world’s problems, many of which it feels 
are caused by the “lack of dialogue among the religions.”102 
The Brueggeman Center’s focus is on dialogue that is 
1) inter-religious,  
2) interdisciplinary 
                                            
100  Huntington, Samuel P. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, (London: 
The Free Press), 2002, pp. 66-67. 
101  http://www.xu.edu/dialogue/mission.cfm (2004) 
102  Ibid. 
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3) intercultural 
4) inter-institutional.  
As befits an institute associated with a university, the Brueggeman Center has 
a number of university-level programmes. These include the Brueggeman 
Symposium and the Brueggeman Chair in Theology and Annual Lecture Series. 
The Brueggeman Symposium is a lecture series devoted to a unifying theme. 
Past themes have included the “Millennium Peace Celebration (September 
2000), Religion and Ecology (September 2001), Religion and Human Rights 
(September 2002), and The Changing Role of Women in World Religions 
(October 2003), Global Religious Fundamentalism, 2004.” 
The Brueggeman Chair is a sponsored annual professorship. Benedictines, 
Muslims and Jews have held the Chair at different times. 
The majority of the Center’s other work has strong roots in the local Cincinnati 
community. 
They include:  
 
The Town Hall Meeting 
A cooperative programme involving the World Affairs Council, the labour 
organisation AFL-CIO, the Southern Ohio District Export Council, Xavier’s 
ethics/religion and society program, the centre for business ethics and social 
responsibility to provide “expert-led dialogue on the vital issues and impacts of 
globalisation”103 
 
Diverse Traditions•Common Ideals 
A collaboration with the International Visitors Council, the Islamic Center of 
Greater Cincinnati, the National Conference for Community and Justice and the 
Hillel Jewish Student Center on a series of events aimed [at exploring] “the 
intercultural and interfaith impacts of [the attacks in New York City and 
Washington, D.C. on] 9/11 on various populations in Cincinnati.”  
 
Artistic Expressions of Faith 
A collaborative activity with the Cincinnati Art Museum, the Taft Museum of Art, 
Hebrew Union College and the Islamic Center of Greater Cincinnati to present 
“an annual series of lectures and discussions that explore the ways various 
cultures and religious traditions express their religious experiences. “104 
 
                                            
103  Ibid. 
104 Ibid. 
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Special Focus Programs 
A series of programmes for discussing issues relevant to the community. 
 
“Healing Deadly Memories” 
Developing teaching materials designed to improve relations between Christians 
and Jews, especially in regard to the role of the Jews in the Christians’ historical 
interpretation of the Paschal story. 
In addition, the Center also welcomes suggestions from outside itself for new 
programmes that might fit in with the Center’s aims. 
Like the Jordanian Royal Institute for Inter-Faith Studies, the Brueggeman 
Center, too, has seen its focus shift. 
“The centre was originally called ‘The Brueggeman centre for inter-
religious dialogue’. While inter-religious dialogue remains the 
distinguishing characteristic and integrating force, the Center’s name 
was altered in June 2003 to recognise an expanded mission and 
program direction. If dialogue is to have real impact, the Center’s 
parameters needed to be expanded to include other academic 
disciplines, representatives from the business community, 
government and civic society.”105 
 
As we have seen time and again, inter-religious dialogue is decreasingly 
focused on matters theological, but in almost all cases is increasingly concerned 
with the profane and the ethical as an important, if not the primary, focus of the 
activities, even if religion continues to be the glue which holds the meeting 
programmes together. 
 
                                            
105  Ibid. 
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VI. Dialogue  
 
This study has so far concentrated more on what those advocating inter-religious 
dialogue want to achieve and why and somewhat less on how. 
That conscious choice of emphasis up to this point has made it possible to 
cover a lot of ground rather quickly, but has not absolved us of the responsibility 
of returning now to look at the dialogue part of inter-religious dialogue. The 
purpose of our quest, after all, has been to try to ascertain the theological point of 
inter-religious dialogue, a dialogue which the Roman Catholic prefect of the 
Pontifical Council, Cardinal Francis Arinze, has described as ‘an essential 
element of Christian witness.’106  
That ‘witness’, however, may be more of a problem than some might like. If it 
implies, as has traditionally been the case, preparing the hearer of the witness for 
conversion, then the question arises of whether it should properly be referred to 
as dialogue at all. If ‘witness’ is not intended to prepare someone for conversion, 
and is not preparatory to syncretism, which most observers would say it is not, 
then what is the point? It becomes little more than an exchange of information. 
That may, in fact, be part of the explanation for the drop-off in interest in inter-
religious dialogue among the ‘believer in the street’. (S)he doesn’t quite get the 
theological point. Believers may well see and understand the potential benefits of 
working together on issues such as human rights, the environment, poverty, etc. 
Important as these issues are, however, they are not the core issues of any of the 
faiths. At best, the ways that members of particular faiths deal with them are 
based on values that arise from the faith, but they are not the reason that those 
who make a conscious choice for a faith choose it, nor are they the reason that 
adherents of a faith remain faithful. 
I am aware, of course, that the above raises the important question of what 
the ‘core business’ of a particular faith is. Is Christianity, for example, about 
repentance, about ensuring that the greatest numbers possible get to heaven? 
About achieving the Kingdom of God on Earth?107 About something else? 
                                            
106  http://www.cwnews.com/news/viewstory.cfm?recnum=8763 (2004) 
107  This is complicated, of course, by the perspective of some that Christianity, for example, does 
not have a core ‘business.’ In a letter to the author from the Dr. Rowan Williams, Archbishop of 
Canterbury, following a lecture series at Salisbury Cathedral in 2003, Dr. Williams wrote that he 
doesn’t like to speak of ‘core business’ in Christianity, preferring instead to speak of a ‘core 
relationship.’ 
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And what is the ‘core business’ of Judaism? To achieve the arrival of the 
Messiah? To live a good life? To ensure adherence to the Torah?  
And Islam’s core business? To establish the House of Islam everywhere on 
Earth? To convert as many as possible to ensure their arrival in Paradise? The 
questions outnumber the answers thus far: but the issue goes to the heart of the 
inquiry, for if we’re not talking about ‘core business’ issues (apologies to Dr. 
Williams), then what is the dialogue about? 
A more basic question that needs to be dealt with first, of course is: what is 
‘dialogue’ anyway? 
To this point, I have been proceeding on the basis of an intentionally false 
assumption, namely, that the meaning of dialogue itself was self-evident and 
required no further elucidation. Nothing could be farther from the truth, however. 
It is my contention, in fact, that the use of the term ‘dialogue’ is been an important 
factor in unnecessarily complicating analysis of real-world inter-religious 
discussion. 
What is the problem? Quite simply, that not everyone agrees on what dialogue 
actually means. 
To begin at the beginning, ‘dialogue’ itself is derived from the Greek διαλογος 
(dialogos), which in turn is derived not from “two people speaking” as many 
people believe, but from “through” (dia) + “word” (logos).108  
Physicist and dialogue theoretician, the late David Bohm has identified several 
different types of dialogue. 
The first kind is more like a discussion, which has a great deal in common 
etymologically with ‘percussion’ and ‘concussion’109 and traces its ancestry back 
to the Latin discutio, to scatter or dissipate. In a discussion things are taken apart 
and analysed. These kinds of dialogues, so called, can be encountered at forums 
like the United Nations when nations negotiate over such things as reducing 
nuclear arsenals or CO2 levels. 110  
For Bohm, these are not ‘dialogues’ at all, because they are not concerned 
with core issues, but rather superficial ‘window-dressing’ activities. Yes, we can 
discuss reductions of nuclear arsenals, but discussing the existing world order of 
nation states that makes having such arsenals seem like such a good idea to 
some people is not on the agenda. In Bohm’s view, the idea that there are items 
which are not on the table, not negotiable, untouchable, makes it no dialogue at 
                                            
108  The implication, then, is that ‘through words” we arrive somewhere other than where we started. 
109  Bohm, David, On Dialogue, (London: Routledge) 1996, p. 6-7. 
110  Ibid. 
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all.111 Also, the idea that one side can win and the other lose (I’ll keep my nuclear 
arsenal, you give up yours), takes the wind out of the sails of those who think this 
is dialogue. If someone loses, in Bohm’s view, there has been no dialogue. 
In order to qualify as a dialogue, therefore, nothing can be left off the table. All 
basic assumptions—and “all the pressures that are behind our assumptions”—
are up for grabs. Everyone is placing himself or herself in a position of openness, 
with no preconceived notion of where it will all end.  
Bohm states that all the different opinions that one has are the “result of past 
thought (….) This is all programmed into your memory. You may then identify 
with those opinions and react to defend them.(…) Dialogue is really aimed at 
going into the whole thought process and changing the way the thought process 
occurs collectively.”112 
It is this looking at the thought process that concerns Bohm initially, for 
thought has created, in the sense of having organised, the world around us. 
Thought has built the roads and buildings, thought has created the nations. And 
thought has created religion: 
“separate religions are entirely a result of how we think.”  
And further on: 
“Thought produced the nation., and it says that the nation has 
an extremely high value, a supreme value which overrides 
almost everything else. The same may be said about 
religion.”113 
Another problem-child in the area of dialogue, according to Bohm, is science. 
For scientists, despite what the general public may think, may very well hold 
different views of the truth, which makes it hard for them to get together. 
Bohm cites in this regard the relationship between Albert Einstein and Niels 
Bohr, two leading physicists of the 20th century. When the two first met, Einstein 
expressed feelings of love for Bohr. Over time, however, as “they finally came 
upon a point where they had two different assumptions, or opinions, about what 
was the way to truth (…) they gradually drifted apart. (…) [Eventually, at a party], 
Einstein and his associates stayed at one end of the room and Bohr and his 
associates stayed at the other end. They couldn’t get together because they had 
nothing to talk about. They couldn’t share any meaning because each one felt his 
meaning was true. How can you share if you are sure that you have truth and the 
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other fellow is sure he has the truth, and the truths don’t agree? How can you 
share?” 
Bohm would have preferred Einstein and Bohr to have met, had a dialogue 
and moved beyond relativity and quantum physics (the subjects which divided 
them) into something new.114 
Which is precisely where the problem with the current inter-religious dialogue, 
as dialogue, lies, for that way lies syncretism, which most organisations involved 
in dialogue fear like the plague. 
A similar point has been made elsewhere. Who participates in authentic 
interreligious dialogue? Do we ever see the Pope sitting down in true dialogue 
with the Ayatollah, or either sharing with the Chief Rabbis of Israel? No, we do 
not. Why? Because these men cannot accept “Not in Heaven” [recognising their 
religion’s limitations] as a prerequisite for genuine dialogue. As defenders of 
particular and mutually exclusive faith traditions, the best these men could hope 
for is a cordial exchange of doctrine. 115 
In virtually all of the mission statements of organisations involved in inter-
religious dialogue, two things stand out. 
First, respect for the beliefs of others, to hear what they are saying without 
trying to impose your views on them. 
Second, enough respect for your own beliefs to prevent it being watered down 
in an effort to close the gaps between you and your dialogue partners. 
Which is not to say that syncretists are not among us. They certainly are, 
trying to merge mystical systems, to blend ritual practice. Formally, however, and 
to a certain extent, not unreasonably, the participants in inter-religious dialogue 
are firm in their desires to not surrender or water down their own beliefs. 
Christians are not prepared to surrender their Messiah because Islam cannot 
see Jesus as the Son of God (Al Quran, Sura 4:171). The Jews are not about to 
surrender their Messianic expectation because the Christians believe He has 
already been. Hindus are unlikely to surrender their belief in reincarnation 
because of Christianity’s alleged insistence that one lives once and dies once. 
In Bohm’s view then, we are not involved in dialogue, real dialogue, at all. Nor 
will we be until we put core issues on the table and are willing to see them 
transformed into something else. 
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115  Shapiro, R. M., “Moving the fence: One Rabbi’s view of interreligious dialogue.” In M. D. Bryant 
& F. Flinn (Eds.), Interreligious dialogue: Voices from a new frontier (pp. 31-40). (New York: 
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For Bohm, that means seeing “that there is no ‘road’ to truth. (…) [W]e share 
all the roads and we finally see that none of them matters. We see the means of 
all the roads, and therefore we come to the ‘no road.’ Underneath, all the roads 
are the same because of the very fact that they are ‘roads’ – they are rigid.”116 
Of course, one of the contentions of many religions is that, despite what Bohm 
says, it is not true that ‘none of them matters.’ Christianity states that quite 
clearly: 
The many references to extra ecclesiam nulla salus discussed above 
demonstrate that sufficiently as does much of Scripture. 
Muslims leave a bit more room for manoeuvre, but still claim fervently: 
“There is no god but Allah, and Muhammad is his apostle.” 117 (Many Quran 
references, including Sura 3). 
The Jews, too, believe that the interpolation of Adonai into history does matter, 
both for themselves as a people and for the whole world (Qol Ha-Olam). 
Bohm would have dialogue not be restricted from taking the participants to a 
place where they could see that none of the roads matter, but many if not most of 
the participants in today’s dialogue are not willing to go as far as Bohm would 
take them. 
So, for example, the World Council of Churches, in its Guidelines on 
Dialogue118 : 
12. As witnesses, we approach inter-religious relations and 
dialogue in commitment to our faith. At the heart of Christian 
belief is faith in the triune God. We affirm that God, the Father, 
is creator and sustainer of all creation. We hold the life, death 
and resurrection of Jesus Christ as the centre of God's 
redeeming work for us and for the world. The Holy Spirit 
confirms us in this faith, renewing our lives and leading us into 
all truth. 119 
And the Council for a Parliament of World Religions: 
                                            
116  Bohm, On Dialogue, p. 38 
117  The charmingly alliterative: La Ilaha Ila Allah. Mohammed rasul Allah.  
118  World Council of Churches, Ecumenical considerations for dialogue and relations with people of 
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Encouraging religious and spiritual communities to develop 
their own rationales for inter-religious dialogue and 
cooperation, and address the critical issues.120 
Bohm does leave us a more limited form of dialogue, for those who are not yet 
ready for the whole experience, but we must be aware that it is limited. 
In that form of dialogue, which may in fact reasonably deal with non-core 
issues, one is dealing with particular issues simply in order to get the process of 
dialogue happening and achieving some small good into the bargain is 
acceptable. It would be better if it were then to lead to a broader dialogue, where 
basic assumptions are included, but something, in Bohm’s view is better than 
nothing. 
It raises the question, however, of whether such a limited inter-religious 
dialogue could ever touch the core business, the theological heart of a faith. If it 
does not, can it lead us to the answer to the question of the theological point of 
inter-religious dialogue? Do we have, in fact, an inter-religious dialogue, or a 
dialogue of the religious? 
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VII. To Defend and Explain: the Apologetics 
One’s view of the theological use of inter-religious dialog will depend to a large 
degree on one’s mental model of the religious constellation. A firmament 
containing a single star, after all, precludes the inclusion of others in one’s 
thinking. It will depend in equal measure on one’s view of dialogue itself: what it is 
and what its role is. 
In the next few chapters, I shall be examining the theological and dialogical 
models of thinkers and from the times of the Church Fathers up to the beginning 
of the modern time.  
The earliest participants in inter-religious relations from a Christian perspective 
were the founders and Church Fathers. They differ from those who will follow in 
that later participants—although they were official or self-appointed 
representatives of a faith that is dominant in their societies, both nationally and 
regionally; representatives of a faith with hundreds of years of history and a 
staunch tradition that had already withstood assaults from without and within, with 
varying degrees of success, as far as inter-religious dialogue is concerned—were 
minority voices preaching dialogue and co-existence against a chorus 
emphasising monologues, missionary work and triumphalism or absolutism.  
Such was not always the case. At one time, the Christian church was 
compelled to adopt a much more modest position in relation to the society and 
other religions around it and, from a position of numerical, political and social 
weakness and inferiority, approach these issues much more circumspectly. That 
period lasted for approximately 400 years,121 and began to change only when 
                                            
121  Such figures are tossed around in historical circles with a degree of casualness that disguises 
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Reformation, the Counter-Reformation, the great migrations-compulsory or otherwise-etc., etc., 
demonstrates that it’s more than a mere 400 years…it’s 400 years!! The figure of 400 years is 
somewhat arbitrary in any case. Others may choose a different cut-off. The Catholic 
Encyclopaedia, for example, closes the period off at 476 C.E., with the fall of the Roman Empire 
in the west, and the writing of The City of God by Augustine. Inasmuch as the principles seen in 
those early centuries were repeated throughout the period of the Church’s expansion 
throughout Europe and later in Asia, Africa and the America’s, the exact time frame is moot. I 
am therefore not inclined to argue the point with much vigour. 
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Christianity had managed to supplant the previously dominant faith in, first, the 
Roman Empire and, later, countries outside the Empire, and become the official 
religion.122 
The written record of such dialogue as there was at that time is today grouped 
together as Apologetics, writings to defend and explain Christianity. To a modern 
media-sophisticated audience, the early writings of the Church can best be 
described as elements of a communications plan for a start-up organisation 
facing problems on several fronts. 
First, it is a spin-off organisation with its roots in an already successful entity, 
the nationally based Judaism of the people of Israel. 
Second, it is an organisation undergoing an internal struggle to define its 
precepts, principles and organisational structure, with a number of competing 
visions vying for dominance. 
Third, it is fighting for share of mind against an overwhelmingly numerically 
superior field of competitors with hundreds of years of history and an established 
position in the society.123 
And fourth, from its earliest days, it is fighting against physical annihilation as, 
initially, according to the few reports available, the Jewish establishment and, not 
very much later,  the forces of the Roman empire actively worked for its 
destruction through the execution of its leaders and rank-and-file membership on 
the one hand and attempts to discredit its beliefs on the other. 
Each of these threats demanded a different response, and all of them from a 
perspective of weakness rather than the position of strength and dominance that 
would later characterise its dialogue positions. 
                                            
122  I note in passing that even in countries where Christianity had become de jure the official 
religion, it was not always immediately successful in replacing the previously existing cultus. 
Although we seldom stop to think about it, in Egypt, for example, a former Roman colony, the 
old beliefs (old even then, with a history measured in thousands of years) involving Osiris, Isis, 
Set, etc., were still being practised up to the time that the forces of Islam conquered that country 
in the 600s C.E.. 
123  We are so accustomed to seeing Christianity as the dominant force that it is often difficult for 
readers to internalise these figures and see them for what they really are. Although accurate 
figures are impossible to come by, calculations by some (Stark, R., The Rise of Christianity: A 
Sociologist Reconsiders History, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press) 1996, cited in 
McKechnie, Paul, The First Christian Centuries: Perspectives on the Early Church, (Leicester, 
U.K.: Apollos), 2001, p. 56 ) indicate that at the middle of the third century (approximately 250 
C.E.), Christians, by the broadest definition possible, and including perhaps the Gnostics as 
well, amounted to no more than 1.9 per cent of the population of the Roman Empire. 
Represented by analogy, that is like saying that slightly less than the population of Austria in 
2000 (7.1 million out of 8.1 million) was Christian, and the rest of the population of the European 
Union (approx. 378 million in the 15-nation Union in 2000) was not. (Source: US Census Bureau 
International Population Database.) 
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The early church and the Jews 
The ex post facto nature of the New Testament means that while, outside of faith, 
they cannot necessarily be taken as accurate representations of the relationships 
between the Jesus movement and the Jewish establishment prior to and 
immediately following the death of Jesus, it is certainly possible and reasonable 
to view them as representative of relations in the period that followed shortly 
thereafter. And those relations were not uniformly good. The Church that is 
revealed in the New Testament is one that looked to the Jewish establishment as 
the cause or at least the instigator of the death of Jesus and, doubly damnable in 
their eyes, as having refused to recognise Jesus as the messiah who had been 
promised and prophesied. 
The followers of Jesus felt that the Church was the fulfilment of Judaism, 
however, and the realisation of the prophecies. This was not uniformly accepted 
by the Jewish leadership and community, however, and when, the reports say, 
some Jews believed that some Christians (though they were not yet called that) 
were saying that “Jesus the Nazarene is going to destroy this Place [the Temple. 
DS] and alter the traditions that Moses handed down to us[,]124” they convicted 
Stephen and stoned him, thus creating the first Christian martyr. For such 
heresies against Judaism, Saul, the later Apostle Paul, is said to have began 
working “for the total destruction of the Church; he went from house to house 
arresting both men and women and sending them to prison."125 
The first view that the Christians had of the Jewish establishment, then, was 
two-fold, source and oppressor. At no time during those early days, however, did 
the Church think of itself as anything other than Jewish. Its members kept the 
holidays, worshipped at the Temple at the appropriate times, and, when abroad, 
used the synagogues as their earliest meeting houses.126 
When, under the guidance of Paul, the Church expanded its target audience 
to include the gentiles, dispensing with some key elements, including 
circumcision and the need to follow the laws of kashrut, the stage was set, 
however unintentionally, for the marginalisation of the Jewish elements within the 
Church. The marginalisation accelerated with the destruction of the Second 
Temple and the dispersal of the Jews from the land of Israel until the sheer 
numerical difference between the Gentile and Jewish Christians became so great 
                                            
124  Acts 6: 14 (New Jerusalem Bible) 
125  Acts 8:3 
126  Even, according to Acts, being invited to address the congregation, as at Antioch. See Acts 13: 
13 ff. and Acts 17. 
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that the latter were forbidden to insist that the former follow Jewish practice in 
matters of the Sabbath, the Torah and other matters. 
By the middle of the second century C.E., the breach had become as complete 
as it would remain until the modern time. A summary of the issues that divided 
the two is succinctly provided by Justin Martyr in his Dialogue with Trypho the 
Jew, written in about 160 C.E.. 
The Dialogue is believed by some to be a record of an actual dialogue 
between Justin and a rabbi of note in approximately 135 C.E. and written down 
some time later. It is interesting to note that it is set at a time when both the 
Christians and the Jews were under attack from the established order, the 
Christians due to their supposed obstinacy in refusing to sacrifice to the Roman 
gods and the Jews in Israel for political reasons arising form their repeated 
attempts to toss the Romans into the sea and regain political independence. 
Though the Church is more than a century old at the time the dialogue takes 
place, not only have the old enmities not died, new slanders have arisen. 
"Is there any other matter, my friends, in which we are blamed, 
than this, that we live not after the law, and are not circumcised 
in the flesh as your forefathers were, and do not observe 
Sabbaths as you do? Are our lives and customs also 
slandered among you? And I ask this: have you also believed 
concerning us, that we eat men; and that after the feast, 
having extinguished the lights, we engage in promiscuous 
concubinage? Or do you condemn us in this alone, that we 
adhere to such tenets, and believe in an opinion, untrue, as 
you think? "127 
The matter of the slanders are not the issue, Trypho replies, but the matter of 
the Law is key.  
Trypho professes his amazement that, although the 
 “precepts in the so-called Gospel are so wonderful and so 
great that I suspect that no one can keep them, (…) we” {the 
Jews) cannot understand how Christians,  who suppose 
themselves “better than others”, are in no way different from 
the peoples whom they live among, neither keeping festivals 
nor sabbaths, nor circumcision and “further, resting your hopes 
                                            
127 Justin Martyr, Dialogue with Trypho the Jew, Chapter X, Alexander Roberts  and James 
Donaldson (trans.) in “Early Christian Writings” 
(http://www.earlychristianwritings.com/text/justinmartyr-dialoguetrypho.html) 
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on a man [who] was crucified (…) while you do not obey his 
commandments (…) and do not obey the Law.” 128 
To this Justin replies that, despite their differences, the Jews and the 
Christians do have some things in common, beginning with God himself. 
Justin’s reply is a familiar one: although there is but one God, whom the Jews 
and Christians share, the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, the universal and 
final revelation of Jesus supersedes the Law as passed down by Moses, which is 
particular,  much as a new covenant replaces those that preceded it.129 
This Justin supports with numerous quotes from the Hebrew scriptures, which, 
though in the process of being surpassed by the then-still developing New 
Testament canon in terms of having pride of place among Christians, were still 
considered authoritative. 
In fact, Justin implies, the Hebrew Scriptures prefigure and announce Christ 
and Christianity, and the Jews misinterpret them. 
I also adduced another passage in which Isaiah exclaims: 
"'Hear My words, and your soul shall live; and I will make an 
everlasting covenant with you, even the sure mercies of David. 
Behold, I have given Him for a witness to the people: nations 
which know not Thee shall call on Thee; peoples who know not 
Thee shall escape to Thee, because of thy God, the Holy One 
of Israel; for He has glorified Thee.' This same law you have 
despised, and His new holy covenant you have slighted; and 
now you neither receive it, nor repent of your evil deeds.130  
The “evil deeds” are not without consequence, however. They serve as the 
basis for the troubles Israel is now experiencing, specifically the war with the 
Romans which the Jewish nation is in the process of losing. And the most 
precious of Jewish symbols, that of circumcision, will serve to identify those who 
will suffer. 
For the circumcision according to the flesh, which is from 
Abraham, was given for a sign; that you may be separated 
from other nations, and from us; and that you alone may suffer 
that which you now justly suffer; and that your land may be 
desolate, and your cities burned with fire; and that strangers 
                                            
128  Ibid. 
129  Ibid., Chapter XI. 
130  Ibid., Chapter XII. 
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may eat your fruit in your presence, and not one of you may go 
up to Jerusalem.131 
Justin then continues with a long and detailed accounting of how the Jews’ 
understanding of the Law is incorrect and the source of all their woes and that 
salvation will only be possible through Christ, whose circumcision of the heart is 
“far more excellent.”132 In fact, the Christians’ understanding of the Law is so 
superior, the words of the Scriptures no longer belong to the Jews but have been 
bequeathed, as it were, to the Christians. 
They are contained in your Scriptures, or rather not yours, but 
ours. For we believe them; but you, though you read them, do 
not catch the spirit that is in them.133  
Of dialogue as that is understood today, there is no hint here: Justin intends 
only to persuade, not to learn. At one point, he even loses his patience with 
Trypho for refusing to understand. 
"If I were to be quarrelsome and light-minded like you, Trypho, 
I would no longer continue to converse with you, since you are 
prepared not to understand what has been said, but only to 
return some captious answer.134 
Whether that lack of openness is understandable, given the antagonistic 
history between the two groups, is beside the point.  
Though this dialogue is between a Christian and a Jew, it is highly unlikely that 
it was widely disseminated or read outside Christian circles. That should not 
come as a surprise, even apart from the fact that literacy levels were, by today’s 
standards, low and that distribution meant manual copying. More important is the 
one-sidedness of the discussion. It is clearly a missionary document that cannot 
be expected to have been received with enthusiasm by the Jews whom it holds in 
such disdain, having been relegated to the status of has-beens. 
The question of the relationship between Christianity and Judaism surfaces 
again in the Letter to Diognetus, an anonymous letter from the second century. 
In that eponymous letter, the writer tries to explain the difference between 
Jews and Christians to his correspondent. That difference seems to have been 
virtually indistinguishable to outsiders. Christians share with Jews the rejection of 
                                            
131  Ibid., Chapter XVI. 
132  Ibid., Chapter XXIV 
133  Ibid., Chapter XXIX 
134  Ibid., Chapter LXIV 
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the idolatry of the Roman empire and the worship of one God as master of the 
universe.135 
Jews are in error, however, according to the letter writer, “in regard to their 
food and their superstition concerning the Sabbath, their flaunting of their 
circumcision, [and] their hypocrisy in fasting and the feasts of the new moon…”136  
He concludes that Christians justly abstain from the common follies and errors 
and from the exaggerated ritualism and boasting of the Jews.137 
These two examples will serve to demonstrate that relations between Judaism 
and Christianity in the time of the early Church were anything but amicable, and 
would get much worse through the centuries before, recently, in some quarters, 
they began to improve. Dialogue then was out of the question.138 
 
Gnostics 
The second broad group against whom the Great Church felt it had to fight in the 
early centuries included the Gnostics and other groups now referred to as 
heretics139. These groups held views of Jesus’ message, his nature, the role of 
the church, the role of Jesus’ mother Mary and a number of other subjects that 
differed both from the views of the Great Church and from one another.  
The teachings that the Gnostics disseminated included a theon of two Gods, 
the God of the Old Testament, cruel and stern, and the God of the New 
Testament, a God of love. The material world was created by the Old Testament 
God, who is therefore responsible for all of its imperfections. The God of the New 
Testament was the redeemer. Other teachings included the belief that Jesus, 
being God, did not really suffer on the cross, but an apparition took his place.140 
Such teachings went directly against the developing dogmas of the Church and 
                                            
135  De Benedictinessen van Bonheiden, De Verdedigers van het Geloof. De Apologeten, second 
revised edition, (Bonheiden, Belgium: Abdij Bethlethem) 1984, p. 138, 
136  Ibid., p. 139 
137  Ibid., p. 140. 
138  The enmity was reciprocated by the new post-Temple Jewish leadership. Christian views on the 
Virgin Birth of Jesus were mocked, and references to the supposed illegitimate father of Jesus, 
a Roman centurion called Pantera, were included in the Talmud (Sanhedrin 67a, among 
others). Christian beliefs in other areas were also ridiculed.  
139  The word ‘heresy’ in English derives from the Greek for ‘choice, doctrine.’ In its negative 
religious connotation, it refers to doctrines and positions that differ from those of the Great 
Church. A Germanic translation, ‘ketter’ in Dutch, ‘ketzer’ in German, derives from the Cathars, 
a ‘heretical’ group of medieval Languedoc (today, France). 
140 See, for example, De Vries, Theun, Ketters. Viertien eeuwen ketterij, volksbeweging en 
kettergericht. (Amsterdam: Querido) 1998, pp. 53-69. 
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were an attractive alternative for some, such that Gnosticism threatened to 
undermine the Church altogether.141 
One may reasonably ask whether a discussion, however, brief, of the 
relationship between the Great Church and the ‘heretics’ is appropriate in a 
discussion of the theological meaning of inter-religious dialogue. That question 
mirrors the contemporary question of whether ecumenicalism is part of or 
something different than the current inter-religious dialogue. At one level, of 
course, it seems to be something different. After all, all of the participants in the 
ecumenical dialogue—for the most part united in the World Council of Churches, 
with varying degrees of participation from the Roman Catholics, the Eastern 
Orthodox churches and others—are nominally Christian churches who split off 
from a one-time unified Great Church. The differences between the churches, 
however, are not insignificant. Questions of salvation, the relationship between 
faith and repentance, the literal versus allegorical interpretation of Scripture, the 
nature of the Holy Trinity, baptism and a host of other issues divide the Christian 
churches just as much as the questions of the relationship between the Old 
Testament and the New, the nature of Jesus (divinity vs. humanity, physicality vs. 
spirituality), the creation of the world, the role of women, etc., etc., divided the so-
called heretics from the Great Church. 
Today, as it did in the days of the early Church, all protestations to the 
contrary notwithstanding, the ecumenical discussion parallels the inter-religious 
one. With at least one crucial difference. 
A major motivation for the ecumenical discussion is to restore some form of 
unity.142 That is certainly not the purpose of the inter-religious dialogue, and 
would lead to a syncretism that would be unacceptable to most, if not all, of the 
Christian participants. 
 
Irenaeus against heresies 
Diatribes against the heretics were published by some of the most important of 
the apologetics, including Tertullian (who later joined a sect that was later 
deemed heretical itself, the Montanist sect) and Irenaeus. Irenaeus was so 
                                            
141 Ibid. 
142  “[the World Council of Churches] is a community of churches which recognise in each other 
elements of the true church.” See http://www.wcc-coe.org/wcc/what/ecumenical/index-e.html 
(December 2001). Some efforts have been made to set up a third parallel dialogue among the 
Abrahamic religions, Christianity, Judaism and Islam. Those efforts, while vigorous and vibrant, 
seem to have not yet evolved to the formalised state or the scale of the Christian ecumenical 
debate, which, it can be argued, they would be the logical extension of. 
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absorbed by this fight that it led him to formulate what is today recognised within 
virtually all branches of Christianity as the New Testament canon. 
As regards his opposition to the heretics, and following the model of the 
communications plan introduced above, we may say that Irenaeus was 
concerned that all those preaching any message related to Christ or Christianity 
stay ‘on message’.  And when they didn’t, he felt compelled to combat their “their 
craftily-constructed plausibilities”143 by composing a treatise “in order to expose 
and counteract their machinations.” 
Their offence is:  
(…) [to] falsify the oracles of God, and prove themselves evil 
interpreters of the good word of revelation. They also 
overthrow the faith of many, by drawing them away, under a 
pretence of [superior] knowledge, from Him who rounded and 
adorned the universe(…). By means of specious and plausible 
words, they cunningly allure the simple-minded to inquire into 
their system; but they nevertheless clumsily destroy them, 
while they initiate them into their blasphemous and impious 
opinions respecting the Demiurge.144 
His task is not an easy one, for, as he notes: 
Error, indeed, is never set forth in its naked deformity, lest, 
being thus exposed, it should at once be detected. But it is 
craftily decked out in an attractive dress, so as, by its outward 
form, to make it appear to the inexperienced (ridiculous as the 
expression may seem) more true than the truth itself.145 
No hint here, or in any other anti-heretical document, of any recognition of 
anything holy in any of the heresies. No acknowledgement that the ‘heretics’ may 
have been making a serious effort to deal with some of the difficulties raised by 
the presentation of the story of Jesus and the Church by the Great Church. Could 
Jesus, being God, suffer? Was God the Father the same as the God of the 
Jews? What was the relationship between Jesus the son (Son?) of Man and 
God? The Gnostics certainly presented alternative answers to these questions, 
but their answers were dismissed as mere error or as lie, perversion and 
falsehood that needed to be rooted out in order to save the credulous from 
damnation. A couple of examples will suffice. 
                                            
143  Irenaeus, Against Heresies, Book 1:1 (Gnostic Society Library, 
http://www.webcom.com/~gnosis/library/advh1.htm (March, 2004) 
144  Ibid. 
145  Ibid., Book 1:2 
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Chapter IV:3. (…) For these doctrines are not at all similar to 
those of which our Lord said, "Freely ye have received, freely 
give."(4) They are, on the contrary, abstruse, and portentous, 
and profound mysteries, to be got at only with great labour by 
such as are in love with falsehood. 
And further:  
CHAP. XIII.-THE DECEITFUL ARTS AND NEFARIOUS 
PRACTICES OF MARCUS.  
I. But(2) there is another among these heretics, Marcus by 
name, who boasts himself as having improved upon his 
master. He is a perfect adept in magical impostures, and by 
this means drawing away a great number of men, and not a 
few women, he has induced them to join themselves to him, as 
to one who is possessed of the greatest knowledge and 
perfection, and who has received the highest power from the 
invisible and ineffable regions above. Thus it appears as if he 
really were the precursor of Antichrist. For, joining the 
buffooneries of Anaxilaus(3) to the craftiness of the magi, as 
they are called, he is regarded by his senseless and cracked-
brain followers as working miracles by these means.  
That Irenaeus and the other apologists actually had reason to be concerned 
about a real threat to Christianity will become clear when one reviews the history 
of Manicheism. Founded by Mani, who was born into a Jewish-Christian family in 
Persia, Manicheism borrowed some ideas from Zoaroastrianism and joined them 
to Christianity in an attempt to correct what Mani thought were errors transmitted 
by all the other prophets through the ages. 
Long after most of the other major heresies had been crushed or otherwise 
eradicated, Manicheism, in one form or another, including the Paulicians and, 
later, the Albigensians, was still around in Europe and Asia, and only a crusade 
by Pope Innocent III and a virtually simultaneous though unrelated suppression 
by the Ming emperors in the 14th century put an end to them in Europe and Asia 
respectively.  
Manicheism was not the only threat to Great Church Christianity, however, 
and attacks were composed against a wide range of beliefs that took elements of 
Christianity, especially Jesus as the Christ, and twisted them out of the shape 
that the Great Church followed. 
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The Pagans 
To varying degrees, the campaigns against the Jews and the Gnostics had 
elements in common. They were designed to preserve what the Great Church 
held to be non-negotiable Truths and to stay the course in terms of consistency of 
message. 
Quite a different strategy was followed in regard to the dominant religious 
belief of Empire, derisively called paganism. 
While the name itself constitutes a not-insignificant part of the campaign, in a 
not unsuccessful attempt to position it as the superstitious belief of farmers and 
the uneducated, paganism presented a major threat to Christianity due to its 
close relationship with the established forces of Empire. This became 
increasingly problematic with the passage of time and the deification of, first, 
dead rulers such as the Divine Julius (Caesar), and later, the living ones, who, 
perhaps in imitation of the classic role of the Egyptians and Babylonians, were 
elevated to be sons of Jupiter even while living. Failure to sacrifice to the 
Emperor was a capital offence in the Empire, both as a mark of poor citizenship 
and as a threat to the well-being and stability of the Empire. 
Christianity’s relationship with the pagan Empire was two-fold. On the one 
hand, there was a need to spread the gospel and to convert, and thereby save, 
the souls of the Romans, who would otherwise be lost. On the other hand, there 
was a need to save the body of the Church from the significant pogroms and 
persecutions which periodically took place in an attempt to wipe out these 
immoral atheists. 
Faced with this double-edged problem, the Church adopted a double-edged 
communications strategy to deal with it.  
First, to convince the powers-that-be that, contrary to what was being bandied 
about widely, Christianity was not only not an immoral cult that indulged in 
strange sacrifices, but was rather among the most desirable of citizens, paying 
taxes, respecting the law, and keeping the peace. 
And second, to proselytise among the Romans and slowly, to win them over to 
the Church, to the point where, as Tertullian, perhaps prematurely, triumphantly 
crowed: “We are but of yesterday, and we have filled everything of yours--cities, 
islands, forts, towns, conciliabula, even the camps, tribes, courts, palace, senate, 
Forum. We have left you only the temples."146 
                                            
146  Tertullian, Apologia, It should be noted here that proselytisation may not have been the primary, 
or even secondary, key to success of Christianity. Sociologist Rodney Stark, in his The Rise of 
Christianity, (HarperCollins, 1997) notes that other factors may have been more important, 
including sexual restraint among Christians, leading to less venereal disease; prohibition of 
abortion, leading to a lower death rate among women of child-bearing years; better hygiene and 
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Where the apologetics aimed against the Jews and heretics were 
characterised primarily by their polemics and merciless attacks, those directed at 
the imperial forces were of a completely different nature, conciliatory, 
explanatory, in search of common ground. 
Apologia of Justin Martyr 
The Apologia of Justin Martyr will serve to illustrate. 
The tone is set in the salutation: 
To Emperor Titus […] and to his son Virissimus the 
philosopher and Lucius the philosopher […] the friend of the 
sciences and to the holy Senate and all the Romans […] I, 
Justin […] in the name of them who, of all peoples who are 
unjustly hated and oppressed, and to which I belong, direct this 
argument and plea. 
Justin begins, then, with the flattery common both then and now to those in 
authority, unusual only in that it is of a completely different tone than documents 
directed against those with whom the Church has a great deal more in common. 
The flattery and the attempt at persuasion continues. 
Reason demands that those who are truly pious147 and 
philosophers, should honour and love only truth and refuse to 
follow the beliefs of the elders if these prove to be unvirtuous. 
Justin’s flair with a pen certainly belies those who claim that the early Christian 
writers were less skilled at argument than their pagan counterparts. This text 
follows all the rules of persuasion. For who would not want to be counted among 
the truly pious and philosophers who honour and love truth? In the same vein, 
Justin continues. 
It will become apparent whether you truly are as one can hear 
everywhere, pious and wise (philosopher) and upholders of the 
law and a friend of science. 
Justin is concerned that Christians have been arrested and, by that very fact, 
are considered to have been guilty: one doesn’t arrest the innocent after all. 
Justin does not yet claim innocence for all those arrested. But pleads for an 
honest inquiry. 
                                                                                                                       
care for the sick, especially during outbreaks of plague, that presents a Darwinian survival 
strategy that accounts for the absolute and relative increase in the numbers of Christians 
among the Roman population. 
147  A play on one of the Emperor’s names: Pius. 
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We therefore ask that the lives of those whose names have 
been brought to you be investigated, and if they are found 
guilty, let them be punished as criminals, not as Christians. If 
someone is found not guilty, however, let him be acquitted as a 
Christian who has done nothing wrong. 
The bulk of the Apologia is given over to presenting the facts of Christian 
practice, baptism, Eucharist, etc., to distance it from the slanders that others have 
told of it for various reasons. The tone is everywhere reasonable and conciliatory. 
Nowhere is the faith of the Romans attacked, and nowhere are the Romans 
attacked for their errors. 
In fact, Justin tries to show something of what the Church and the great 
thinkers of antiquity—and therefore also the Romans—have in common. 
In the same way, Plato said that Radamanthys and Minus will 
punish the unjust when they come to them. We say that the 
same will happen, but that the judge will be Christ and that 
their souls will be united with the same bodies and they shall 
suffer eternal punishment, not only for a period of a thousand 
years, as he (Plato) said. 
Letter to Diognetus 
A more actively critical though equally conciliatory approach can be seen in 
the Letter to Diognetus.  
The Letter was written by an anonymous correspondent—with possibilities 
ranging from Quadratus, a missionary bishop, to Theophilus, Clement, Apollos, 
Marcion, Apelles or Aristides and even Justin Martyr—to the Diognetus of the title 
at some time between 100-150 C.E.  
The letter is clearly a proselytising document directed at a follower of the 
pagan religion of Rome. 
After commencing with general praise in regard to Diognetus’s inclination to 
listen to the arguments concerning Christianity, the writer wastes no time in 
getting down to business. 
Come, cleanse yourself of all the prejudices that hold your 
thoughts in thrall and shake off the deceptive life and become 
a new man as from the beginning, for you are going to hear a 
new teaching. See not only with the eyes, but also with reason, 
what substance and in what form are made those things that 
you call gods and think are gods. 
Diognetus’s gods are of stone, copper or wood, and they will, over time, be 
destroyed, the same fate that will befall Diognetus if he doesn’t see the error of 
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his ways. For can they be gods who have to be locked up in a cupboard at night, 
and guarded against thieves by day? 
Should one be a Jew, then? Perhaps, insofar as they refuse to worship man-
made gods. But, considering their “superstitious” belief in the efficacy of the laws 
of kashrut, circumcision, fasting, and sacrifices, perhaps not. For those are 
ridiculous beliefs, our writer says. 
But what is a Christian, and how does one differ from ‘normal’ people. Hardly 
at all, according to our writer: 
For the Christians don’t distinguish themselves from other 
people in their language, country or clothing. They don’t live in 
their own cities, speak no deviant dialect and don’t live 
differently. […] They live in the cities of the Greeks and the 
barbarians, as fate decreed and they live according to the 
values of the country […]. 
But for all that binds them, yet there is that which separates them. 
They live in their own countries, but as strangers, they fulfil 
their civic duties and bear all as foreigners. Every foreign 
country is their homeland and every fatherland for them a 
foreign country. They marry like everyone else and bear 
children, but they do not dispose of their new-born children. 
They share their table but not their marriage bed. 
And so on. Christians are the same, but different. The Christians are to the 
world what “the soul is to the body.” 
Nor is the philosophy of the philosophers sufficient.  
What men actually knew who God is before He Himself came? 
Unless someone believed the hollow, empty words of smooth-
talking philosophers. Some of them taught that fire is God—the 
fire where they shall end up, they call God—others call water 
God, or some other element that God made. […] But those are 
all fables and lies from those deceivers. 
The pagans, then, live in error. Not of their own making, surely, but from the 
liars and teachers who have led them astray. They will be destroyed as if they 
were the wooden idols they worshipped unless they accept Christianity, the soul 
to the worldly body, the added value to existence, their salvation.  
Apologetic as dialogue 
The position of the early Church Fathers, then, differs substantially from the later 
writers we shall look at, and certainly differs from the contemporary participants in 
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the inter-religious dialogue who are more inclined to look for something of the 
holy in their collocutors. 
The Church Fathers were looking towards expansion, to the benefit of the 
individuals to be saved, of course, but explicitly exclusivist and rejecting the 
contributions of other faiths: there is one way, one truth and one life, and no one, 
whether the pagans of the Empire, be it the remnants of Greek society, the then 
still extant Egyptian classical religion or the Roman pantheon, nor the heretical 
Gnostics, nor the Zoroastrians or Buddhists of the East, could ‘come to the 
Father’ but by means of that single path. Where they did acknowledge any 
positive elements in other faiths, it was strictly as foreshadowing of the One Truth 
of Christianity. 
Their goals were conquest at both the macro level, whole societies and 
peoples, and the micro level of the individual. The relations between the religions, 
using Panikkar’s list, was one of ‘rejection and conquest’ from both sides. The 
established pagans were trying to eradicate the Christians and the Christians 
were trying to overcome the pagan society around them. 
The apologists, though they applied honey to the one and vinegar to the other 
were unanimous in their view that there was nothing that would save the non-
Christian soul and that conversion was therefore the only option. This is a strictly 
exclusivist perspective, to use the modern divisions, and provides a strong 
foundation for those modern Christian churches for whom dialogue, as currently 
practised, is quite rightly something to be approached with caution and not to be 
embraced: that way lies syncretism! 
Nor can one easily describe their process of approach as dialogue. Any 
discussion or debate was strictly designed to demonstrate the superiority of 
Christianity, the Christian message and Jesus the Christ over all other religions 
and gods. Regardless of how one defines dialogue, what the apologists were 
engaged in was anything but.  
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VIII. The Collationes of Pierre Abelard 
Many of the those who have made inter-religious dialogue a main feature of their 
work have shared the view that searches for common ground among the various 
religions have required the intervention of someone or something outside the 
context of the searchers themselves.  
That trend has a long and honourable tradition, and is also characteristic of 
the text that we now turn to, Dialogue between a Philosopher, a Jew, and a 
Christian, by Pierre Abelard, though with a significant difference. 
Abelard (1079-1142) was born in Brittany, France, of minor nobility and, in a 
classic tale of small-town boy makes good, moved to Paris at a young age and in 
a relatively short time became the brightest star in the city of lights, making as 
many admirers as enemies. 
He set up his own private exegetical schools (the University of Paris was still 
more than a century in the future) and became renowned for his use of rhetoric 
and dialectic. 
One of Abelard’s most often cited works in the area of interreligious dialogue 
is a text that Abelard called Collationes¸ (Comparisons) but that is more 
commonly (though inaccurately) known today as Dialogus inter Philosophum, 
Judaeum, et Christianum, Dialogue between a Philosopher, a Jew and a 
Christian.  
The Dialogue 
As others have noted, the Dialogue is not a dialogue among the three 
participants named, but rather one in which a pagan philosopher is matched 
against a Jew and a Christian148 working in tandem to counter his arguments. 
This will present some difficulties later, as we shall see. 
The scene of the dialogue draws on the biblical and classical tradition of using 
dreams as a dramatic device. The first-person narrator—read Abelard—dreams 
of three men coming to him with a request that he adjudicate in their dispute over 
their “different religious faiths.”149 One is a philosopher,150 one a Jew and one a 
Christian. 
                                            
148  Abelard’s own title Collationes,  avoids this inaccuracy, but the text is better known as the 
Dialogus and translators are divided about how they should render it. 
149  Abelard, Peter, Dialogue between a Philosopher, a Jew, and a Christian, in Ethical Writings, 
Paul Vincent Spade (trans.) (Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc.), p. 59 
150  According to some sources a Muslim philosopher, perhaps Averroes, a noted commentator, as 
was Abelard himself, on Aristotle. 
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The purpose of their dispute is to help the philosopher find the one faith, 
“among the different religious faiths facing”151 him which is most in agreement 
with reason. He would then be able to choose the best religion for him. 
We must be careful here, for we are not dealing, as the parliamentarians of 
religion would in 1893, with a distinction between believers and non-believers, 
theists and atheists. The Philosopher has a faith, is a believer in “the one God,” 
but it is a god of natural religion that would later be more familiar to the Deists of 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries: the Philosopher has come to his 
understanding of God through philosophy and reason, building on natural 
religion, without divine intervention or revelation. 
Having conducted his own inquiries, the philosopher has “discovered” that the 
Jews are “fools” and the Christians “crazy”152 but is not put off by that. Rather, he 
enters into discussion with them, to no conclusion, and agrees finally to put the 
matter to the judge, even though the judge is also an adherent of one of the 
contesting faiths because “we were unable to find anyone who did not belong to 
any of these three groups.”153 
There are some elements of dialogue present here. The adjudicator in this 
discussion is, first of all, human (Unlike the judges who will be presented by 
Nicholas of Cusa in a following chapter). No divine intervention or explanation is 
needed here to settle the argument. Secondarily, although formally outside the 
discussion, the judge is a member of one of the two or three—depending on how 
one counts—contesting beliefs. This is an entirely human discussion among 
theoretical equals in accordance with the principle set by Habermas of 
“vulnerable forms of innovation-bearing, reciprocal and unforcedly egalitarian 
everyday communication.”154 
Neither the Jew nor the Christian contribute to the prefatory discussion, and 
the unnamed judge agrees to take on the role of adjudicator, with protestations of 
inadequacy, also because he may learn something from it. 
The dialogue itself deals with a number of themes, none of which would be out 
of place in a modern college or university religious studies program. 
Between the Philosopher and the Jew, the primary theme is first principles, 
and especially authority:  
 by what authority does one believe? 
 by whose authority do the Jews follow the Law? 
                                            
151  Abelard, Dialogue. 
152 Ibid. 
153  Ibid., p. 60 
154  Habermas, J., 1985, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, quoted in 
http://www.infed.org/biblio/b-dialog.htm, (March 2004) 
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 who must submit to the authority of the law? 
In the dialogue between the Philosopher and the Christian, we move from first 
principles towards issues of a more eschatological nature: 
 what is the ultimate (human) good/ultimate (human) evil? 
 how is one to achieve the ultimate good? 
 what is one’s ultimate destination? 
Dialogue  Between the Philosopher and the Jew 
In the shorter of the two dialogues, the Philosopher begins by assuming that the 
“natural law” is primary, “both in time [and] in nature as well.” Natural law, which 
he equates to the “science of morals we call ‘ethics’” is superior in regards to 
other forms of religion inasmuch as what is “simpler is naturally prior to the more 
multiple.”155 Other religions, including both Judaism and Christianity, have added 
something which “seem[s] altogether superfluous” to the natural law through their 
scriptures. He may therefore go first. 
The philosopher’s first question is directed to both of his collocutors 
simultaneously: how did they come to their faith—through reason or simply 
because it was the faith of their fathers?156 His own hypothesis, that one simply 
adopts the faith of one’s fathers, he dismisses derisively as inadequate. The 
more so because people “even break into such craziness that they aren’t 
embarrassed to profess that they believe what they admit they can’t understand.” 
The Jew takes up the challenge thus made, protecting himself with the 
assurance that any inadequacy on his part will be compensated by the Christian, 
wearing, as it were “two horns in the two Testaments he’s armed with” making 
him able to “fight the enemy more strongly.”157 
The Jew begins by dividing the faith life into two parts, childhood and 
adulthood. As a child, one follows unquestioningly the faith of one’s fathers, but 
as an adult, reason keeps one believing.158 
                                            
155  Abelard, Dialogue., p. 63. 
156  One may wonder why “faith,” revelation or some other element of the religious experience was 
not also included among the choices, but Abelard’s binary option does serve to focus the 
attention on the most basic division that relates to most people. The study of the psychology of 
conversion was certainly not very advanced in Abelard’s time and even if it were, conversion is 
often felt, rightly or wrongly, by those going through it to be a conscious, reasoning experience. 
For completeness, I anticipate some critics and note here that although advances in religious 
anthropology, sociology and psychology over the past decades have contributed much to the 
understanding of how religion develops in individuals and groups, and Abelard’s binary choice is 
oversimplified, it is not thereby invalidated as an outline of the operative systems at work in 
developing belief and faith. 
157  Abelard, Dialogue, p. 64. 
158  Ibid., p. 65 
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That reason is explained in terms of obedience to the Law.159 If one believes 
that a higher authority has relayed an instruction through an intermediary, one 
cannot be faulted for obeying the instruction in good faith, even if it were not 
delivered personally. 
In addition, the Jew continues, obeying the Law is also a way of showing one’s 
love for God through deeds, an option not open to those who don’t have the 
law.160 And finally, if obeying the Law does no good, it also does no harm, so one 
must either find fault with the Law or “stop asking why we follow it.”161 
The Jew continues with a recitation of how much hardship and persecution 
Jews must put up with simply because they are Jews and follow the Law.162 
The Philosopher then commences with an examination of whether the choice 
to follow the Law is based on a correct or incorrect intention.163 
Intention is a key concept to understanding Abelard’s work, for it underlies the 
whole of his ethics. In his work on the subject, entitled Ethics,164 Abelard makes 
intention the most important component of action as regards sinfulness, 
supplanting even action or desire. Acts, according to Abelard, are not in and of 
themselves sinful. The intention behind the act is what must be considered. He 
gives the example of a runaway servant who kills his master in order to prevent 
himself being killed. In that his intention was not to kill his master, but to prevent 
his own death, the servant should not be accused of murder. A significant 
problem with granting intention such an exalted status was perceived early on by 
one of Abelard’s strongest contemporary critics, Bernard of Clairvaux, when he 
opined that “[h]ell was filled with good intentions and desires.”165 
In the context of the Dialogue, the question for the Philosopher is therefore 
whether the intention is sufficient for the Jews to put up with all of the trials and 
tribulations that they are faced with: 
                                            
159  In his original Latin text, Abelard consistently uses the word “lex” for Law. This is not surprising 
or unusual, but as an interpretation of Torah does not sufficiently cover the didactic aspects at 
work in the Hebrew hrwt. 
160  Abelard, Dialogue,  pp. 66-67. 
161  Ibid., p. 67. This compares easily with Pascal’s Wager: if there is no God, then believing in Him 
does no harm, but if there is a God, then believing in Him does me good while not believing in 
Him does me Harm…I therefore choose to believe in him. 
162  Ibid., pp. 67-68. 
163  utrum haec intentio recta sit an erronea. 
164  Abelard Peter, Ethics, in Ethical Writings, Paul Vincent Spade (trans.) (Indianapolis/Cambridge: 
Hackett Publishing Company, Inc.) 
165  L'enfer est plein de bonnes volontés ou désirs. Often incorrectly attributed as original—in the 
paraphrase ‘the road to hell is paved with good intentions’—to other speakers including Mark 
Twain, George Bernard Shaw, James Boswell, Samuel Johnson and John Ray. 
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Surely there’s no religious faith that doesn’t believe it serves 
God and doesn’t do for His sake the things it supposes to 
please Him. Yet you don’t for that reason approve of all other 
people’s sects; you try to defend yours alone or to put it far 
ahead of others.166 
The Philosopher then embarks on a long discussion of the merits of the 
natural law in the Biblical period prior to the formalised institutionalisation of 
Judaism, when the Adamite, the Noahite and the Abra(ha)mic covenants—which 
he sees as equivalent to the natural law—were quite sufficient. The natural law 
was quite simple: love for God and neighbour. This in contrast with the natural 
law whose simple faith and obedience had already secured for Abraham “and his 
seed the promise of the land and of future multiplication.” 
The Philosopher places the beginning of the decline with the introduction of 
circumcision, from which, he notes, no reward, either in this life or the next, is 
attached.167 168  
Furthermore, the Philosopher continues, the natural law must be considered 
sufficient for most people, inasmuch as circumcision and other outward works 
characteristic of the Law were given only to the Jews and not to other peoples. 
The Jew begins his reply by noting that while the natural law may be sufficient 
for salvation, that does not exclude the possibility of circumcision and other 
outward forms having positive contributions to make for the Jews. The first of 
these is the idea of separating the faithful from the unbelievers around them after 
Abram had been led from his land and kinfolk.169 These practices so separated 
the faithful from the surrounding peoples, that there was little chance of 
intermingling.170 
To the question of rewards, the Jew notes that it appears true that there are 
only earthly rewards attached to following the requirements for circumcision, 
cleanliness, and the laws of kashrut which prohibit the eating of certain foods. 
                                            
166  Nulla quippe est fidei secta, quae se Deo famulari non credat et ea propter ipsum non operetur, 
quae ipsi placere arbitratur. Non tamen ideo sectas omnium approbatis, qui solam vestram 
defendere aut longe ceteris nitimini praeferre. Abelard, Peter, Dialogue, p. 69. 
167 Ibid., p. 70. 
168  Abelard devotes much attention to circumcision, almost to the point of fixation. It has been 
noted (cf. Irvine, Martin, The Pen(is), Castration, and Identity: Abelard's Negotiations of Gender, 
a paper presented at Cultural Frictions: Medieval Cultural Studies in Post-Modern Contexts 
Conference, October 27-28, 1995), that this may bear a direct relation to his own castration. Be 
that as it may, it detracts nothing from the content of the Dialogue itself, any more than 
Kierkegaard’s unrequited love weakens the power of Fear and Trembling. 
169  Ibid., p. 75. 
170 Ibid. 
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That is deceptive however, and only reflects that the requirements were issued at 
a time when the “people were still carnal and rebellious.”171  
The Philosopher notes that those restrictions don’t apply to real sins, such as 
murder or adultery, which are not atoned for by sacrifice, which is how violations 
of the cleanliness laws are dealt with, but by death, which doesn’t allow for 
purification leading to salvation. And this is, for the Philosopher, a key point, 
returning to the issue of intention which he brought up earlier. For “[j]ust as the 
soul’s guilt is brought on by its willing (its intention. DS), so it is at once pardoned 
through its contrite heart (…)” 
The Philosopher concludes this part of the dialogue, even though the Christian 
has not yet contributed anything to answering the question the Philosopher posed 
to both of them in regards to the question of the origin of faith, by taking the 
position that the others “can recognise that I need not submit to [the] burden [of 
the Law].”172 
Dialogue Between the Philosopher and the Christian 
Having exhausted the discussion of the first principles with the Jew, one might 
have expected that the same theme would be taken up with the Christian. The 
authority on which Christian faith rests is, after all, different from that which 
supports Jewish faith, involving as it does the intervention of God in the world 
through incarnation. That discussion, however, is left untouched and the theme 
becomes teological: what is the ultimate destination of mankind and what is the 
best route to get there?  
Turning to the Christian, the Philosopher follows what will later come to be 
known as an evolutionary or developmental theology in expressing the 
expectation that the Christian’s Law “should be more perfect, stronger in its 
reward, and more reasonable in its teaching, the later it is.”173 
After some initial banter, the Christian, in contrast to what we saw in the 
dialogue with the Jew, takes the initiative and redefines the terms of the 
discussion to, in fact, anticipate the conclusion by obtaining the agreement of the 
Philosopher that they are talking about the same thing, but from a slightly 
                                            
171  Compare some Islamic explanations of the blessings of Paradise (including food, shade and fair 
maidens, all of which evoke many fond imageries to the Arab living in the harsh desert), in 
which the pleasures of the afterlife are explained in physical terms in order to underline that 
Paradise is superior to what is available here on Earth.  
172  Ibid., p. 89. 
173  That position ignores, of course, or at least downplays the possibility of impurities creeping in, 
which is a common theme in early Protestantism, the Catholic Reformation and, on a somewhat 
smaller scale, the Jesus Movement in North America and Western Europe in the 1970s which 
attempted to strip Christianity of all the excess baggage it had accumulated over 2000 years 
and return to the supposed purity of the undoubtedly somewhat mythical Early Church. 
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different perspective: the Philosopher’s ethics is the equivalent of the Christian’s 
divinity studies. The difference in focus is that the Christians concentrate on the 
destination, where the ethics should lead, and the Philosopher on the means of 
arriving at that destination through proper action.174 
The philosophers seek reasons, where the Jews seek signs, the Philosopher 
quotes the Gospel, and that also demonstrates the superiority of Christianity over 
Judaism: that Christian preachers succeeded in converting Greeks through 
reasons. Greeks who were not only inquirers into these subjects, but their 
discoverers as well. 
The Christian notes that the Philosopher appears hereby to have surrendered 
the battle and should therefore no longer “legitimately hesitate about our faith.”175 
The Philosopher then notes that many of those conversions were at the point 
of a sword and it was only after the conversion of the rulers that Christianisation 
really took hold anywhere.176 
And when, the Christian continues, one agrees that in Christ “both the natural 
law was restored and the perfect discipline of morals was handed down by no 
one but him,” one must agree that it’s enough to be saved.177 
The importance of reason, of investigation, in Christian faith, is agreed by both 
parties with the Philosopher taking the position that faith that does not submit to 
reason—in opposition to Gregory’s dictum that ‘faith for which human reason 
supplies a test has no merit’—is itself without merit, leaving as it does no grounds 
for discussion. The Christian does not dispute that, but qualifies it with the note 
that there sometimes appear to be reasons when there are none.178 
Having taken rather a long and circuitous route in establishing the terms under 
which their dialogue is to proceed, the discussion begins in earnest with the 
subject of the dialogue being decided as the comparison of views concerning 
what the ultimate good is and the road by which one can reach it. 
The ultimate good, according to the Philosopher, is that which “makes anyone 
who has arrived at it blessed.”179 Its opposite, ultimate evil, is that which, when 
attained, makes one wretched. 
                                            
174  Ibid., p. 93. 
175  Ibid., p. 94. 
176  Ibid., p. 95. Both of these points can be considered throwbacks to the original dialogue between 
the Philosopher and the Jew as to the question of the source of belief. Curiously, this theme is 
not further developed using the argument from the first dialogue that, after conversion, whether 
by sword or any other means or inducement, individual reflection keeps one believing. 
177  Ibid. 
178  Ibid., p. 96. 
179  Ibid., p. 99 
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Ultimate good may also be called virtue, which is to be achieved by “the study 
of moral literature, exercise or taming the flesh, so that the good will that is firmed 
up into a habit can be called virtue.” The blessed, in the Philosopher’s view, are 
those of a “strong in good morals (…) the virtues.”180 
When asked, the Philosopher agrees with the Christian that Philosophers also 
put value “on the soul’s immortality and on a kind of blessing in a future life,” in 
return for their merits.181 And later, that “a human being’s ultimate good, or ‘final 
good’ as it was called, is the future life’s blessedness and virtues are the way to 
get there.”182 
It should be noted here that Abelard may be setting the scene for serious 
problems later. He seems to be positing salvation or justification through merit—
the way that one gets to the ultimate human good—through the building up of 
credits through virtuous behaviour. The role of the intercession of the third 
Person of the Trinity, held by Christians to be singular and decisive, is not even 
touched upon, let alone emphasised.183 Even the person of Jesus, in fact, does 
not play much of a part in these dialogues, which may appear odd in a dialogue 
whose stated purpose is to determine which religion the Philosopher should 
choose. When one considers, however, that the dialogue is to be based on 
finding the religion that is most in accordance with reason, then it perhaps 
becomes less of a problem for some. If, that is, one accepts that that objective is 
a reasonable one, a position that many will have difficulty with, as it seems to 
eviscerate Christianity’s unique saving proposition among the religions.184 We 
may note a certain irony in the fact that a dialogue that is supposed to be about 
religion spends very little time discussing the religious. Only a short time later, 
Abelard wrote Ethics, which one would assume from the title to be a philosophical 
elaboration of a system of ethics. In fact, though philosophy of ethics does play a 
part in it, much more attention is paid to elements of the religious life, such as sin, 
confession, repentance, etc., in Ethics than in the Dialogue.  
Ultimate human good and ultimate human evil—as distinct from ultimate good 
and evil—are the subject of the next section of the dialogue, with some 
considerable discussion of the role of credits and debits accumulated by virtuous 
or non-virtuous acts. The conclusion reached by the Christian, and not in any 
                                            
180  Ibid., p. 100 
181 Ibid., p. 100-101 
182  Ibid., p. 103. 
183  I leave it to my colleagues of dogmatics and church history to work this out further, but it seems 
to me that, read in isolation, a danger that all texts are prone to, one could easily conclude that 
one was dealing with what some would unhesitatingly label a heretical document. 
184  Gospel of John 3:16. 
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significant way contested by the Philosopher, is that ultimate human evil and 
good are “his ultimate hatred or ultimate love for God”185 respectively, directed as 
they are to achieving, or rejecting, the ultimate good, which is God. Here Abelard 
reflects back on a point raised during the dialogue between the Jew and the 
Philosopher, but now, the hatred or love as such is sufficient to please or 
displease God. And the hatred or love extends beyond this life, and those who 
are being punished increasingly hate the Author of their punishment, while those 
who are being rewarded increasingly love Him.186 
 A key concept in this ultimate human good, the Christian continues, is seeing 
the blessedness of God,187 for whoever sees God will see his blessedness 
increase, not solely through the act of seeing, but progressively through the act of 
increasing understanding.  
The Philosopher then asks whether the “vision of God that blessedness 
consists of can be increased or diminished by some difference of place, or 
whether it can be displayed to all in all places equally, or if some fixed place is 
allocated to it (…)”188 
The Christian’s reply is clear: “(…) In fact, he’s the one (…) shouldn’t be said 
so much in to be in a place (…) as to enclose inside himself all places, containing 
even the very heavens (…)”189 
And later: “Indeed, the Lord Jesus plainly implies that this paradise 
everywhere consists in the very vision of God, when, on the day his soul, having 
suffered in the flesh, descended into hell to set his own people free from there, he 
said to the thief who acknowledged him, ‘Amen I say to you, today you will be 
with me in paradise.’190  
And yet later: “The venerable teacher Augustine, who was also most expert in 
your (the Philosopher’s. DS) teachings, explained this carefully. He said ‘We are 
near to or far from God, not in places but in morals.”191 
The Philosopher then inquires as to those references in the Old and New 
Testaments that seem to indicate physical location and/or movement, i.e. Jesus 
to heaven, sitting at the right hand of the father, etc.192 
                                            
185  Abelard, Peter, Dialogue, p. 123 
186  Ibid.  
187  Ibid. pp. 123-127 
188  Ibid. p. 128. 
189 Ibid. 
190  Ibid., p. 129. 
191  Ibid., p. 130. 
192  American stand-up comedian George Carlin, raised in the Roman Catholic tradition but noted 
for his strong anti-church stance, took this concept of physical location and movement to its 
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That, the Christian explains, needs to be understood mystically, prophetically, 
and not “judaically” or literally. 
The dialogue concludes with a discussion that goes back to Abelard’s earlier 
point, the importance of intentions.193 
Nothing, whether action or object, can be said, according to the Christian, to 
be in and of itself good or evil, but the intention makes it so. And so can one, in 
Shakespeare’s phrase, appear to be ‘cruel to be kind.’194  
At this point, the dialogue ends, but is not concluded. The closing words 
indicate that it goes on, in fact, for some time. What is discussed, though, is not 
for us to know. 
The dialogue not being concluded, we don’t know whether, eventually, the 
Philosopher is persuaded. Certainly agreement has been reached on a number 
of points, but he has not at any stage said, ‘yes, you’re right, I must become 
either a Jew, a Christian or anything else’. 
Observations 
Abelard’s choice of a human as adjudicator in this matter, his choice of mens 
mensura mundi, well in advance of the rise of humanism, and before some of the 
writers who will be presented below, sets him apart from many commentators, 
even as his choice of a dream setting places him firmly within the tradition of 
others who have dealt with this subject. 
Abelard reveals some limited inclusivism in this work, especially when he has 
the Jew say that the Christian, who has “two horns” in his two Testaments which 
he is armed with, will be able to answer questions that the Jew, cannot. This us 
— believers — against them—non-believers—model will also be seen again in 
other writers, up to and including the organisers of the Parliament of Religion 
(1893) who wanted to make common cause against the atheists. 
One may also see an inclusivist tendency in Abelard’s emphasis on the 
omnipresence of God, in fact, the in-ness of the world in God. For such a model 
must perforce include even the non-believers, regardless of their spiritual state. 
That does not mean, however, that Abelard is attempting to do away with the 
dictum “Extra Ecclessiam, nulla salus,” for hell continues to have a role to play in 
his theology.  
                                                                                                                       
logical and humorous conclusion when he used it to prove(?) that God couldn’t be omnipresent 
if He had to move from place to place, and therefore, was also not all-powerful, as he would be 
“subject to physical laws (…) making Him only slightly superior.” (Carlin, George, “Religious 
Life” in An Evening with Wally Londo featuring Bill Szlazo, (Little David Records, LD-1008, 
1975)  
193  Abelard, Dialogue, p. 142 ff. 
194 “I must be cruel, only to be kind,” Hamlet. Act iii. Sc. 4. 
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Abelard’s dialogues, in contrast to the dialogues of Socrates, for example, are 
in fact true dialogues (even though slightly weighted towards one side), with each 
participant raising critical issues and not merely raising facile questions for the 
master to dispose of. This makes them fit starting points for discussions covering 
a wide range of topics in a variety of settings. Even his lack of a definite 
conclusion could be placed in a post-modernist framework in which discussions 
never can be completed. 
His inclusivist elements notwithstanding, however, the model Abelard has 
chosen is clearly exclusivist. He rejects any positive truth from his dialogue 
partners, except as superseded by Christianity, and his objective is individual 
conversion through mission. Abelard, then, remains firmly within the boundaries 
set by the Apologists: there is one Truth and Christians have it; non-Christians or 
heretics do not. All are, however, participants in the one great drama of salvation, 
either as saved or damned, simply because there is but one single World, which 
is ‘in’ God. 
Does Abelard offer a way out of the maze we have set ourselves, offering an 
explanation of the theological use of religious dialogue? While he does contribute 
some significant points, and makes significant contributions to the process of 
dialogue itself, the stated purpose of his dialogue—to identify a religion that is 
reconcilable with logic and reason, and therefore fit to be adopted by a non-
believer—falls well short of the goal of inter-religious dialogue in the modern day. 
It may well be acceptable as a theory of mission, of conversion, but we must look 
elsewhere to find an answer to our original question 
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IX. Nicholas of Cusa and the Peace of Faith 
Cardinal Nicholas Cusanus (1400-1464) is one of the first important thinkers of 
the modern age, living as he did on its cusp, where the renaissance began the 
slow disintegration of medieval feudalism, where calls for reform if not yet 
Reformation began to be heard in the European Church, where the Western 
Church again took pride of place over the Eastern, and, more important for our 
purposes here, where the ongoing confrontation with the Muslim world led to the 
destruction of the Byzantine empire and, as a result, of the Byzantine Church as 
a dominant force in Christianity.  
It will be helpful for our purposes to locate Nicholas in his context, for that 
informs both his contribution and his contradictions. The Hundred Year’s War 
between France and England was on-going; in Bohemia, the Hussites had 
produced the first viable heterodox Christian community within the borders of 
Western Europe; in the face of the Muslim advance, the Eastern and Western 
Churches were trying, with varying degrees of enthusiasm and very near 
success, to heal the schism that had separated the two halves of Christendom for 
nearly 400 years.  
It was Nicholas’s relationship with the latter occurrence that has led to his 
lasting influence. As a papal envoy, he had been dispatched to Constantinople as 
part of the discussions regarding the council that would discuss—and briefly 
succeed in—healing the rift between the patriarchies of Rome and 
Constantinople. When the city was conquered in 1453, Nicholas, along with many 
of his contemporaries, was shocked, as much by the violence of the conquest as 
by the paradigm shift that the fall engendered.195 How could Constantinople fall? 
Had God chosen the side of Islam? Would all of Christendom be next?196 
In a fever of activity (in the three months immediately following his learning of 
the catastrophe in Constantinople, in addition to his other duties), Cusa wrote one 
of his most important works, De Pace Fidei — On the peace of faith — in which 
he set out a plea for terrestrial peace in the form of a celestial dialogue, on the 
                                            
195  Van Cusa, Nicolaas, Godsdienstvrede, Jos Lievens (trans.) Jos Decorte (commentary), 
(Kampen: Uitegeverij Kok Agora) 2000, pp. 7-8 
196  I note in passing the similarities in reaction to the fall of Constantinople and the attacks on New 
York City and Washington, D.C. on September 11, 2001, less than five months before this 
writing. Everywhere in the Western world, in the immediate aftermath of the attacks, similar 
cries about the clash of civilisations, calls for retribution, and extensive discussions about the 
relationship between Christian civilisation, so-called, and Muslim civilisation (an inaccurate term 
by which is usually meant countries including the Arabic-speaking, Islamic-confessing 
civilisations of the Maghreb and contiguous Islamic countries through to Pakistan). 
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basis of the determination that the religions of the nations and their adherents 
already share the same faith, regardless of whether they realise it, and that 
recognition of that fact among the peoples would lead to the end of religious 
wars. 
While it would certainly add to the drama of the moment if it were true, it is not 
so that Nicholas was shocked into the revelations contained in De Pace Fidei by 
the events of May 1453. The whole of the philosophical and theological 
underpinnings of the work had been laid a decade and a half before, during a 
return voyage from Constantinople where he had been serving as a papal 
emissary to a council dedicated to preparations for the Ferrara-Florence councils 
aimed at the ending of the East-West schism. Rather, May 1453 seems to have 
galvanised him into writing a more popular treatment of a much more substantial, 
though theoretical, version of the same subject already dealt with in 1440 in De 
docta ignorantia, — On learned ignorance — which was inspired, according to 
Nicholas, by a revelation “from on high”197 in 1437.198 
 
De Pace Fidei 
De Pace Fidei purports to be the record of a vision had by someone who was 
familiar with Constantinople through having visited it in the past. So upset is he 
on hearing of the “horrors perpetrated by the Turkish sultan”199 that he prays to 
God to limit the persecutions of the faithful.200 As a result of the prayer, the man is 
granted a vision201 “perhaps due to his long contemplation,” which shows him that 
                                            
197  Nicholas of Cusa, Selected Spiritual Writings, H. Lawrence Bond (Trans. and introduction), The 
Classics of Western Spirituality # 89, (New York: Paulist Press) 1997, p. 6. In fact, even the 
sequence of the material handled reflects the earlier work. 
198  The importance of the revelation notwithstanding, I also note that Nicholas was not alone in 
some of the views contained in De docta ignorantia, and they may owe more to his time in 
Constantinople than is commonly stated. At the council of Ferrara-Florence (1438-39), for 
example, to discuss the East-West schism, the representative of the Eastern Church (and a 
Platonist) Gemistus Plethon stated that he was convinced that “there would soon be but one 
religion in the world.” When asked whether that would be Islam or Christianity, Plethon replied, 
“neither.”  (cf. Godsdienstvrede, p. 27)  
199  Cusa, Godsdienstvrede, p. 47 
200  Ibid. 
201  Some have seen in the fact that it is a vision an acknowledgement by Nicholas that his dream is 
unachievable. cf. Godsdienstvrede, p. 8. Considering that all the points raised in De Pace Fidei 
have been extensively treated elsewhere, such as in De docta ignorantia, which was addressed 
to no less than a cardinal of the Vatican, it seems to me that too much may have been read into 
this. Apart from this literary device, how else would one have God, Jesus, the apostles, and all 
the representatives from the world’s faiths gather to have this dialogue? 
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religious peace is possible, if only “the right steps were taken in an honest 
effort.”202 
He was carried up to a ‘spiritual’203 height, where sages sat in conference with 
the denizens of heaven, under the chairmanship of God to discuss the question 
of the complaints that had reached heaven from many quarters regarding taking 
up arms in the name of religion, and “using (…) power to force others to 
renounce their old, familiar faith or to kill them’.204 
One of the wise, who had been appointed to watch over the nations of the 
earth, introduces the subject by reminding God, the assembled audience, and 
more importantly, the reader, that everything humanity has is from God, down to 
its very soul. This has as a result that every human being already has everything 
(s)he needs to turn the ‘eye of the soul205,’ towards God, if (s)he were inclined to 
do so.  
Here we may see a foreshadowing of what is to come, for in noting the human 
capacity for turning towards God, Nicholas puts no conditions on it, nor does he 
refer to turning towards Jesus, following the Koran, etc. The implication is that 
every human being, in his or her current, unchanged, natural state, need only 
want to approach God to be united with the highest love and ‘return to his 
origins.’206 
But, he continues, most people live lives that are nasty, brutish and short, and 
have no time ‘to seek out the hidden God.’  
Prophets have therefore been appointed to the peoples, ‘to act as [God’s] 
representatives,’ to set up cults and laws and to teach the illiterate.207 
Different prophets for different peoples at different times.208 
It is, continues the wise one, “characteristic of human existence on earth to 
view long-lived customs as laws of nature and to defend them as truth. Thus 
arise serious differences of opinion, when one community prefers its belief to that 
of another.”209  
                                            
202  Ibid., p. 48. 
203  Latin = spiritus; a state of mind above the rational that is necessary to achieve ‘learned 
ignorance.’ cf. Cusa, Godsdienstvrede, p. 48. 
204  Ibid. 
205  In contrast to human reason and other faculties based on the senses. Ibid., p. 49.  
206  Ibid. 
207  Ibid., p. 50 
208  Ibid. Compare, Koran, Sura 40:78—“We have sent forth other apostles before you; of some you 
have already heard, of others We have told you nothing. (…)” 
209  Ibid. 
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To resolve this crisis, then, direct intervention by the object of all humanity’s 
worship is required.210 After all, the sage continues, “You are the only one that 
people worship in all of what all of humanity worships, nobody attempts to 
achieve anything but good, which is what You are…in every spiritual search, 
everyone is only looking for the truth, which You are.211  
This is possible because God is “unknown to all and indescribable,” which is 
why there are different religions that appear to look in different ways and use 
different names.212 If God should so choose, however, then all the troubles would 
cease and “All people would see that there is but one single religion in the 
diversity of religions.” That realisation would not result in the disappearance of 
the variety of practices, nor is that desirable: diversity leads to more piety. 
The sage completes his speech with an appeal that God intervene, as he can 
according to his wishes, to stop the religious violence.213 
 
Here ends Part I of De Pace Fidei.  Before moving on to look at Part II, I 
should like to pause briefly to reflect on some of the aspects raised in the first 
part. 
Some commentators have wondered how De Pace Fidei was ever published 
at all, or, once published, how it managed to avoid being put on the Index of 
Prohibited Books.214 This is not an idle question, especially given the general 
tenor of the time in which it was written. One might reasonably expect that the 
concept of a single religion but a diversity of religious expressions would have set 
mid-1400 Inquisitional alarms bells ringing. Only twelve years previously, at the 
Council of Florence, the Decree of the Copts had been published in which the 
axiom, extra ecclesiam nulla salus—outside the Church, no salvation—had been 
promulgated in its most rigid form.215 On the other side of the coin, it is interesting 
                                            
210  Ibid., 51. 
211  Ibid., I have elsewhere (Suchard, D. Faith without Borders?) criticised the indiscriminate use of 
the inclusive in such statements. In fact, as in the case of Satanism, to name but one example, 
‘good’ is not what the believers pursue. This should be considered distinct from the Calvinist 
position that “all men are inclined to evil,” and represents those for whom a conscious choice 
has been made against ‘good’ or ‘truth.’  
212 Ibid. Compare the Hindu expression: “There is but one God, but He has many names.”  
213  Ibid., p. 52. 
214  Dupuis, Jacques, S.J., Toward a Christian Theology of Religious Pluralism, (Maryknoll, N.Y.: 
Orbis Books), 1997, p. 108 
215 Ibid. In his book, which has been criticised by the Vatican for what it sees as errors in Catholic 
teaching, Dupuis traces an inverted-V graph for the development of the extra ecclesiam 
doctrine, rising from the beginning of Christianity until 1442 (Council of Florence) after which, 
under the influence of the discoveries of new faiths following Columbus’s voyages, it began a 
downward trend. 
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to note that Nicholas’s plea for the end to religious conflict did not stop him from 
helping to organise what would prove to be an abortive Crusade (under Pius  II) 
against the Turks to retake Byzantium in 1564, after a nine-year delay caused by 
political disputes.  
 
A number of key themes have been developed in Part I. They mirror to a great 
extent the content of Chapter One of De Docta ignorantia, entitled ‘How knowing 
is not knowing.’216  
As in Pace Fidei, Docta Ignorantia begins with a discussion of the nature of 
things and how “by divine gift there is within all things a certain natural desire to 
exist in the best manner in which the condition of each thing’s nature permits. 
Toward this end all things work and possess the appropriate instruments.”217 In 
other words, everyone seeks good and has the ability, by the grace of God, to 
find it.218 
With irrefutable logic, Nicholas continues that “no sound mind can reject what 
is most true” and the same “sound [mind] and free intellect knows as true that 
which, from an innate searching, it insatiably longs to attain (…)” 
The inquiry, however, must needs be proportional, for “all who investigate 
judge the uncertain proportionally by comparing it to what is presupposed as 
certain.”219 That becomes problematic when the infinite enters the equation, for 
“the infinite escapes all proportion, the infinite as infinite is unknown.” 
Nicholas concludes Chapter One with a conclusion that “if the desire for 
knowledge is not in vain, surely then it is our desire to know that we do not know. 
If we can attain this completely, we will attain learned ignorance.”220  
It is a different form of ignorance that afflicts humanity in Part II of Pace Fidei. 
With the freedom granted by the divinity, humanity chose to pursue “the stimulus 
of the sensual life that comes from the world of the lord of darkness.”221 
                                            
216 Bond, H. Lawrence, (Trans. and introduction), Nicholas of Cusa, Selected Spiritual Writings, The 
Classics of Western Spirituality # 89, (New York: Paulist Press), p. 87 
217  Ibid., pp. 87-88. 
218  Ibid. Compare this with the Aristotelian view of virtue, where virtue is described as being the 
best that one can be, given the parameters—physical limitations and context—within which one 
must work. In fact, though when read in isolation by the modern reader, Nicholas may seem to 
be coming up with concepts that were revolutionary for his time, he is firmly anchored in the 
philosophy that preceded him. The title of De Docta Ignorantia, for example, and several of its 
concepts are directly borrowed from [Pseudo-]Dionysius the Areopagite. One also hears echoes 
of the Alexandrian Hypatia, the Greek Proclus, and others. See further, De Crescenzo, Luciano, 
Storia della filosofia medioevale, (Milan: Arnoldo Mondadore Editore S.p.A.) 2002. 
219  Ibid. 
220  Ibid. p. 89 
221  Pace Fidei, p. 53. 
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Only through the use of prophets had God been able to “recall errant 
humanity” to the path of righteousness. 
That call was not completely successful, however, God says in Pace Fidei, 
and it was necessary to send the Word “who covered himself with human Being 
and ultimately brought light to humanity, which was enslaved to its too-free 
will.’222 
Through his blood witness, the Word showed humanity that there was eternal 
life, which “is nothing but the ultimate desire of the inner person [and] (…) the 
truth [that eternally] (…) gives eternal nourishment to the spirit.”223 
Nicholas here gives a preliminary taste of what will later cause his greatest 
difficulty: the incarnation and person of Jesus. He very nearly succeeds, and then 
at the last moment fails in resolving this very difficult issue in any pluralistic 
theology. 
It will be helpful here if we pause to look in some depth at a crucial element of 
Nicholas’s philosophy, discussed at great length in Docta Ignorantia: the concept 
of infinity and how that must lead to an admission of ignorance on the part of the 
thinking person. 
A number of key points will need explanation here: maximum, unity, minimum,  
contracted, infinity, coincidence. 
Maximum: maximum is quite simply that which nothing is greater than. In 
Nicholas’s lexicon, maximum is the absolute one (italics mine. DS)  and all things 
are in this maximum.224 The Maximum is believed by “the indubitable faith of all 
nations” to be God.225 
Unity: is equal to Being and coincides with maximumness; nothing is opposed 
to it. 
Minimum: Because the maximum has no opposition, the minimum is 
coincident with the Maximum, “and therefore the maximum is in all things.226 
Contracted: a lesser—and therefore finite—form than the maximum from 
which all contracted things come. The “universal unity exists in a contracted way 
                                            
222  Ibid. 
223  Ibid., p 53-54 
224  Docta Ignorantia, p. 89. It is statements such as these that have led to the charge that Nicholas 
is a pantheist and therefore, heretic. (See, for example, De Vries, Theun, Ketters: viertien yawn 
ketterij, volksbeweging en kettergericht, (Amsterdam: Querido) 1998, p. 494.) We shall 
encounter others later. As will become apparent later, I do not subscribe to this view. 
225  Pace Fidei, p. 54 
226 Ibid. 
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as universe, and its unity is contracted in plurality, without which it cannot 
exist.”227 
Infinity: The place where there is one only and all are one.228 Not the sum of 
finite elements. Equal to the Maximum and the Minimum. 
Coincidence: The reconciliation or harmonisation of contradictions at the 
infinite. I.e. maximally (infinitely) large = maximally (infinitely) small. 
The infinite is such a central feature of Nicholas’s thought, that it is probably 
worthy of some digression to cover his treatment of it, for it provides the basis for 
his reasoning that there is only one religion and none of the current religions 
meet the criterion. 
It is, first of all, important to realise that for Nicholas, the infinite is not merely 
the sum of all that is—“(…) where we encounter a greater and a lesser, we do not 
reach the simply maximum.”229 An infinite line, for example, would not be the sum 
of all lines, for when one had accumulated all lines into a very long line, it would 
still be possible to add another line to it, which is a reflection of number, and it 
would therefore not be infinite. Even more to the point, an infinite line composed 
of an infinite number of two-metre long lines would not be longer than an infinite 
line composed an infinite number of one-metre long lines. In that regard, from the 
perspective of the infinite line, a line of two metres is equal to a line of one metre, 
even though in our contracted universe, a two-metre line is clearly longer than a 
line of one metre. There cannot, therefore, be a progression into infinity.230 This is 
as true for the physical universe as for abstract philosophical concepts. 
Furthermore, the intellect can only approach the absolute truth of a thing by 
means of a likeness, and a likeness, however closely it approximates the 
absolute truth of what it represents, can never attain the ultimateness of that 
absolute truth. Truth, therefore, can never be apprehended “precisely as it is.”231 
                                            
227  Ibid. Recent work in the field of physics regarding string theory or membrane theory and 
postulating the possible existence of 11 dimensions and a theoretical infinite number of parallel 
universes—of which the one in which we live is but one—collected in a so-called multi-verse in 
no way damages this theory. The finite universe is merely expanded, but must still, from 
Nicholas’s perspective be resolved in the one unity, which is the Maximum, which is God. 
228  Ibid., p. 22 
229  Docta Ignorantia, p. 90. 
230  Ibid., p. 94. 
231  Ibid., p. 91. Nicholas calls the ultimate truth of something its quidity, or whatness, and notes that 
it is unattainable in its purity, and though it has been pursued by all philosophers, none has 
found it. The problem of quidity has also been taken up in popular literature. One thinks 
especially of the science-fiction work of Robert Heinlein who granted to one of his literary 
creations the ability to grok something, that is, to perceive its quidity. Heinlein obviously 
accepted the difficulty inherent in grokking, as the character involved, Valentine Michael Smith, 
although human, had been raised and educated by Martians, and had great difficulty in passing 
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Even within the contracted universe in which we live, no two things, however 
much they resemble each other will ever achieve precise equality.232 
The ultimate, or infinite, which cannot be approached by comparison—for two 
things can never achieve precise equality—is therefore Unity, or God, 
Which/Who is the  absolute Maximum and Minimum. The implication is, 
therefore, that God, the Maximum, is actually “all that is possible.”233 All that is, 
therefore, arises (flows, issues, comes forth) from that Maximum in a contracted 
way.234  
The only conclusion the reasonable person must reach, therefore—if one 
accepts Nicholas’s premises—is that no one can ever come close to perceiving 
God precisely as He is, an admission that goes far beyond negative theology and 
into, in Nicholas’s phrase, learned ignorance. 
In Part III of Pace Fidei, the celestial gathering continues and the Word who 
became Flesh, speaking on behalf of all, reminds the host that although God’s 
creation is perfect, the free will that has been granted to humanity must regularly 
be called back to the one Truth “that every free spirit must needs see” and the 
“whole diversity of religions brought back to one true religion.” 
The King of Heaven agreeing, the angels are directed to summon the wise 
men of the world together so that they can be made to see the wisdom of the one 
true religion and take that message back to their fellows, who are suffering under 
the differences of the differing religions. The conversion, though, will not be 
forced. Rather it will be accomplished “with the common assent of all people, in 
one mind agreeing to be led to a single, henceforward inviolable religion.”235 
The following peoples are represented in the conclave: the Greeks, 
representing the classical philosophers; the Italians, representing the Western 
civilisations; the Arabs, for simple Islam with its stark monotheism; the Indians, 
who are the representatives of the Eastern religions; the Chaldeans, who may 
represent the peoples of the Mesopotamian peoples; the Jews, representing 
                                                                                                                       
on his ability to his fellow earthlings. (Heinlein, Robert, A Stranger in a Strange Land, (New 
York: Putnam) 1961.  
232 Ibid. 
233  Ibid. 
234  Here again, we encounter the stumbling block that has led some to consider Nicholas to have 
been a pantheist, for in Nicholas’s view, the rock and the tree are just as much the result of a 
creative act by God as people are, and some part of the Maximum resides in them and also in 
humanity. In looking for a model to help get around this hindrance, I was drawn to the computer 
software programming possibilities of the Java object-oriented programming language where 
objects extend other objects and, while they may contain some of the qualities of the 
programming object they extend, they are not that object.  
235 Pace Fidei., pp. 54-55 
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Christianity’s antecedents; the Scythians, or barbarians; the French, representing 
Scholasticism; the Persians, representing Moslem mysticism; the Syrians, 
representing, interestingly, not Moslems per se, but peoples with a long 
philosophical, theological tradition; the Spanish, representing a country where 
Islam, Judaism and Christianity (still in 1453, and again today) co-exist; the Turks 
(in 1453 the greatest perceived threat to Christian Europe, considering the events 
in Constantinople) representing Islam in general; the Germans; the Tartars, 
representing the uncivilised peoples; the Armenians, representing those who 
defend baptism; the Bohemians, representing the Hussites with whom Nicholas 
had had close dealings 20 years earlier and where his first conciliatory attitude 
manifested itself publicly; and the English, representing the heresy of Wycliffe.   
These representatives of what for Nicholas must have seemed the chief 
participants in his theological constellation, are addressed in three parts each by 
a different collocutor: The Word, and the apostles Peter and Paul. 
The Word addresses the first eight, which are concerned with the nature of 
God, the Trinity, and related issues that are analogous with the first two 
commandments related to the oneness of God and the prohibition against 
worshipping other gods or false idols.  
Peter addresses the next five. This section concerns the nature of Christ, his 
divinity, and of his death and its significance.  
Paul, the teacher of the peoples, addresses the final four, which concern rite, 
ritual and dogma. 
The structure of the book seems too neat to have been coincidental. The first 
section can quite easily, for example, be seen as the Old Testament section, the 
second as the New Testament section and the third the post-Scriptural, or 
Church section. 
Alternatively, the Word can be seen as giving the Torah, Peter, the Prophets 
and Paul the Writings. 
More likely, however, and in keeping with the theme of the Trinity that so 
preoccupies Nicholas, as we shall see, the Word speaks of God the Father, Peter 
speaks of God the Son, and Paul, of God the Holy Spirit working through the 
Church.236 
                                            
236  In any case, I believe it highly unlikely that Nicholas chose his speakers at random or because 
he thought his argument too weak in some points, as some commentators do. See, for 
example, Pace Fidei, 78, footnote. 
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The Word 
The Greek 
The Greek, representing classical philosophy as a whole, begins by wondering 
how peoples can be brought to accept another religion than the one they may 
have fought so hard to defend. 
The reply is that there is but one religion, though there may be many 
expressions of it. This is illustrated by a philosophical dialogue such as one finds 
in Plato and other classical philosophers, regarding the question of whether there 
is but one source-wisdom out of which all other wisdom flows. The answer which 
the Word and the Greek ultimately agree on is a principle that stands at the heart 
of Nicholas’s thought: simplicity or unity precedes all diversity, and the simplicity 
is infinite and therefore never attainable by anything else. The Greeks, according 
to the Word, call that ultimate simplicity wisdom. 
The Italian 
Carrying the preceding point further, the Italian joins the discussion and notes 
that the simple wisdom contains all that can be said, because word is in the 
wisdom and the wisdom is in the word. 
Was everything created in wisdom? asks the Word. And is that the same as 
saying that everything was created in the Word? The Italian answers in the 
affirmative, because the Word of the Creator can be nothing other than his 
wisdom. To the following question of whether wisdom is a creature or a creator, 
the Italian answers that God creates everything in wisdom, and therefore must 
Himself be the wisdom of the created wisdom. The Word agrees and concludes 
that wisdom must be eternal, the origin and the most simple, which means that 
wisdom is the one, singular and eternal God. 
The Arab 
The question of polytheism is raised by the Arab, representing the simple, 
monotheistic beliefs of the Moslems. How can polytheists be brought to accept 
the singular God and the singular religion? To resolve this problem, the Word 
moves to the concept of the godhead, which all polytheists accept, and in which 
all of their gods participate, and which precedes all the gods. There is, therefore, 
a single creative creator that precedes the many gods, which is equal to the one 
God. There can, after all, be only one creation. For if there were more, they would 
be preceded by a single creation. The polytheists, then, would have to be brought 
to worship the creator God rather than the subordinate gods in order for them to 
participate in the one religion without forcing them to cast off their own religion. 
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Nicholas dealt with the issue of polytheism at length in Docta Ignorantia 
(Chapter 24): “Pagans also gave names to God according to God’s various 
relations to creatures. They called God Jupiter because of the marvellous 
goodness. (…) They also named God Saturn because of the depth of thoughts 
and inventions regarding the necessities of life; Mars because of victories in 
war…”237 
The difference between the Jews, who were worshipping the “one, infinite God 
whom they did not know, while the pagans themselves were worshipping God in 
God’s unfoldings, that is they were worshipping God wherever they beheld God’s 
divine works.”238  
The problem arose when the pagans “were led astray, for they did not take 
what was unfolded as an image but as the truth. As a consequence, idolatry was 
introduced among the common folk, while the wise, for most part, correctly 
believed in the unity of God (…)”239 
The Indian 
The Indian then asks what the position should be regarding idols. Here the Word 
offers a double solution, depending on the intent of the worshipper. If the idols 
are used to illustrate what is permitted in the true cultus of the one God, then they 
are permitted. If, on the other hand, the idols are themselves considered divine or 
are used to distract believers from the one true religion, they must be destroyed. 
But, replies, the Indian, the people have come to rely on the oracles that are 
often associated with the idols. The Word replies that the oracles are frauds by 
the priests, and if they sometimes give correct answers, then it is simply 
coincidence or, even worse, the work of the evil spirit. When the Indian replies 
that even the Indians will accept this and it is to be hoped that they will then 
destroy their idols, as the very sensible Romans, Greeks and Arabs have done, 
but that will not resolve the problem of the Trinity, which seems to imply 
polytheism, with three Gods. 
Nicholas devotes a lot of time to the discussion of this very crucial point, 
including, in addition to the Indian, the Chaldean, the Jew, the Scythian and the 
Frenchman in it. 
In a simplification of a much more comprehensive treatment of the question of 
the Trinity that he had already dealt with in Docta Ignorantia, Nicholas states that 
God is one and three-one. One in that he has already demonstrated that there 
                                            
237  Docta Ignorantia, 124 
238 Ibid., 124-125 
239  Ibid., 125 
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can only be one creative God, and three-one in that within the infinity of God, 
there is unity, the equality of the unity and the connection between the unity and 
the equality. Further, though there may be three correlations “which in God are 
called persons, [they have] actual being only together in unity.”240  
For Nicholas “the Father is actually God, the Son actually God and the Holy 
Spirit actually God; the Son and the Holy Spirit are actually in the Father; the Son 
and the Father are actually in the Holy Spirit and the Father and the Holy Spirit 
actually in the Son.” He notes, however, that these are only human ways of 
speaking about God and the Trinity and that must, by definition, be contracted 
and therefore unable to see God or the Trinity, as they truly are. 
In terms of our discussion here, the whole issue of the Trinity creates or, if you 
like, identifies, a crucial problem in any attempt to find a single acceptable religion 
among the peoples. For the other two Abrahamic religions, the problem is 
especially critical. How does he deal with it? By restricting his explanation at this 
stage to the metaphorical, Nicholas glosses over the objections the Moslems and 
Jews may raise to his solution of one and three-one, having their spokesmen 
agree that it is a reasonable explanation. It will again arise during the discussion 
of the nature of Christ. Jewish scholars especially, have noted, however, that 
Nicholas does not do justice to the Jewish perspective—strict, non-Trinitarian 
monotheism—on this issue,241 especially when the Jewish spokesman in Pace 
Fidei says that the Jews “will gladly agree when they see that the [Trinity] is the 
simplest form of fertility,”  and claimed that one of the prophets (unnamed. DS) 
“had revealed the Trinity to us, if only summarily.”242  
The Scythian—for Nicholas the simple, peasant folk—has no question, but 
receives the brief to agree that the explanation of the Trinity is so clear that the 
peoples will obviously accept the reasoning “if they hear the explanation that we 
have heard.” 
The Frenchman reiterates that support, but notes that a great disagreement 
remains in the world, namely the question of whether the Word has become 
human to redeem humanity. At this point the Word concludes and passes on to 
Peter to discuss this further. 
Peter 
Before we begin our examination of Peter’s presentation of the role of Christ in 
the search for a single religion, I want to pause briefly to note that Nicholas 
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through Peter makes an assumption here that modern writers might be loathe to 
without also including a treatment of the question in the dialogue: assuming that 
a) Jesus is the Christ and b) that even those who disagree with the belief that the 
Christ is God would agree that Jesus is the Christ. 
Peter begins by addressing the Frenchman’s question, noting that some have 
denied that God’s Word is God. Based on the previous section, where the Trinity 
was discussed at length, Peter doesn’t intend to go into this aspect of the 
question at great length. It is sufficient for him to repeat that it is so. ”He who 
accepts that God’s Word has become flesh or man, must also believe that the 
person whom they call God’s Word is also God.” 
The Persian 
This section is the longest single dialogue in Pace Fidei, including sections 30–41 
or nearly one-sixth of the total. The Persian represents two Moslem theologians, 
Al Ghazali and Ibn Sina, who together may be said to have provided the link 
between classical philosophy and European scholasticism. 
 How, asks the Persian, could God, who is unchanging, become a man? 
How could the creator become a creature? 
This question seems to be a direct challenge from classical philosophy, and 
specifically Plato, who argues in The Republic against God “being a magician”243 
who would change his shape which could only result in a lowering of his state, as 
all conditions that are not God are lower than God. For God to change his shape 
would be a lie, and God is Truth, therefore God would not adopt another shape, 
though he would be capable of it. “The Gods,” quoth Socrates, “are not magicians 
who transform themselves, neither do they deceive mankind in any way.”244  
Peter begins not by discussing whether God could become flesh, but by 
examining again the question of the perception of Christ and his humanity. Peter 
asks the Persian what he means when he calls Christ “God’s Word.” 
The Persian, perhaps referring to sura 5:110 of the Koran, replies that Christ 
received not the divine nature but divine grace, by which he was the messenger 
of God’s message. 
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What then, Peter asks, is the difference between Christ and all the other 
prophets, who also received divine grace? A difference of degree, replies the 
Persian: Christ was the greatest of the prophets.245 
This difference of degree Peter compares with the distinction between a royal 
messenger and the royal heir. One has authority, the other “the living, free and 
unlimited word of the king.” The heir shares (is equal to) the royal nature of the 
king, which gives his message more authority. So, according to Peter, should 
Christ also be seen: as sharing the divine nature of the heavenly King. 
To this the Persian replies that Christ could be another God, if Peter’s 
reasoning is correct, because the parable of the king and the heir implies two 
people. By removing the numeric distinction between the king and the heir, Peter 
tries to resolve the difficulty. The authority remains, regardless of who brings the 
message. “(…) the royal power is one, both in the father and the son. In the 
father it is as if the power were not begotten, in the son as begotten or in the 
living word of the father.”246 
Inasmuch as even the Moslems believe that Christ was the highest possible 
prophet, Peter continues, and they accept that He embodied the Word of God, 
then they must accept that he was God. The Moslems also accept Christ’s 
miracles, such as the raising of the dead, which no human could have 
accomplished. And if His human nature could not achieve that, then his divine 
nature must have. And if He possessed the divine nature, then it also follows that 
he was God. 
What about the Jews, then, the Persian continues, who accept “nothing of 
Christ.”247 
Here Nicholas weakens his own case for the search for a single religion, 
having Peter say: “They can read all that about Christ in their scriptures, but 
because they follow the literal meaning, they refuse to come to insight. But the 
resistance of the Jews will not hinder unity. There are few of them and they will 
not be able to disturb the whole world.”248 
Nicholas was more thorough in discussing Jesus as the Christ in Docta 
Ignorantia, when in Chapter 4 (Section 203), he refers to “countless infallible 
proofs that he is the one whose coming at some future time all creation awaited 
                                            
245  Though Moslems consider Mohammed to have been ‘only’ a prophet, extending the line 
including Adam, Noah, Abraham, Moses and Jesus, most Moslems would be surprised, I think, 
to see Jesus elevated above Mohammed as the greatest. 
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from the beginning and whose appearance in the world he had himself foretold by 
the prophets.”249 
He then combines a number of preceding arguments to arrive at the 
conclusion of Jesus’ divinity:  
“Since through all things God is in all and through all things that are in God, 
(…) and since both these statements must be considered together, in union, as 
God is in all things in such a way that all things are in God, and since the divine 
being is of the highest equality and simplicity, hence God, while in all things, is 
not in them according to degrees, as if communicating Godself by degrees and in 
parts. But none can exist without a difference of degree; for this reason all things 
are present in God according to themselves with a difference of degree. Since, 
therefore, God is in all things in such a way that all are in God, it is clear that, 
without any change to God and in the equality of being all things, God exists in 
unity with the maximum humanity of Jesus, for the maximum human can only 
exist maximally in God.”250  
Syrian 
The Persian is followed by the Syrian, representing a long and varied 
philosophical tradition. The dialogue now turns to the role of Christ, whom the 
interlocutors have just agreed was God. The Syrian wants a proof for the unity of 
God and Christ. The proof, says Peter, is that every religion believes in some 
form of resurrection of the spirit. But, he says, only God is immortal, and the rest 
of creation, mortal and temporary. The resurrection of the spirit, however, implies 
a unification of the mortal with the immortal, the temporary with the eternal. In 
order to accomplish this, Christ, the perfect human is necessary to provide a link 
to the perfect God. That is the salvation, for without Him, no unity would have 
been possible. The other religions believe the same, Peter continues, and have 
rituals to prepare their souls for unity with the eternal. “Christ is assumed by all 
those who hope to achieve eternal happiness251,”  which is eternal life. 
Again, it is the Jews who spoil things, by claiming that the Messiah, whom 
they believe, according to Peter, would be able to achieve those things that Jesus 
did, has not yet arrived. Peter brushes that aside, saying it is sufficient that the 
other peoples acknowledge and recognise that fact. 
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Spaniard 
The question then arises as to the Virgin Birth of Jesus. The Spaniard, 
representing the country that then, and for nearly 40 years after Pace Fidei was 
written, was a country of Christians, Jews and Moslems, wants to know how to 
deal with this question. 
Peter follows his own logic, and notes that the perfect man could not have 
come from an imperfect father, but only from the Holy Father, God. An imperfect 
father could not have passed on perfection. So, too, with the Virgin. A virgin, says 
Peter, is the height of fertility and virginity. Jesus had “Him as father from whom 
every human father receives his fatherhood. And He has her as mother who had 
sexual intercourse with no man.”252  
This theme was also dealt with in Docta Ignorantia (Chapter Five, section 
208). God’s motive here is, having taken pity on human weakness, to clothe the 
Word in a form that humans could understand 
Turk 
The Turk then, following the pattern established in Docta Ignorantia, raises the 
issue of the crucifixion. The question here is whether Christ was crucified at all, 
and if so, by whom. Peter affirms that we must believe in the crucifixion because 
of the evidence of the martyrs who died proclaiming it. But why was it necessary? 
As an example of how worthless this world is, Peter says, and to more loudly 
proclaim the kingdom of heaven, which was best done “by the witness of his 
blood;”253 and to be fully obedient to God.254 Heaven having been hidden before 
Christ, there was no belief and no hope of achieving union with the divine. 
Human nature had to be raised to the highest rank and able to participate in the 
divine nature. Additionally, Christ’s death was necessary for him to cast off his 
human form and regain his divine nature.255 
German 
From the German comes the question of the nature of life eternal, contrasting 
what the Jews and the Moslems are said to believe with what the gospel 
promises. The Jews have only temporary promises, the Moslems promises of 
sexuality, the German says. Christians believe in an angel-like asexual existence. 
How is one to reconcile these inconsistencies? 
The answer lies, says Peter, in how one reads the scriptures. Sexual feelings 
are part of the finite world of the senses and are not necessary in the eternal. The 
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Moslems, therefore, must read their scriptures figuratively and not literally. The 
prophet, in order to keep the people away from idolatry, promised them a future 
that was no less pleasing than the physical world they were accustomed to.  
And what about the Jews? the German continues. They after all have only the 
promise of finite prosperity. The fact that Jews are often martyred for their belief 
indicates a belief that goes beyond the Law, and that does not arise from it. They 
therefore have a faith, and the faith, Peter says, assumes Christ. QED 
With the German, Nicholas concludes the section concerning Christ and His 
place in the One religion that Nicholas is seeking. The Tartar then introduces the 
question of the religious life, and specifically the question of the variety of rites 
and rituals. 
 
Paul 
Tartar 
As is fitting for this subject that concerns the practices of the Church, Peter now 
retires and the apostle Paul, teacher to the peoples, takes over in an explanation 
that shares much, and perhaps for the time, too much, with the future Reformers, 
especially Luther. 
In response to how the diversity of rite and ritual can be reconciled, Paul notes 
that they are only the outward signs of the inner faith and, in any case, it is faith 
and not works that will save the soul. If one accepts that, he continues, then it 
becomes irrelevant that there is a diversity of practice, not only within Christianity 
but among all the religions. 
The Tartar accepting that reasoning, the question then arises as to how faith 
saves. 
Paul’s answer is that faith saves through belief in God, the same God who 
made a promise to Abraham, and through that belief one becomes acceptable to 
receive the grace of God. The faith of Abraham, whose promise was fulfilled in 
Christ. The implication is, based on the preceding, that belief in God equals belief 
in Christ and vice versa. And, as all the religions believe, regardless of whether 
they know it, in the one God, even if that is in the form of the Godhead, then they 
believe in Christ. 
Works do have a part to play, however, for “faith without works is dead.”  
But, counters the Tartar, all the peoples have their different laws from different 
prophets, the Jews from Moses, the Moslems from Mohammed, the Christians 
from Jesus, and other peoples from other prophets. 
In keeping with Nicholas’s principle that all diversity comes from unity, Paul 
notes that there is one prime law, that you love God. All other laws can be 
reduced to that one.    
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Armenian 
The Armenian then inquires about the baptismal font. Baptism is, after all, 
necessary according to Christian belief. 
Inasmuch as other religions, especially the Jews and the Moslems, are also 
familiar with ritual bathing, Paul says they should have no trouble accepting 
baptism as an outward symbol of their belief, as Christ initiated.  
So, the Armenian continues, we must accept baptism because it is necessary 
to be saved. It is most necessary to believe, Paul says. For adults, baptism is not 
essential, if one has not had the opportunity to be baptised. Infant baptism should 
encounter even fewer objections from Jews and Moslems, who already allow 
their male children to be circumcised at the age of eight days for religious 
reasons. In fact, they should applaud the introduction of baptism, even if they 
then decide to also retain circumcision. 
Bohemian 
The Bohemian—representing the Hussites of Bohemia whom Nicholas had 
had such close contacts with twenty years before the writing of Pace Fidei and for 
whom the communion in both kinds (bread and wine) was a principle point—asks 
about how the various peoples can be brought to accept the communion and 
transubstantiation.  
For Paul that is no problem. In the first place, communion is but a symbol of 
the eternal life that we have received through the grace of God. In the second 
place, the same faith that allows one to believe everything else about Christ, his 
mission, God, etc., must allow one to believe in transubstantiation. Only the spirit 
is capable of grasping this mystery, for it is a mystery that plays only at the 
spiritual level. Communion is not absolutely necessary for salvation, Paul 
continues, noting that there are circumstances when one may refuse it. What is 
important is belief. On that basis, the other religions can also determine which of 
their rituals are worthy of keeping and discarding, as long as the belief is kept 
strong. 
Englishman 
Then comes the Englishman, to inquire about the other sacraments, marriage, 
priesthood, confirmation, Last Rites. 
Uniformity, Paul says, is not the goal here. For one thing, it disturbs the 
common peace. In addition, one must take the weakness of people into account, 
as long as it does not put eternal life at risk. marriage and the priesthood should 
prove little difficulty, Paul continues, although the other peoples will agree that 
both sacraments are more pure in Christianity. 
As regards other Christian practices raised by the Englishman, church offices, 
fasting, prayer, etc., Paul again claims not to want uniformity. In fact, he says, 
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piety may increase with diversity as each people strives to outdo the other in 
pleasing God. 
 
Pace Fidei comes rather abruptly to a conclusion. The dialogue, we are told, 
continues, and holy scriptures are brought together and compared. The final 
conclusion that is reached is that there is only one true religion. It happens, 
however, to contain all the points of Christianity, which, as soon as all the 
peoples come to see that will lead to the end of religious wars and conflicts. 
Regardless of how one looks at his argumentation, it is not so that the charge 
can be made against Nicholas that he unfairly treats the question of the one 
religion only from the perspective of his Christianity, from the divinity of Jesus, 
from the question of the Trinity, the Virgin Birth, and the host of other 
particularities that Christianity is heir to. According to his thesis, all religions 
participate in the infinite in degrees, including Christianity, albeit Christianity, in 
his view, to a greater degree than the others. If his thesis has any merit at all, 
then it is beholden upon him to illustrate how Christianity fits into this great model. 
It would be inappropriate for him, and unfair to his faith and his office as a prince 
of the Church, to have tried to concoct a model which ignored these crucial 
elements of Christianity as he saw it. For if his Christianity could not fit into the 
model, then the model is flawed.  
Nor is it unfair for him to attempt to find a place in the model for competing(?) 
religious beliefs. It is for representatives of the other religions who are inclined to 
apply a similar model from their perspective to follow a similar path, but then with 
the core elements of Islam, Judaism, Hinduism, etc., as the foundation upon 
which the other faiths must rest. 
But is it a model that we can apply today to the inter-religious dialogue? 
Throughout Pace Fidei, there rings an undertone of triumphalism. Christianity will 
overcome because, unbeknownst to all the other religions, they already agree 
with it. They are, to anticipate Rahner by more than half a millennium, invisible 
Christians. 
Using this model, then, dialogue should be used to arrive at the point that the 
Pace Fidei dialogue reached, to allow the other believers to realise that 
Christianity is the most perfect religion. It is not, however, the one religion that 
Nicholas introduced early on. 256 Reading between the lines, therefore, one could 
make a case for Nicholas being in favour of a general cease-fire in the religious 
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The limits of an ethic-centric 
 112
wars so that everyone could realise that there was still work to be done in 
progressing towards that one religion. That process would have to start, 
according to Nicholas, by recognising that though we are still far from achieving 
that one religion, all religions are still part of the one religion, and if that were 
recognised, it should allow people to stop slaughtering one another in the name 
of faith and achieving the Pax Fidei. By selecting Christianity as the normative 
opening gambit in the theological peace negotiations, Nicholas opens the way for 
other faiths to present their cases. 
All current participants in the dialogue, however, have made it a prime 
directive that seeking that new religion, often denigrated as syncretism, should 
precisely not be the point of the dialogue. And there is probably too much history 
and too great a power imbalance to even attempt it. 
As a model of dialogue, however, the model that Nicholas presents to us in 
Pax Fidei is no dialogue at all. Unable to resolve the issues themselves, the 
peoples of the world leave it to God to resolve, after which they meekly agree 
with all the points raised and promise to spread the word among their citizens. 
The status quo ante of the dialogue, using Panikkar’s model, is one of 
rejection and conquest, but Nicholas is clearly trying to move initially to a position 
of co-existence and cooperation and, perhaps eventually to appropriation and 
dialogue. 
His model is inclusive to a certain extent, with an emphasis on peaceful 
coexistence. Conflicts will thereby be resolved, leading to peace at the macro 
level of nations and peoples. 
Nicholas’s dialogue is no more real dialogue than Plato’s or Socrates’ was, 
however. On the one hand, the subservient listener and poser of questions, on 
the other, the source of wisdom. The model that Nicholas presents is for 
adherents of different religions to ignore one another and to consult God directly. 
Its value in helping us determine the theological use of the current dialogue 
among believing individuals and faith institutions is therefore, probably, limited. 
On the other hand, his dialogue-through-publication, a meta-dialogue in which 
the questions are addressed at an academic and institutional level and then 
allowed to flow down and influence the actual one-on-one dialogues taking place, 
through, for example, the popularisation of abstract works such as Nicholas’s 
own De Docta Ignorantia which later led to Pax Fidei, may offer some solace. 
There may be more use in discussing the objective of his dialogue. The 
creation of millions of ‘invisible Christians’ was not his goal, after all, but his 
means. His stated goal was to put an end to inter-religious warfare, or 
international warfare that used religion as pretext or motivation. In that regard, it 
is important that Nicholas in his time took time out to consider the role of his faith 
in conflict. If anything, that consideration dominated Nicholas’s career; first the 
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Church’s conflict with the Bohemians, then the schism with the Byzantines, 
concluding with the conflict with Islam.  
Leaving aside for the moment the sad observation that neither he nor anyone 
else for that matter has had much success, at least so far, in eliminating or 
reducing religious-based conflicts, I want only to state briefly here that I don’t 
think that this objective, this theological use of dialogue, is one that should be 
pursued except as a sideline of the main purpose, which will be discussed at 
length further. 
Another possible theological objective, the realisation among believers that 
every human being already has everything needed to turn the ‘eye of the soul’ 
towards God, if (s)he were inclined to do so, regardless of one’s religious 
affiliation, and in so doing finding happiness, may offer a more fruitful avenue. 
Using modern terminology, Nicholas must clearly be placed in the inclusivist 
camp. Not only are all people yearning for the same thing – Good, which is God – 
but all of their faiths are but differing expressions of a common Truth. 
His promotion of the most important elements of Christianity as the basis for 
that Common Truth work against applying his model unabridged in the modern 
dialogue, but, in contrast to the apologists and Abelard who preceded him, he at 
least sees a positive theological contribution from the other faiths. In that, he is 
not limited to the ethical, where good conduct leads to peace, but good, peaceful 
relations among the religions on the basis of their shared spiritual basis would 
result in the unlikely event that his model were to be accepted. 
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X. Rings of the Father: Gotthold Ephraim Lessing 
Jumping forward a couple of centuries, and northward by several degrees of 
latitude, we turn now to a writer who presented his work in a different form of 
dialogue. Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729-1781) was a Saxon by birth, and came 
from a line of magistrates, burgermeisters (mayors), and theologians. His 
ambition from a young age was to be a popular playwright in the style of Molière, 
and insofar as he succeeded in penning the most frequently performed piece in 
the German theatre repertoire, Minna von Barnhelm, one may say that he 
succeeded. 
In addition to plays, Lessing also wrote essays, poetry, and some letters which 
have been survived. Several of his writings will be useful in my present 
investigations, which I shall anchor around one of the best known, if not quite the 
most successful of his plays, Nathan the Wise, (1789) with particular attention to 
what has, perhaps incorrectly, become accepted as the defining exposition of 
Lessing’s theology, the parable of the rings. 
To most modern Western readers, Nathan the Wise will likely not appear a 
play of any particular power. Many of the ideas discussed in it have become, if 
not commonplace and generally accepted—certainly in believing circles—then at 
least familiar to many people. In its day, however, it was a play that challenged 
the laws, customs and assumptions of its society.  
In contrast to Nicholas, Lessing’s primary concern and the focus of his 
philosophical project was not Islam – though Islam plays an important role in 
Nathan – but Judaism, and specifically the question of the position of the Jews in 
post-Thirty Years’ War Prussia and others of the fragmented German states.  
That position was far from enviable. Restrictions in movement, housing, 
education, occupation, and prescriptions as to clothing all served to keep, in this 
case, German cities, for all intents and purposes, free of Jews. 
It is important to remember that the ideas that we, post-Kristalnacht,257 have 
come to associate with German, White Supremacist, Russian nationalist and, 
                                            
257  On the nights of 9 and 10 November 1938 throughout Germany, 101 synagogues and almost 
7,500 Jewish businesses were destroyed, 26,000 Jews were arrested and sent to concentration 
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and Fall of the Third Reich, (New York: Fawcett Crest), 1960, pp. 580-589 and Dawidowicz, 
Lucy, The War Against the Jews 1933-45, (Middlesex: Penguin Books), 1975, pp. 136-141.  
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increasingly in recent years, Moslem anti-Semitism since the Nazi period—the 
role of das Volk, Aryans, pure blood, etc.—were not yet part of the anti-Semitic 
arsenal. The great Russian anti-Semitic forgery The Protocols of the Elders of 
Zion had not yet been written, nor had German Idealist philosopher Johann 
Gottlieb Fichte’s258 concept of the Jews forming a “state within a state” with 
divided loyalties been formulated. The stereotypical image of the Jew in Eastern 
Europe, the Hasid with his distinctive clothing and earlocks that was later so 
caricatured, was not yet common as Hasidism was only just getting underway in 
Lithuania and Poland. Prejudice against the Jews, restrictions in social, 
occupational and physical mobility, and other factors, were based almost solely 
on religious grounds, or at least on grounds that were religiously based.259 
Additional elements, such as the restriction that Jewish beggars might not enter 
Berlin for fear of bringing plague with them, were the result of economic 
conditions arising out of the inability of most Jews to participate in the economic 
life of the society around them. Non-religious elements did play a part, however, 
such as the argument that the Jews “Asiatic temperament” made them unfit for 
emancipation under the Enlightenment.260 
Prior to Nathan, Lessing had written another play that roused the ire of the 
large anti-Jewish segment of the population. Entitled simply The Jews, the short 
play took as its point of departure a Jew who possessed all the qualities a 
gentleman of that time was expected to possess. It was not well received. Critics 
complained that it did not reflect the reality they saw around them, where ignoble 
Jews—perhaps made ignoble by exclusion and projection in equal measure—
were expected and therefore found. 
One Jew at least, however, had managed to break through this image, at least 
to some degree, and was contributing fully to the German Enlightenment: Moses 
Mendelssohn. Originally from the German state of Dessau, Mendelssohn had 
come to Prussia following his teacher. Among his other accomplishments, he was 
                                            
258  See Dawidowicz, Lucy, The War Against the Jews 1933-45, p. 54 
259  The complaint against Jews that they were usurers, for example, arises from the prohibition 
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a philosopher and essayist among whose major concerns was how to break 
through the self-imposed mental ghetto walls that he felt the Jewish community 
had put up around itself in mimicry of the physical ghetto walls thrown up around 
them by the European societies. 
Lessing and Mendelssohn became close friends, and it was through Lessing’s 
intervention—by publishing some essays that Mendelssohn had sent him without 
first asking his consent—that Mendelssohn broke through into the ranks of Berlin 
intelligentsia. It is considered highly likely that Mendelssohn served as the model 
for the character of Nathan.261 
It was, however, not Berlin only or Mendelssohn only that inspired Lessing. 
Family tradition also played a part. Grandfather Lessing for example, as early as 
1669 had defended a Disputatio politica with the theme “On Religious Tolerance”. 
His paper “On the toleration of religion” defended tolerance on the quite practical 
grounds that it had led to “so many years in peace” in Germany.262 Lessing’s own 
experiences, especially when he travelled through the city-states of Italy, where 
he saw on the one hand the shabby and shameful treatment of the Jews in the 
Papal city and, on the other hand, their enlightened, tolerant treatment in 
Livorno.263 
 
Nathan the Wise 
The story 
The scene opens at an unspecified date, sometime between October 1187 (the 
retaking of Jerusalem immediately prior to the Third Crusade264) and 1193, in 
                                            
261  An alternate reading of the inspiration for Nathan is that Lessing was disappointed that the 
German and French lodges of the Freemasons did not allow Jews to join. Lessing was a 
member of the Freemasons and that was a disappointment in its turn to his friend Mendelssohn. 
See also, Ryder, Matthew M., “Goethe, Lessing and Schiller: German Dramatists, Freemasons, 
Poets and Romanticists”, (http://www.freemasons-freemasonry.com/ryder.html (June 2002). In 
the year of Lessing’s death, 1781, the torch passed swiftly to another’s hand, and when 
Mendelssohn was asked by the Alsatian Jews to make a plea for their emancipation, he asked 
another friend, Christian Wilhelm von Dohm, an historian, political writer and Prussian diplomat 
to do it for him. Dohm wrote the essay Über die bürgerliche Verbesserung der Juden (On the 
Civic Betterment of the Jews), Berlin, 1781, based on the same idea that we shall encounter in 
Nathan, that “the Jew is a human being even before he is a Jew.” Cited in Dawidowicz, Lucy, 
The War Against the Jews 1933-45, p. 52. 
262  See Kuschel, Karl-Josef, Jud, Christ un Muselmann vereinigt? Lessings “Nathan der Weise”, 
(Dusseldorf: Patmos) 2004. 
263  Ibid. 
264  It is only possible to ascertain the supposed date from the fact that a Templar was taken as a 
prisoner to Jerusalem, which Saladin’s forces had reconquered in 1187 after nearly a century in 
crusader hands. In the Third Crusade, in which the English king Richard I (Lionheart) and Phillip 
II (Augustus) of France—originally with the assistance of Frederick Barbarossa of Prussia, who 
drowned en route, causing the disintegration of the Prussian crusader army—attempted, 
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Jerusalem, where the Sultan, the Kurd Saladin (d. 1193), who had established 
the Ayyubid sultanate uniting Syria and Egypt with himself as head, was staying 
to supervise the rebuilding of the city.  
Nathan, the play’s eponymous protagonist, is a Jewish merchant and trader 
who has just returned from a business trip. Upon his return, he learns that there 
had been a fire during his absence and his beloved daughter Rachel had only 
just been saved from a fiery death by the timely intervention of a Knight Templar. 
He is told of the fire by Daya, the Christian companion to Rachel. 
The knight, who, it appears, spends all his time pacing morosely under the 
trees at a nearby oasis, was captured in a battle between Saladin’s forces and 
the Crusaders at Tibnin265 and was to have been killed266 until Saladin thought he 
saw his dead brother Assad’s267 face in the face of the young knight. Daya also 
relates that Rachel is completely in love with her saviour from the flames, but he 
won’t have anything to do with her, relations between Templars and Jews being 
what they were.268 
Nathan wants to express his gratitude to the knight for having saved his 
daughter and goes for a meeting. After some initial unpleasantness, again 
because the Templar feels he has to uphold his order’s poor opinion of Jews, 
Nathan and the knight agree to have their relationship be based on the fact that 
they are both men, and neither of them very important or great, rather than on the 
fact that one is Christian and the other Jewish. 
Having overcome his initial reluctance, the knight agrees to come to Nathan’s 
house and meet Rachel, so she too can express her gratitude. Daya, the 
                                                                                                                       
partially successfully, to regain some of the territory of the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem that had 
been gained during earlier Crusades and then lost. 
265  As Nathan is a play and not a historical document, Lessing may be forgiven his rather loose use 
of historical dates. Tibnin featured twice in actions between Crusaders and the Moslem forces of 
the Holy Land. Once when it was captured by Nur Ad-Din, Saladin’s predecessor as sultan, in 
1162, after the Second Crusade, and once in 1197, after the Third Crusade and the death of 
Saladin. 
266  During major field campaigns, the Moslem forces were quite likely to kill Templars when they 
found them (a courtesy that was equally likely to be reciprocated). That was not always the case 
during sieges, however. For more details on the conduct of the Third Crusade, see Maalouf, 
Amin, Rovers, Christenhonden, Vrouwenschenners: De kruistochten in Arabische kronieken, 
José Lieshout (trans) (Amsterdam: Rainbow Pocketboeken) 2001, and Reston, James, Storia 
della Terza Crociata (Edizione Piemme) 2002. (Warriors of God: Richard the Lionheart and 
Saladin in the Third Crusade. (New York: Doubleday, 2001)) 
267  Assad is not based on a real brother of Saladin. 
268  Those relations can best be described as mutual fear and loathing. The monastic Knights 
Templar had no compunctions about killing Jews, and did so with great abandon whenever the 
chance presented itself, which was frequently. The Jews of Europe and of the Kingdom of 
Jerusalem learned quickly to expect no Christian charity from these knights. 
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companion is thrilled at that prospect, for she has a secret agenda. She is only in 
service to Rachel because her husband, whom she accompanied from Europe to 
the Levant on a Crusade, was killed. She believes that if she can get Rachel and 
the knight wed, they will return to Europe, taking her, as faithful handmaiden, with 
them.  
Once he actually meets Rachel for the first time since the rescue, the knight, 
Curt van Stauffen by name, falls madly in love with her, his duty to his order 
notwithstanding. He pledges never again to step into the house unless Nathan 
agrees to their marriage. Nathan, however, on his guard since he has discovered 
the knight’s name, is not yet prepared to give his permission until he has checked 
one or two things. 
In the meantime, we have also been introduced to Saladin, a character based 
on the historical person Yusuf Salah ad-Din, renowned throughout the Muslim 
world as the one who freed the Holy Land, seen from the Muslim perspective, 
from the Crusaders.269 Saladin is going through a bit of a financial rough patch at 
the moment because the tribute from Egypt is late. After consulting with his sister, 
the always reasonable and understanding Sittah, and with his chancellor of the 
exchequer, Al-Hafi, Saladin agrees to approach Nathan with a request for bridge 
financing until the funds arrive from Egypt. 
For reasons which are never made too clear, Saladin doesn’t want to ask 
Nathan directly for the money when they meet, but asks him instead “what faith, 
or moral law, has most appeal for you.”270 For, so reasons Saladin “Of these 
three Religions (Christianity, Judaism and Islam) only one can be the true one.”271 
 
                                            
269  Without wanting to digress too much, I note here in passing that for all his good qualities, 
Saladin’s reputation, to the degree that it is based on his successes against the Crusaders, has 
been highly overrated. In fact, with the exception of one battle, Hittin—which Saladin’s forces 
won because of stupidity on the part of the Knights Templar, who opted to attack in the middle 
of the day without securing a source of water—and the immediate aftermath (which saw 
Saladin’s forces retake many of the Crusader cities) as a result of many of the Crusaders having 
been killed at Hittin, Saladin lost virtually every encounter with the Crusaders of the Third 
Crusade, led by Richard I (Lionheart) of England, and might very well have lost Jerusalem as 
well had Richard not decided to cancel the attack before it began. See also, Maalouf, Amin, 
Rovers, Christenhonden, Vrouwenschenners: De kruistochten in Arabische kronieken, José 
Lieshout (trans) (Amsterdam: Rainbow Pocketboeken) 2001, and Reston, James, Storia della 
Terza Crociata (Edizione Piemme) 2002.  
270  Lessing Gotthold Ephraim, ‘Nathan the Wise,’ Act 3, Scene 5, Bayard Quincy Morgan (trans) in 
Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, Nathan the Wise, Minna von Barnhelm, and other plays and writings, 
Peter Demetz (ed.) (New York: Continuum) 1991 
271  Ibid.  
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The parable of the rings has not always been used to show the benefits of 
suspending absolute truth. In Gesta Romanorum, a medieval (13th/14th 
century) collection of anecdotes, to which moral reflections are attached, the 
story, “Of the Triple State of the World”, is told of a knight who had three 
sons. On his deathbed, he bequeathed the inheritance to his firstborn; to the 
second, his treasury; and to the third, a very valuable ring, of more worth 
indeed than all he had left to the others. 
But the two former had also rings, and they were all apparently the same. 
After their father's death the first son said, "I possess that precious ring of 
my father." 
The second said, "You have it not -- I have." 
To this the third son answered, "That is not true. The elder of us has the 
estate, the second the treasure, and therefore it is but meet that I should 
have the most valuable ring." 
The first son answered, "Let us prove, then, whose claims to it have the 
preeminence." 
They agreed, and several sick men were made to resort to them for the 
purpose. The two first rings had no effect, but the last cured all their 
infirmities. 
The message that was to have been taken from this version is that the 
knight is Christ. The three sons are the Jews, Saracens [Muslims], and 
Christians. The most valuable ring is faith, which is the property of the 
younger, that is, of the Christians.272  
 
So, too, are there other ring stories in a similar, though not identical vein. 
The Dominican Etienne de Bourbon (d. 1261) wrote one of a ring with 
healing power and three daughters. And Old French story “From the real 
ring” (ca. 1270-1294) a contemporary Crusade-era tale which tells 
symbolically of a struggle among three brothers, representing Christianity, 
Judaism and Islam. As Karl-Josef Kuschel notes, all of these stories share 
the fact that they are told by Christians, for Christians, and ‘prove’ the 
superiority of Christianity.273 
 
Nathan feels that the Sultan has laid a trap for him: 
 
“(…) I must tread warily!—But how?— 
To be a Jew outright won’t do at all.— 
But not to be a Jew will do still less. 
For if no Jew, he might well ask, then why 
                                            
272 See Ashliman, D.L., (ed.) “The Three-Ring Parable: tales of Aarne-Thompson type 972” 
(http://www.pitt.edu/dash/ashliman.html), (1999)) 
273 See further, Kuschel, Karl-Josef, Jud, Christ und Muselmann vereinigt? Lessings “Nathan der 
Weise”. 2004. 
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Not Mussulman?—That’s it! And that can save me! 
Not only children can be quieted  
With fables.—(…)”274 
 
The fable Nathan tells, the Parable of the Rings, has become probably 
become more famous than the play which spawned it,. 
 
Parable of the Rings: the story 
In eastern lands, lived a man who had a beautiful ring of opal that had the 
magic power that whoever wore it, and trusted its strength, would be beloved of 
God and men. Upon his death, he bequeathed it to his best-loved son on 
condition that that son would also pass it on to his best-loved son, and so on 
through the generations. After several generations, however, the ring came into 
the possession of a man who had three sons whom he loved equally, and to 
whom he had at various times promised the ring. When he was at the point of 
death, and loathe to go back on his word, he ordered two extra and superficially 
identical rings to be made, so each son would receive the ring. Each son does in 
fact receive his ring, unbeknownst to the others and each thinking that he alone 
has it, which would give him the right to rule in his father’s place. 
When the sons discover that the others, too, have received rings, legal 
proceedings are initiated to have their rings declared authentic. The loving father, 
after all, could not, would not have lied. The other brothers must by lying. The 
judge declares that he is unable to decide. But should the ring not cause the 
wearer to be loved. Which then is the most loved? No one answers. Or no one is 
most loved. Could it be that all rings are counterfeit and the real ring is lost? The 
solution provided by the judge is that each son carry on believing that he alone 
has the true ring. And in a thousand, thousand years, to return to judgement 
when “a wiser man than I will sit as judge upon this bench.” 
Saladin humbly realises that the ‘thousand thousand years’ is not yet passed 
and that he is not the wiser judge. He therefore does not feel competent to make 
the choice that he originally asked Nathan to provide the information for. 
“Go, go,” he says, “but be my friend.”275 
                                            
274  Ibid., Scene 6 
275  The presence of Saladin in the story has also inspired others. There is a supposed (though 
unproven and suspect) historical record of a somewhat similar meeting having been hosted by 
Saladin’s son, Gazi Al-Zaher Usef Ibn Ayub Al-Salah during which a certain Abbot Georgi from 
the monastery of “St. Simon the Fisherman” disputed with three Muslim clerics at Aleppo as to 
the veracity of the two religions. The document’s questionable provenance stems from the fact 
that the dispute is supposed to have taken place in October 1165, eighteen years before 
Saladin’s forces took Aleppo. An online version is available at 
inter-religious dialogue 
 121
The parable of the rings is not original to Lessing, but goes back to Boccacio’s 
The Decamerone, some 400 years previously. Boccacio’s Nathan was called 
Melchisidek , and his ring had no more power than as a symbol of power and 
authority. Whoever received the ring became the pater familias with all the rights 
and privileges pertaining thereto. Melchisidek, however, in contrast with Nathan, 
was painted by the lady Filomina in her story in The Decamerone (the third story 
of day one) as simultaneously a miser and one who loaned money out at usury. 
Although Melchisidek is a moneylender, Saladin in Boccacio’s story feels, for 
reasons which are unclear, that Melchisidek will refuse to loan him the funds he 
needs to replenish the national exchequer because of the costs of wars and high 
living. Lessing’s Nathan seems cut from a completely different cloth, however, 
more in the style of the second Decamerone story of day one, told by Neïfile, in 
which an honourable Jewish businessman, Abraham by name, is brought to 
conversion, not by the sword but by the logic of seeing the clergy, up to and 
including the Pope, committing all the sins, with special emphasis on the sins of 
the flesh, and yet the Church continues to expand. This, he claims, must be 
evidence of the power of the Holy Spirit.  Nathan doesn’t go nearly that far, but 
does have all of Abraham’s nobility and purity of spirit. 
The sons in Boccacio’s parable are not particularly deserving, either. Each of 
them more than the other lusts after the authority that possessing the ring 
conveys and almost coerces his father into granting it to him. When the litigation 
follows to determine the rightful heir, no decision is possible. 
Lessing brought some changes to the story, making the sons deserving; 
granting to all three sons the right, or obligation, to exercise the authority of the 
father with the final decision to await the final judgement; making Nathan’s 
primary business that of import and export with money-lending only as a 
secondary activity; and making the ring desirable not for its temporal power but 
for its ability to make the bearer loved and respected. That may also reflect the 
different relationships between the Church and society between the two periods. 
Boccacio’s Church was very much concerned with temporal power. By the time of 
Lessing post-Reformation and Enlightenment, the Church was very much 
involved with winning the hearts and minds of the Europeans with the clear 
                                                                                                                       
http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/source/christ-muslim-debate.html (June 2002). The original 
document is said to be in the hands of the family of Karim Hakkoum of Portland, Oregon, 
U.S.A., but all attempts to contact the family or anyone involved with the translation have proven 
fruitless. It is not known whether Lessing was aware of the supposed existence of the meeting 
recorded in the document or of the document itself. 
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awareness that believers now had choices that didn’t involve Inquisition and/or 
execution as a consequence.276 
 
The story continues  
After finishing telling the parable, Nathan and Saladin become the best of friends. 
Saladin also learns of the relationship with the Templar and, by so doing, is 
reminded that he exists. The Templar, meanwhile is beside himself with sadness 
at the possibility, for Nathan has not yet given him an answer, that he may not be 
able to marry the lovely Rachel. The conniving Daya, however, still intent on 
getting back to Europe, tells a secret to the Knight that she expects will turn all to 
her advantage: Rachel is not as she seems; not Jewish, but Christian. She 
doesn’t know that, however. The Knight is confused and seeks advice from the 
last person he might be expected to, the Orthodox Patriarch, no friend of the 
Templars in general and of our Knight in particular. So alerted to the situation, 
though not yet knowing who is involved, the Patriarch vows to get to the bottom 
of it and punish the evil-doer who would dare to rob a Christian child of its 
heritage and, even worse, to raise it without any faith at all, but what “reason 
would require.” 
While all this has been transpiring, Nathan has been conducting his 
investigations arising from learning the Templar’s name and finally comes with a 
decision about the proposed marriage of Von Stauffen to Rachel. It may not 
proceed. Not, however, because of a gulf between their faiths, but rather due to a 
lack of distance between their bloodlines. Rachel and Von Stauffen, it appears, 
are siblings. And it is no wonder that Von Stauffen closely resembles Saladin’s 
brother, for Assad was his father. And Rachel’s. 
Though it is never explicitly stated, both of the children are therefore Muslims 
by birth, though one raised a Christian and one a Jew. The curtain falls on 
general joy among all the participants. 
At the time of its publication, Nathan was not universally praised. The religious 
community, for example, and especially the dominant Lutherans of Lessing’s 
Prussia, were “irritated” because the play “further emphasised that ‘real’ religion 
is manifest in (…) experience and practice, now seen primarily as the ‘‘essential’’ 
religion of love and reason. The consequences of the separation of justification 
                                            
276  The parable of the rings continues to evolve. In 2004, on the web site of the True Jesus Church 
of Anaheim California, (http://www.tjc.org/article.cfm?id=B336EE2B-6838-4944-AF28-
6C8A6C549E45) (no longer on the site and not archived in the Internet Archive), the story of 
“Saladin’s Golden Ring” is told. In that version, which the author says is borrowed from Lessing 
(making no mention of Nathan the Wise) the story as recounted in The Decamerone is told, but 
with the character of the Jew replaced by Saladin. 
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and sanctification were increasingly clear as faith was being reduced to 
morality.”277 
For all its unique qualities, Nathan blends seamlessly with Lessing’s other 
work and with his philosophy in general. As a work of theology and philosophy, it 
highlights Lessing’s belief that practice is always superior to theory. “He writes for 
action, and not primarily for vague and speculative theory, although unlike British 
and French 'Enlighteners' he preserves a strong interest in metaphysical 
speculation. When he writes about theory it is in the service of shaping a 
personal stance.”278 As he did in the play Minna von Barnhelm, Lessing strongly 
rejects in Nathan, “theoretical or formal codes because they get in the way of 
concrete and practical human behaviour.”279 
 
Nathan, the Enlightenment and civic society 
It can hardly be doubted that Nathan is quite firmly located in the Enlightenment: 
its emphasis on the revolutionary values of fraternité, egalité et liberté and on the 
need relate with one another as people rather than as members of religious or 
other communities make that abundantly clear.  
Nathan is strongly founded on the holy trinity of the Enlightenment: 
• the rejection of the religious interpretation of history 
• the elevation of a secular or materialist interpretation in its 
stead, and 
• the need for societal reform280 
This was an elitist goal to a certain extent, as many proponents of the 
Enlightenment did not believe that religion, which was felt to be a natural 
development of mankind, could ever be eradicated. Voltaire’s battle cry “Ecrasez 
l’infame”—crush the infamy of Christianity in particular and religion and 
superstition in general—was never likely to be successful among the vast 
majority of the population. The objective was therefore to remove religion from its 
dominant and oppressive position. To that end,, Nathan makes a large 
contribution, beginning with its critique of religious and religio-political violence as 
a means of repression and control, which place it strongly in the Enlightenment 
                                            
277  Lindberg, Carter, “Do Lutherans Shout Justification But Whisper Sanctification?” in Lutheran 
Quarterly, Vol. XIII, No. 1, p. 20 
278  Frei, Hans, “Religious Transformation in the later Eighteenth Century”, a paper presented as 
part of The Rice Lectures, Rockwell, February 1974, Lecture One: Lessing and the Religious 
Use of Irony, (Transcribed and edited from material in the Yale Divinity School Library Hans Frei 
Archive, Box 10 – Folder 168-9 by M.A. Higton.) 
279  Ibid. 
280  Speelman, Patrick J., Henry Lloyd and the Military Enlightenment of Eighteenth-Century 
Europe, (Westport, CT/London: Greenwood Press) 2002, pp. 62. 
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tradition and make it again as relevant today as it was when it was written, albeit 
for somewhat different reasons. 
Nathan is imbued with potential violence with a religious tint. First, of course, 
is the character of Curt von Stauffen, whose very existence depends on religious 
violence. As a Knight Templar, his primary mission is the domination of the Holy 
Land and its liberation from the Muslims. His secondary mission is the killing of 
Jews, Muslims and other non-Christians. The character of Saladin, too, is not 
without its share of religious-based violence. It forms the basis for his questioning 
of Nathan, his attempt to catch Nathan out by claiming superiority for Judaism or 
Islam, with the unspoken threat of violence if the answer is not satisfactory. The 
Patriarch of Jerusalem, of course, who is outraged at the prospect of someone 
having raised a Christian child as a Jew or, even worse it seems, as a non-
believer, is another character for whom violence is not a tool that one need 
necessarily shy away from. Even among the minor characters, violence 
threatens. Daya, for example, is willing to denounce Nathan to the Patriarch if it 
will serve her desire to get back to Europe, regardless of the consequences for 
Nathan. 
As noted by Jean-Pierre Wils,281 the Enlightenment has at its foundation the 
conviction that “when religious differences are resolved by force, they cause 
irrevocable damage.” For that reason, religion must take a step back from 
politics. And, in order to prevent violence over the long term “it is necessary to 
de-absolutise and de-dogmatise the religious question of truth.”282 
Nor is this connection of religion and violence necessarily an artificial one, 
concocted by the critics of the religious establishment. It must be recognised that 
“although religion has been used to justify violence, violence can also empower 
religion.”283 
The spread of Christianity among the Asian, African and American colonies of 
the European powers284 is the most often cited expression of this empowerment, 
but its success within, first, the Roman empire, and later, Europe as a whole is no 
less an illustration of how violence may reasonably be considered the single 
                                            
281  Wils, Jean-Pierre, De Dialectiek van de Verlichting en de logica van het geweld, (The dialectics 
of the Enlightenment and the logic of violence), in P. Valkenberg (Ed.), God en geweld (Budel: 
Uitgeverij Damon) 2002. 
282  Ibid., p. 95. 
283  Juergensmeyer, Mark, Terror in the Mind of God, The Global Rise of Religious Violence, 
(Berkley/Los Angeles/London: ) 2001, p. 242, cited in Jean-Pierre Wils, p. 91. 
284  Referred to by comedian George Carlin as ‘nailing [religious] sandals onto the natives’ feet.’ 
Carlin, George, “Religious Life” in An Evening with Wally Londo featuring Bill Szlazo, (Little 
David Records, LD-1008, 1975)  
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greatest cause for the spread and maintenance of Christianity. And it is against 
this background of violence that Lessing through Nathan, protests.  
The rise of Deism and ‘natural theology’ as inseparable elements of the 
Enlightenment, was one of the key ways of accomplishing that de-absolutisation 
and de-dogmatisation. When there are no detailed religious differences to resolve 
by force, when religion is separate from politics and where religion imposes no 
absolutes and no dogmas, the result is what the modern industrialised world 
recognises as a secular democracy with the separation of church and state, 
religion which has lost its right to use violence as a weapon of offence or 
defence. Some would also say that another result is a religion—certainly in the 
case of Christianity and Islam—where questions of absolutes are not merely 
window-dressing but form what some would define as the core of their being-that 
has lost its raison d’être. This question will loom much larger in the discussion of 
the modern dialogue further on. 
A crucial element of this step to remove absolutes from the public debate is 
the rise of scepticism, the belief that one cannot be sure of what one knows, 
certainly when the questions at issue are not empirically verifiable. That was 
linked in religion with what has become known as ‘natural theology,’ the idea that 
revelation was not actually necessary: human beings came naturally equipped 
with all the knowledge of God, or the potential to know all that was necessary, 
without any further mediation from God or any other messenger.  
Nathan does not go quite that far. He seeks rather a suspension of theological 
argument and distinction, not its abolition. 
 
The Parable as Model for Dialogue 
A well-known quote from Lessing states: ”If God held all truth in his right hand 
and in his left the everlasting striving after truth, with the risk that I should always 
and everlastingly be mistaken, and said to me 'Choose!' in humility I would pick 
the left hand and say, 'Father grant me that: Absolute truth is for thee alone.' “ 
That is certainly the position taken by Nathan and accepted by Saladin in the 
play. Both disavow claiming absolute certainty in favour of the search that could 
last millennia. 
At first glance, The Parable appears to fit in well with the current inter-religious 
dialogue as commonly perceived. Its conclusion that no one is to force his or her 
claim until “a thousand, thousand years” have passed and that all are to proceed 
on the basis of equality, with none forcing his or her ideas on the other appears 
similar to the practice of joint discussion and common action.  
That perception is fatally flawed however, if one is to be able to speak of 
dialogue in any meaningful way. In fact, the Parable grants to everyone the 
freedom to believe that he or she is in possession, and perhaps sole possession, 
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of the Truth, which will become apparent after the ‘thousand, thousand years.’ It 
also introduces the element, however, that everyone must be prepared to accept 
the possibility that, in fact, his or her belief may not be the Truth, in which case 
we will collectively have spent the thousands of years in Error. 
This scientific, Enlightenment-spawned, doubt-based position is, in fact, 
contrary to the stated objectives of the current dialogue, where each believing 
community is invited to contribute to the collective religious feast on a basis of 
equality. Every faith, the dialogue presumes, has something to contribute, in 
contrast to the Parable’s position that only one will be found to be right if we only 
wait long enough. Even the Roman Catholic position, often felt to be against 
dialogue, states that there is ‘that which is holy’ in other religions. 
Only the humility of Lessing’s Saladin, who perceives that he is not able to 
judge the result, may have something in the way of the present dialogue, where 
conscious humility in regards to other believers is the order of the day. 
Having discarded what is commonly thought to be the heart of Nathan the 
Wise, however, we have not completely dispensed with Lessing. For he has 
provided us along the way with a model that more closely resembles the current 
dialogue  
The first example of this model takes place before the play actually begins, 
when the Templar rescues Rachel from the flames. Faith did not enter into his 
calculation, and yet he acted according to a morality that states that human life is 
valuable, that the weak must be protected, and that honour should guide one’s 
conduct. This we may typify as an unconscious model as he did not formulate it 
as a position in regards to Rachel in particular, or Jews in general, before he 
acted. 
An extension and philosophical defence of the model is provided by Nathan, 
himself, in his discussion with the Templar: 
Templar:  I must confess, 
 you know just how the Templars ought to 
think. 
Nathan:   Templars alone? and merely ought? and 
merely, 
 Because the Order’s rules command it so? 
 I know how good men think; I know as well 
 That all lands bear good men. 
Templar:  But different, 
 You grant? 
Nathan:  Oh yes: in color, dress, and shape. 
Templar:  And more or less in one land than the 
other. 
(…) 
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Nathan:  O come, we must, 
 We must be friends!—Disdain my folk, as 
much 
 as ever you will. For neither one has 
chosen  
 His folk. Are we our folk? What is a folk?  
 Are Jew and Christian sooner Jew and 
Christian  
 Than man? How good, if I have found in 
you 
 One more who is content to bear the 
name 
 of man!285 
 
Here we see what appears to be a closer reflection of the status of the current 
dialogue. The enmity apparently caused by the different beliefs is set aside and, 
in recognition of a common humanity, friendship results. 
Here Nathan asserts, and Van Stauffen agrees, that one’s religion comes from 
one’s culture, with the unspoken implication that he who is born a Christian could 
as easily have been born a Jew and vice-versa.  
Appearances can be deceiving, however, and the relationship that has 
developed is, in fact, the opposite of what the current dialogue is seeking, in form 
if not in substance. 
The inter-religious dialogue as conducted in the modern age seeks not to 
locate the common humanity of the participants, but their shared spirituality and 
the religious contribution that each makes to the whole. It seeks to unite the 
powers concentrated by faith rather than those that flow out of humanity. The 
purpose of the dialogue, however, and the purpose of the friendship that Nathan 
offers and Von Stauffen accepts do have something in common: by setting aside 
their differences, they are at the least able to act jointly and positively. At best, 
this can be considered an a religious solution, one step removed from the anti-
religious potential suggested by Von Stauffen when he notes: 
But when and where has pious frenzy, claiming 
The better god, intent on forcing him  
Upon the world at large, revealed himself 
in blacker form than here, and now? 
 
In support of that statement, whenever someone acts out of religious motives 
in Nathan, evil is either the motivation or the result. The Orthodox Patriarch of 
                                            
285  Nathan the Wise, Act II, Scene 5. 
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Jerusalem, for example, tries to enlist Von Stauffen to kill Saladin. The same 
Patriarch also tries to hunt down Nathan—though he doesn’t know whom he 
should be hunting—for the sin of not raising Rachel as a Christian, or as a 
believer in any faith. When acting out of his Christian faith, Von Stauffen 
expresses nothing but hatred and contempt. It is only when religious allegiance is 
put on hold that the actors are able to allow their humanity to shine through. 
Lessing’s intent is noble, and not entirely dissimilar from that of Nicholas of 
Cusa: religious peace on Earth, or at least a cessation of hostilities among the 
believing communities. His method, however, is one of suspending one’s 
religious truth, of ignoring it in relations with individuals with other beliefs and 
proceeding solely on the basis of humanity.  
That constitutes a modification of the probable inspiration for the parable of 
the rings, the Koran itself. As a responsible artist, Lessing had delved into the 
Koran in a German translation by G. Sale.286  There he would have encountered 
several Suras referring specifically to the question not of suspension of Truth, but 
of waiting for the Final Judgement of Allah on who was right. See further, for 
example, Koran, Sura 5:48: We have ordained a law and assigned a path for 
each of you. Had Allah pleased, He could have made you one nation: but it is His 
wish to prove you by that which He has bestowed upon you. Vie with each other 
in good works, for to Allah you shall all return and He will declare to you what you 
have disagreed about.”287  
In Lessing’s model, conflict is to be avoided, leading to social integration at the 
level of the individual in society. Exclusivism, leading to the rejection of the Other, 
is suspended, but not cancelled. Is Lessing inclusivist or exclusivist? Although 
arguments can be made for both positions, the stronger case has to be made for 
the exclusivist at a theological level: one day we shall know which Truth is true, 
but that is not granted to us today. Lessing’s inclusivism remains firmly grounded 
in social intercourse.  
While this does present a viable solution to the problem, it does not do so in 
such a way that allows one’s religious faith to act as a positive element in the 
relationship that develops. It asks, in fact, that one’s religious faith be suspended 
and taken out of the equation. As such, it appears to fail a crucial test in the 
present inquiry, which is to identify the theological rather than the humanistic use 
and application of the inter-religious dialogue. 
 
                                            
286 See Kuschel, Karl-Josef, Jud, Christ und Muselmann vereinigt? Lessings ‘Nathan der Weise’, 
(Düsseldorf: Patmos Verlag GmbH & Co) 2004. P. 220. 
287 Dawood, N.J., The Koran, (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Classics) p. 393. 
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XI. Review 
Having identified some of the defining characteristics of models of dialogue in the 
first part of this study and having examined some major writers on the subject in 
the second part, is it now possible to determine where the writers that have been 
discussed fit? Even though the writers predate the theories by several hundreds 
of years, I believe that it is possible. 
 
The Apologists 
The Apologists, alone of all those we have looked at in that they were writing 
from a position of weakness, have a dual model, one directed at the corridors of 
power and one at the pagans that surrounded them. 
From the former, they were seeking a modus vivendi in order to continue and 
grow. From the latter, they were seeking conversion. They wanted therefore to 
reject without being rejected, with the ultimate goal of becoming the dominant or 
even the only faith of empire. 
Their model can therefore best be characterised as: 
Exclusive-rejecting leading to conquest at both the macro and the micro 
levels. 
The Truth of their own position was, for them, so overwhelmingly obvious that 
no others had anything positive to contribute.  Anything positive in other faiths, 
such as the Greek worship of the Invisible God commented on by the apostle 
Paul, was simply foreshadowing, or a weak echo of the one Christian Truth. To 
avoid eternal damnation, both individuals and societies needed to see the Error 
of their ways and the Truth of Christianity. Partial solutions incorporating 
something of the others were totally unacceptable. 
 
Pierre Abelard 
Relations among the religions of Abelard’s world were not much different than 
would later be the case when Nicholas of Cusa would write. In Europe, 
Christianity was incontestably dominant, though with an entrenched Muslim 
presence in the Iberian peninsula. The First Crusade was still in the near future 
and the fall of Constantinople more than a century, and for Abelard, the threat of 
Islam must have seemed very small indeed. 
Of far more interest were the works of the philosophers of antiquity, especially 
Plato and, even more, Aristotle. And it was to these that Abelard directed his 
attention in the Collationes. For Abelard, Christianity was the extension and 
replacement for Judaism, both of which could be brought to bear against the 
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pagan philosophers. One may reasonably wonder whom Abelard was arguing 
against. His ultimate goal cannot be in doubt, however. It was conversion…the 
acknowledgement by the philosopher (he had given up on the Jew entirely) that 
Christianity was the superior philosophy and any reasonable person should adopt 
it. The fact that the debate in the Collationes remains unfinished may give one 
cause for thought, but the general thrust of his intent is set out quite clearly. 
One could summarise Abelard’s model as: 
Exclusive-rejecting, mission oriented leading to conversion at the micro 
level. 
For Abelard, as with the apologists, there was only one True Faith, 
Christianity, and all others led to damnation. Christianity was also the most 
reasonable faith, and anyone who spent any time thinking about it properly, in the 
true spirit of searching, could not help but come to the conclusion that that was 
the case. It was the responsibility of the Christian to transport that message to 
each individual heathen searcher with the objective of saving their souls. The one 
inclusivist element in Abelard’s dialogue, is the acknowledgement that all men 
find themselves in God’s universe; even more strongly, in God, in whom the 
universe resides. 
  
Nicholas of Cusa 
The inter-religious constellation facing Nicholas of Cusa can best be 
described, following Panikkar, as one of ‘rejection and conquest.’ The two faiths 
that Nicholas was most concerned with were Christianity and Islam, both of which 
were (and, to greater or lesser degrees, are) convinced of their own Truth at the 
expense of the other. Moving to the second model component, mutual 
perceptions, one could say that both Christianity and Islam of the time were 
convinced that the Other was unclean and needed to be convinced of that fact 
and converted or be eradicated. The Other had no participation in the Truth. 
Nicholas’s motivation for wanting to enter into the dialogue was, if we are to 
take him at his word, and we have no reason not to, the fall of Constantinople 
and the ongoing inter-religious hostilities. And his objective was to create a state 
of peace among the religions, not only between Christianity and Islam, but 
expanded to include all the religions that he knew at the time, with the exception 
perhaps of Christian heretics. 
Nicholas’s dialogue form transcended human participation and went directly to 
a form of lecturing by the Word, Peter and Paul. Nicholas, then, does not propose 
any form of human inter-religious dialogue at all, perhaps feeling that the matter 
was too complex for humans to be successful. 
Nicholas’s solution of the problem may seem to some to be exclusivist, with 
Christianity replacing all the others. In my view, however, I think it could 
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reasonably be characterised as inclusive, inasmuch as Nicholas’s conclusion is 
that all religions contain elements that have been brought to completion in 
Christianity, if they would only recognise that. 
To summarise Nicholas’s dialogue model, we could refer to it as: 
Inclusive/co-existence-oriented, conflict resolving leading to peace at the 
macro level. 
Nicholas believed that there had been revelation in other faiths, but that all 
revelation, if followed to its logical conclusion, leads to a Truth which Christianity 
is closest to, even if not yet in full possession of. That recognition of the 
commonality of the faiths that lead all people to yearn for the Good that is God, 
was reason for Nicholas to plead for peace among the religions and peace 
among nations. It was no longer necessary to eradicate the unbeliever, merely to 
help him to recognise the ultimate result of the faith he already held. Christianity 
becomes the primes inter pares, but no longer the sole possessor of the Truth. 
 
Gotthold Ephraim Lessing 
Lessing’s concerns were far less geopolitical than Nicholas’s, and went to the 
individual casu quo his friend and colleague Moses Mendelssohn before 
extrapolating to the group, specifically the Jews. The Jews were being treated 
inhumanely and contrary to the principles of the Enlightenment, and that needed 
to stop. 
The mutual perception of the two religions concerned was one of mutual 
contempt. For the Christians of Lessing’s Germany, Jews were really, physically 
unclean, as well as having been spiritually befouled by their failure to recognise 
Jesus’ divinity and having killed him. For the Jews, the Christians simply were 
evil, oppressing them and not living up to the Gospel. 
Lessing’s motivation was, therefore, the poor conditions for the Jews and their 
treatment at the hands of Christians and the officially Christian state. 
His objective, then, was to bring them into the Enlightenment and the 
mainstream of German and European life. 
Lessing, however, does not provide a simple answer to the question of 
inclusivism vs exclusivism. The Parable of the Rings, for example, is exclusivist, 
though we will have to wait until the final judgement to know who was right. His 
working, pragmatic solution, however, is to suspend the question and to get along 
first as humans. In that, he is inclusivist. His preferred form of dialogue reflects 
that: one on one relations between individuals, not groups or institutional 
religions. 
A summary of Lessing’s model might read: 
Suspended exclusivism-rejection, conflict avoiding leading to integration 
at the micro level. 
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Lessing seems quite content to let believers hold on to their religions, as long 
as it did not interfere with the day-to-day business of co-existence. Conflict was to 
be avoided on the basis of shared humanity, leaving religion out of the equation 
as much as possible. Even when forced into dealing with the issue of Truth in the 
confrontation with Saladin, Lessing’s Nathan  prefers to avoid it entirely rather 
than engaging in a religious contest that was unbalanced in terms of power 
relationships and objectives and could only lead to trouble. 
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XII. Initial conclusions 
Whatever else the writers described above are involved in, in terms of their own 
religious practice, when it comes to dialogue, they all fall neatly, intentionally or 
otherwise, into one of the four models we had identified earlier, and curiously, it is 
not one of the explicitly religious ones. 
The position of the apologists, that all must give way before the overwhelming 
blinding shaft of Truth that is Christianity, has long since been abandoned by 
Christian participants in dialogue, though not in equal measure. Regardless of 
whether they believe that other faiths contain some elements of the ‘true and the 
holy’, Christian dialogue participants have put aside the call to active mission and 
proseletysation in favour of explorations of what binds humanity in their common 
search for truth. 
The same applies to Abelard’s logical conclusion that reasonable people must 
come to see the simple superiority of Christianity through reason. Even if that is 
true, the dialogue participants, within the context of the dialogue at any rate, are 
not engaged in demonstrating that superiority to their fellow participants. Each 
may bring his own contribution, which will be viewed without prejudice and which 
others will try to see from the Other’s point of view, from inside. 
Nicholas of Cusa’s search for common ground in the unity in diversity of 
practice, does bear some resemblance to some elements of the philosophy of the 
dialogue today. There may be something ‘true and holy’ in the Other and we are 
required to find that and cherish it. So, too, the emphasis on Christianity as the 
most perfect of the extant faiths, even if not perfect itself, can be seen in the 
dialogues of some participants, but it is not one that leads immediately to a move 
to mission. Nicholas’s solution falls out of contention, however, when the 
structure of his dialogue is put under examination. His dialogue is no dialogue 
among believers but a submission to the revealed will of God.  
The model that most closely resembles the current state of inter-religious 
dialogue seems to be Lessing’s. Not the model of the Parable of the Ring, for 
none of these participants is willing, or even if willing, able to suspend his or her 
own claims to Truth. 
Lessing’s other model, however, in which Nathan and the Knight Templar 
agree to leave off challenging each other’s claim to Truth and deal with each 
other first and foremost as humans, bears more than a passing resemblance to 
the situation as it obtains today in most inter-religious dialogue. 
As it turns out, that may be just as well. For dealing with the issues that the 
participants have identified as the prime motivation for most of the dialogues—
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war, poverty, exploitation, environmental issues, the threat of nuclear, chemical 
or biological destruction, etc., etc.—even when there is a strong religious 
component, such as, for example, in India, where Hindus and Muslims face these 
issues daily, seems to be most successful when Lessing’s model of humanity is 
followed rather than, for example, Nicholas of Cuss’s model of uniformity. 
In the next chapter, I shall look at some recent research that demonstrates 
that point, and then examine the question of the consequences for inter-religious 
dialogue. 
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XIII. Hindus and Muslims: a suitable case for study 
 
One of the main arguments used by those who are heavily involved with inter-
religious dialogue is that it will promote better relations in our streets, our cities, 
our countries and our world. If we find an open space in which to meet and ‘truly 
listen’ to the religious Other, we will, first, stop being cruel to one another and, 
second, be able to work together for the good of all. 
Even apart from the fact that, as noted above, this is not a theological 
objective, but may more properly be seen to be best counted as a not-
unimportant, but secondary one, seen from the point of view of religions’ core 
business, it appears that, although the absence of any support in daily reality or 
headlines for that position seems to have dampened the enthusiasm of its 
adherents only slightly, recent research demonstrates that, in order to achieve 
what those involved in inter-religious dialogue say is one of their major 
motivations for participating, we may have to ignore the religious element entirely 
and find whatever assistance we need in the Civil Society. 
As evidenced by the selection of readings that we have examined earlier, we 
can state that religious-oriented political and social unrest is not a recent 
invention. Nor is it, however, contrary to common and oft-stated belief, an 
invention of the Christian or of the Muslim world. 
As long ago as 800 B.C.E., the Athenians were reassuring the Spartans that 
their common religious heritage made them logical allies against the hated 
Persians, who worshipped different gods.288 
That may well be or have been so in a situation where nations stand against 
nations, or, as Huntington would have it, civilisations stand against civilisations, 
but what of those situations—such as India, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, the Philippines 
and Indonesia—where two or more major, though not necessarily equal, blocks 
of believers live in the same towns and streets in what Huntington refers to a 
‘cleft countries’289 torn between two civilisations? Who is then your ally and who 
your enemy? Can a Muslim live in peace with a Hindu? 
If one were to go solely from the newspaper headlines, one’s initial response 
to the previous question would have to be in the negative. It seems quite clear 
                                            
288  Huntington, Samuel P. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, (London: 
The Free Press), 2002, p. 42. 
289  Ibid., p. 137-138. 
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that India is proof that, as the Dutch say: ‘two faiths on one pillow: the Devil 
sleeps between them.’ 
Is that so, however? 
Ashutosh Varshney, associate professor of political science at the University 
of Michigan, has conducted an innovative study into the Indian situation.290  
Initially motivated by an outbreak of the international inter-religious and inter-
civilisational conflict and violence related to291 the predominantly Muslim state of 
Jammu and Kashmir in India—a source of discord between both India and 
Pakistan and between Indian Muslims and the Indian state—Varshney then 
expanded his inquiry to cover all of India and the relations between Hindus and 
Muslims in the sub-continent. 
In his search to “understand the sources of communal violence,” Varshney 
wanted to identify “why Hindus and Muslims had riots in some parts of India, but 
[…] conducted their lives reasonably peacefully in others.”292 
The puzzle, as Varshney formulates it, is that “[d]espite ethnic293 diversity, 
some places—regions, nations, towns or villages—manage to remain peaceful, 
whereas others experience enduring patterns of violence. Similarly, some 
societies, after maintaining a veritable record of ethnic peace, explode in ways 
that surprise […]. Variations across time and space constitute an unresolved 
puzzle in the field of ethnicity and nationalism.”294 
The standard methodology for approaching this problem, Varshney says, is to 
study the commonalities of the violent situations.295 This, he feels, in inadequate 
inasmuch as it fails to account for those situations which share all the 
commonalities of the violence, except for the violence. The question then arises 
of how to explain the lack of violence where it doesn’t occur. 
To resolve this shortcoming, Varshney proposes to include a study of ethnic 
peace to complement the studies of ethnic violence in order to arrive at a well-
rounded theory. 
The key of the new methodology was to discover the variance, the element 
that was different between violent and peaceful communities and that therefore 
could account for the difference in inter-ethnic relations. 
                                            
290  Varshney, Ashutosh, Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India, Second 
Edition, (New Haven & London: Yale University Press) 2002 
291  Varshney, and Nelson Mandela in 1960, for that matter, insist on the distinction between the 
two. Though violence without conflict cannot be, conflict without violence most certainly can. 
292  Ibid., p. xiv 
293  Varshney defines ‘ethnic’ as any ascriptive group identity, including religious.  
294  Ibid., pp 5-6. 
295  Ibid., p. 6 
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The next question became the level of granularity, national, state, regional, 
town, village, neighbourhood, etc. 
An analysis of reports of rioting and deaths in rioting over a period of 45 years 
(1950-1995), showed that, contrary to popular belief, rioting and ethnic violence 
was a highly localised affair. 
Although nearly 70% of Indians live in rural settings, only 4% of deaths in 
communal violence occurred there.296  Conclusion: Hindu-Muslim violence is 
primarily an urban phenomenon. 
Within the urban group, however, there is also disparity. Eight cities (Mumbai, 
Ahmedabad, Hyderabad, Meerut, Aligarh, Baroda, Delhi and Calcutta), though 
they represent only 18% of India’s urban population, account for 49% of all urban 
deaths. Eighty-two per cent of the urban population, has “not been riot-prone’.297 
All states, even states containing violent cities, had far more peaceful 
municipalities than violent ones. The level of granularity, therefore, should be the 
town, Varshney concluded. 
In search of the variance, therefore, Varshney chose six cities, three from the 
list of eight riot-prone cities and three peaceful ones, and paired them up. 
Pairs were decided, first, on the basis of roughly similar Hindu-Muslim 
percentages in the city and second, on other factors that the cities in the pair 
shared in common. 
The pairs were Aligarh and Calicut, Hyderabad and Lucknow and Ahmedabad 
and Surat. 
The reason for selecting the similarity in demographic proportions as the 
minimum control was due to the nature of political discourse in India, in which the 
“the size of the [ethnic] community is considered to be highly significant.”298 
The conclusion that Varshney came to, and which will be set out in more detail 
below, was that “the pre-existing local networks of civic engagement between the 
two communities stand out as the single most important proximate (italics 
Varshney’s. DS) cause. Where such networks of engagement exist, tensions and 
conflicts were regulated and managed; where they are missing, communal 
identities led to endemic and ghastly violence.”299 
Varshney breaks ‘local networks of civic engagement’ down into two types, 
associational and quotidian. 
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In associational engagements, members of the two communities meet in non-
state associations, including, but not limited to, trade unions, reading clubs, 
entrepreneurs associations, film appreciation clubs, festival associations and 
sports clubs. 
Quotidian relationships are such things as encountering one’s neighbours in 
the street, members of the two communities eating dinner at one another’s 
houses, children playing together, etc. 
Varshney concludes that “[b]oth forms of engagement, if robust, promote 
peace; contrariwise, their absence or weakness opens up space for communal 
violence. Of the two, the associational forms turn out to be sturdier than everyday 
engagement, especially when people are confronted with the attempts by 
politicians to polarise ethnic communities.”300 
Varshney identifies two links between civic life and ethnic conflict. 
The first is “prior and sustained contact between members of different 
communities [which] allows communication between them to moderate tensions 
and pre-empt violence, when such tensions arise owing to an exogenous shock 
[…]. In cities of thick interaction between different communities, peace 
committees at the time of tension emerge from below [italics Varshney’s. DS] in 
various neighbourhoods; the local administration does not have to impose such 
committees on the entire city from above [idem]. Such highly decentralised 
tension-managing organisations kill rumours, remove misunderstandings, and 
often police neighbourhoods. If prior communications across communities does 
not exist, such organisations do not emerge from below.”301 
The second link is the existence of associational integration: “If unions, 
business associations, middle class associations of doctors and lawyers, film 
clubs of poorer classes, and at least some cadre-based parties are integrated, 
even an otherwise mighty politician-criminal nexus is unable to rupture existing 
links. Everyday engagement in the neighbourhoods may not be able to stand up 
to the marauding gangs protected by powerful politicians, but the organised 
strength of unions, associations and the integrated cadres of some political 
parties—those not interested in ethnic conflict—constitute a formidable obstacle 
for even politically shielded gangs.”302 
                                            
300  Ibid., pp 3-4. 
301  Ibid., pp 46-47. 
302  Ibid., p 47. I note here that some of the elements that Varshney refers to do not necessarily 
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City pairs 
Aligarh and Calicut 
Varshney begins the delineation of the similarities between the two cities of 
Aligarh and Calicut by noting that both cities are respected centres of Muslim 
learning. 
Aligarh is home to the Muslim University (AMU), which is “a symbol of the 
educational and political aspirations of a critical mass of Indian Muslims.”303 
Calicut is “the centre of culture and education for Kerala Muslims (…) It is the 
headquarters of several leading Muslim institutions and organisations: the Muslim 
League, the Muslim Educational Society and the Muslim Service Society. (…) 
The Calicut University was especially set up to make higher education accessible 
to Muslims of the area. 
The similarities continue: “(…) starting in the 1970s, both cities have 
developed a substantial Muslim middle class.” Muslims from both Aligarh and 
Calicut migrated to the Middle East “in large numbers after the oil price increases 
of 1973.” And finally, the Muslim population of the two cities is quite similar: 
approximately 35% in Aligarh since 1951 and approximately 37% in Calicut. 
The question then arises as to why the city of Calicut enjoys an almost total 
lack of inter-communal violence while Aligarh “is among the most riot-prone cities 
of India.” 
Varshney posits two possibilities that might at least partially explain the 
differences: 
First, that the two communities in Calicut are deeply engaged in the civic 
environment. This “makes it hard for politicians to play the politics of religious 
polarisation.”304 Even parties that successfully exploit communal differences in, 
for example, Aligarh, such as the Hindu nationalist party, BJP, are unable, even 
when they try, to foster animosity in Calicut.305 
In Aligarh, by contrast, both BJP leaders and Muslim leaders use communal 
polarisation as a principle political strategy, with violence often a part of the 
calculations.306 
A second important distinction relates to the historical development of the two 
cities in regard to intra-Hindu relations. 
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The dominant political stream in Calicut related to Hindu caste issues rather 
than Hindu-Muslim issues. The politics of today continues along those lines with 
more inter-caste than inter-religious tension. In Aligarh, where “a declining 
Muslim aristocracy, part of the ruling class in pre-British times, was unable to 
come to terms with a framework of political participation that relied on elections, 
not nominations and quotas. Rather than accepting the egalitarian implications of 
democratic rule, the former Muslim aristocrats wanted to protect their privileges, 
to which the rising Hindu middle classes were opposed.”307 
When tensions from outside the cities explode, as during the 1989-1992 
period when Hindu nationalists agitated to destroy the Baburi mosque in 
Ayodhya, the two cities react differently. 
In Calicut, “all (italics Varshney’s. DS) political parties, including the Muslim 
League and BJP, supported the local administration’s efforts to maintain law and 
order. The city-level peace committees, formed with the participation of political 
leaders, were the key tension-management device,” and the press also played a 
great part in quashing rumours that would have fanned the flames. 
In Aligarh, by way of great contrast, “horrendous violence” broke out and the 
local press went out of its way to encourage it, printing “blatant falsehoods in 
order to incite passions.”308 Furthermore, “Aligarh’s remarkably fragile local 
mechanisms of peace were insufficient to deal with the situation, as they had 
repeatedly been in the past fifteen years.” And criminals with connections to the 
communal politicians and the communal press were able to kill without being 
called to account. Effective city-wide peace committees could not be formed 
because “it was difficult to get the BJP and Muslim politicians together.”  
In Calicut, on the other hand, the politicians were crucial to promoting peace 
and, perhaps even more important, peace committees, which provided levels of 
communication and information all the way down to neighbourhood level, 
provided a non-violent outlet for people’s anger, becoming a central part of the 
“constructive enterprise in Calicut.”309 
Varshney’s explanation for the difference in the responses of the two cities is 
based on their inter-communal relationships: 
In Calicut, for example, nearly 83% of Hindus and Muslims often eat together 
in social settings, compared with only 54% in Aligarh. In Calicut, 90% of families 
report that their children play together, compared with only 42% of Aligarh 
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children. Nearly 84% of Hindus and Muslims in Calicut visit one another regularly. 
In Aligarh, only 60% visit, and then infrequently.310 
Associationally, the differences are even starker. In Calicut, clubs of all kinds, 
both religious and non-religious, abound. And there is a great deal of “inter-
religious interaction in non-denominational organisations.” 
Economically, Calicut is highly dependent on trade, rather than manufacturing, 
and an “overwhelming proportion of these traders were members of trade 
associations.” Many of these trade organisations drew their membership from the 
various religions and “in 1995, as many as 11 of 26 trade associations (…) had 
Hindu, Muslim and Christian officeholders.”311 
Aligarh, on the other hand, has a slightly different economy, with a 
manufacturing base in locks. The trade association representing these usually 
small manufacturers consciously chose to actively engage in politics, in contrast 
with Calicut, which has a non-politics rule to prevent division. As a result, a 
separate trade association for the religious and for the secular grew up. The 
supporters of the religious organisation supported the BJP; Muslim traders joined 
the secular group.312 
The distinction continues at the employee level. Industrial Aligarh has few 
unions, and thus few union halls where workers from the different communities 
could meet and interact. Commercial Calicut has a vibrant trade union community 
and membership based on workers’ perception of which organisation will get 
them a better deal rather than on community issues. 
In less formal contacts, where relationships are not imposed by the work one 
does but by one’s own interests, the differences become even starker. 
Calicut, which enjoys the highest level of literacy in all India, also has a wide 
variety of social clubs: reading clubs, film clubs, science societies, theatres, etc. 
which have both Hindus and Muslims as members.313 In Aligarh, the numbers of 
such are considerably lower. 
In short, where people get together in both formal and informal non-State 
settings, they develop relationships of trust that transcend communalism and 
provide a buffer for those times when the situations threaten to explode. In 
municipalities, such as Aligarh, where those networks do not exist, neither does 
the buffer.  
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Hyderabad and Lucknow 
The next pair of cities shares similarities with Aligarh and Calicut, in both its 
peace and its violent history. 
Hyderabad is here the more violent of the two, with a record of repeated 
violence since 1938, propelling it to a prominent position in the list of most violent 
cities and leading to the development of “an institutionalised riot system—
connecting politicians, criminals, parts of the local administration, and the press.” 
Lucknow, on the other hand, has managed to avoid violence leading to fatalities 
even through the “two biggest nation-wide shocks in the century: India’s partition 
in 1947 and the demolition of the Baburi mosque in December 1992 in Ayodhya.” 
Demographically, Hyderabad and Lucknow have minority Muslim populations 
(approximately 36% and 29% respectively). At the level of elites, there is 
significant integration between Hindus and Muslims. In Hyderabad, however, the 
integration does not filter down to the masses living in the inner cities. In 
Lucknow, integration is pervasive at the level of both the elites and the masses. 
Another similarity is that in Hyderabad, as in Aligarh, the dominant political 
antagonisms are between Hindus and Muslims. In Lucknow, as in Calicut, the 
dominant divisions are within one of the two religions. While in Calicut, the 
divisions were among the Hindus along caste lines, in Lucknow, it is the Muslim 
Sunni-Shia divide that dominates.314 
Economically, the two cities are even more different than Aligarh and Calicut 
are. The dominant sector in Lucknow is embroidering clothing. In that sector, 
Hindus and Sunni Muslims are strongly represented, giving them an integrated 
contact that the Sunnis and Shi’ites, for example, do not share. 
The Hindus tend to be the owners of the businesses, and the Muslims the 
contract or piece workers.315 That also adds a level of inter-dependency and 
symbiosis: if inter-religious or inter-ethnic violence broke out, the economy of the 
whole city would collapse. 
Hyderabad, by contrast, is a city with a much more advanced economy. There 
are several large industries, but no economic symbiosis. 
And in the small to medium enterprise (SME) sector, even clients and vendors 
divide along ethnic lines, thus preventing the development of another potential 
zone of contact.316 
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This largely economic interaction model continues in times of stress. In 
Lucknow, the relationships of trust lead automatically to the formation of 
neighbourhood peace committees from below. In Hyderabad, peace committees, 
when needed, are imposed on the community from above by the local 
administration. The Hyderabad strategy tends often to fail, primarily because the 
local political leadership of the BJP and the Muslim party hate each other and are 
already “committed to a political strategy of polarisation.”317 
 
Ahmedabad and Surat 
This final city pair looks at the very critical question of how two historically 
peaceful communities can degenerate into violent ones. 
Ahmedabad and Surat share some characteristics with the other city pairs: the 
Muslim population consistently between 12% and 15% since the independence of 
India in 1947, and different patterns of inter-communal violence, with Ahmedabad 
being the victim of endemic violence318 and Surat being peaceful, with one 
notable exception. 
These two cities are also the most tightly controlled, being in the same state, 
in contrast with the other pairs, which were north-south matches. Furthermore, 
the political context for Ahmedabad and Surat has been the same for both for 
nearly two centuries, which cannot be said of the other two pairs. 
The comparison of the violence in the two cities goes back as far as the 1920s 
and the introduction of national politics by Gandhi. Gujarat, the state where both 
of the cities are located, was also Gandhi’s home state. There was thus extra 
pressure on Gujarat to serve as the shop window from which to display to the rest 
of India and the world what India could become. 
Gandhi and his Congress Party cohorts not only built a cadre-based political 
organisation,  “which succeeded as mass-level organisation to an extraordinary 
degree,” but they also formed “labour unions and a whole variety [of] 
organisations for social change. 
Between 1920 and 1947, while “there were many provocations and occasions 
for big riots in the two cities (…) the large array of civic associations, consisting of 
political, business, and social organisations, either successfully pre-empted 
communal rioting or controlled its spread.”319 
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More recently, however, those tightly knit ties that bind the communities 
together, have “become quite fragile of late. Its capacity to resist and neutralise 
the riot-entrepreneurs has decreased.” 
The role of Gandhi in this discussion is quite crucial, especially in the context 
of the current inter-religious inquiry. Gandhi made Hindu-Muslim peaceful 
coexistence a key element of his politics. To the extent that he succeeded, 
however, it appears that it was not on the basis of some idealistic mantra, but the 
result of a conscious effort to integrate the two communities, multiplying the 
points of contact so they were at least touching if not always embracing. The 
violence, when it came, seems to have been the result of the disintegration of 
those points of contact. 
Surat’s peaceful coexistence lasted longer, until 1992 and the burning of the 
Baburi mosque. Five days of riots in the city ended with 197 people killed, of 
whom 175 were Muslims. “Of the many riots that broke out in the aftermath of the 
Baburi mosque demolition, only Bombay’s violence surpassed the brutality, arson 
and plunder witnessed in Surat.”320 
In both cities, there were changes in the four key elements at work in the state 
and the cities--cadre-based political parties, Gandhian voluntary associations, 
business associations and labour unions.  
Politically, the Congress Party decline and the rise of the Hindu nationalist 
BJP were felt in both cities equally. 
The same can be said of the voluntary associations, the Gandhian 
associations declined, while Hindu nationalist organisations rose. 
Labour unions declined in strength, but to varying degrees: in Ahmedabad 
they only lost strength, in Surat, they collapsed entirely. 
The biggest difference, however, was in the business associations, which 
declined in Ahmedabad, but increased in strength in Surat.  
And when push came to shove, it seems to have been that slight difference 
which spared Surat to the degree that it did in 1992. 
Ahmedabad on the other hand, has had a regular history of problems. 
Beginning in the 1980s, “Ahmedabad had riots with alarming frequency: January 
1982, March 1984, March-July 1985, January, March and July 1986, January, 
February and November 1987, April, October, November and December 1990, 
January, March, and April 1991 and January and July 1992.”321 
But since Surat, too, has had seriously violent arguments, does that not 
negate the arguments that Varshney has been making so far. It appears not, 
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because a major contributing factor to Surat’s violence was the presence of many 
new immigrants in the shantytowns, hard workers who worked six and seven 
days a week 12 hours a day, leaving no time for interacting with members of any 
other communities. And when the rioting started, it was limited to those 
shantytowns and did not penetrate the old city, where the inertia of the good 
relations of the past held. 
 
Conclusions 
Although even Varshney says that the road of inquiry that he has opened up 
must still be travelled by other researchers in other countries—the United States, 
Northern Ireland, etc.—indications are that he has stumbled onto a key element 
of inter-religious, inter-communal, inter-ethnic, inter-Civilisational peace. The 
more integrated communities are, regardless of their inter-religious ties and 
relations, the stronger they will be in resisting temptations to attack the Other for 
ills real or imagined. 
 
Relevance to dialogue 
What does that mean for this present inquiry? It may very well mean that inter-
religious dialogue, with its emphasis on improving relations among peoples, 
among classes and among religions, is not necessary, is not necessary in its 
present form, or is even harmful to its own project by drawing attention to what 
divides rather than what binds. 
It also means that cooperation between and among religious communities for 
other ethnically based projects, whether that is fighting poverty or working for the 
environment, human rights or any number of other projects may not be the result 
of inter-religious dialogue, but rather the motivation for it. Rather than dialogue 
leading to cooperation, cooperation, it seems, leads to dialogue. 
It seems to me that it also means that the whole enterprise needs to be re-
examined from its theological starting points to determine what the theological 
content of the dialogue is and/or should be. 
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XIV. Where do we go from here? 
The reasons why the inter-religious dialogue has had so little result from a 
theological perspective is quite straightforward: it hasn’t been able to get off the 
ground. Literally. It has been almost entirely Earth-bound, trying to identify the 
elements that the religions share in this world. 
All of the dialogue that has so far not resulted in syncretic creations – and 
much that has – has concentrated almost entirely on our common humanity and 
working together to make this world a better place and stop killing one another. 
That is all fine and well as far as it goes, but the problem is that it doesn’t go 
very far theologically. That is not too surprising, when one considers that on the 
dogmatic front there cannot be much unity without surrendering what each 
believer considers key. 
A Christian cannot accept the Muslim belief that Jesus was not the Son of 
God. Nor can a Muslim accept a Christian denial of Mohammed’s personal 
revelation. 
Perhaps then we have to look elsewhere, remembering that “at the beginning, 
God created the heavens and the Earth.322” Perhaps we need to direct our 
attentions heavenward. 
In some respects, this will be a problematic approach, inasmuch as the very 
concept of what the heavens are is subject to the same shifts in meaning and 
understanding as is everything that humanity turns its hand to. 
From a, first, Jewish, and later, Christian perspective, the story of the heavens 
begins at the very beginning, with its creation simultaneous with the Earth. 
Reflecting the knowledge, understanding and revelation available to the 
peoples of the Ancient Near East at the time, the heavens were initially described 
as waters held back from the Earth by a vault or dome, and the location of the 
sources of light.323 
The vault of the heavens was the domain of the birds and flying insects. 
Beyond that, the early Biblical writers were somewhat vague, leaving speculation 
in respect of the nature of the heavens for later writers and priests. 
Such a view of heaven is not without its problems, as witness the oft-cited 
quote from cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin of the officially atheist Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics, broadcasting from space in 1961 during the first manned 
space flight when he reported: “I don’t see any God up here.” 
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Those early heavens were part of a tri-partite whole comprising the Heavens 
above, the Earth in the middle and Sheol, the residence of the dead. 
In that early view, the Heavens were occupied by the sky gods, Earth by living 
human beings and Sheol by the infernal gods and the dead.324  
That view was fine-tuned during the course of the development of the Hebrew 
Bible, banishing the sky gods and leaving the Heavens to JHWH, with the other 
components remaining more or less the same.325 
Throughout the time recorded in the Old Testament, the heavens received 
relatively little attention and mainstream Judaism right up to today tends to prefer 
to emphasise the world it knows by experience than the heavens of speculation. 
As the website Judaism 101 notes, however, “it is possible for an Orthodox Jew 
to believe that the souls of the righteous dead go to a place that is similar to the 
Christian heaven”,326 drawing on reference in the Torah to, inter alia, Abraham, 
Isaac and Jacob being “gathered to their fathers.”327 
That rather simple view became more complicated over time and was far more 
complex at the time of the story of Jesus’ crucifixion, where Jesus is first said to 
descend to Sheol, and then, with the thief on the cross next to Him, to “Paradise”, 
prior to returning to Earth at the Resurrection, before returning to the Heavens at 
the time of the Ascension.  
Through the Middle Ages, the hierarchical cosmology developed even further, 
with Dante Alighieri postulating a 10-part universe (see Figure 1) in The Divine 
Comedy, with the Earth at the lowermost point, and God at the uppermost. The 
intermediate layers were populated by various groups including Breakers of 
Vows, who were relegated to the Moon, Lovers on Venus, Theologians at the 
level of the Sun and so on. 
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Still later, Emanuel Swedenborg (1688-1772) devised a universe said to be 
based on his own personal experience of having visited Heaven, and consisting 
of five levels: Earth, the spirit world, Natural Heaven, Spiritual Haven and 
Celestial Heaven. 
While Dante’s view, shared 
by other medieval theologians, 
scientists and mystics,  was 
almost certainly a reflection of 
the prevailing Ptolomeic Earth-
centric view of the world, in 
which the heavens shared 
physical space with the known 
universe with the Earth at its 
centre, a view which has been 
discounted astronomically in 
virtually all its parts,328  it does 
contain within it an important 
insight, which I shall explore 
further when I return to look at 
those models in more detail 
below. 
The Jewish view is 
complicated by the concept of 
Olam ha-ba, the world to come, 
which can be interpreted as 
both the spiritual afterlife and 
the messianic age. But Heaven for Judaism is not an end-goal as it is in 
Christianity or in the Muslim Jannah, however. “Judaism is not focused on the 
question of how to get into heaven. Judaism is focused on life and how to live 
it.”329 Ideally, mitzvoth, commandments, are not carried out for their potential of 
ensuring entry into Heaven, but “because it is our privilege and our sacred 
obligation to do so. We perform them out of a sense of love and duty, not out of a 
desire to get something in return.”330 
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That contrasts sharply with the Christian view, whereby although carrying out 
God’s will should also ideally be done out of love of God or Jesus, failing to do so 
will result in a punishment, traditionally referred to as going to Hell. Fulfilling the 
obligations, however, will ensure that one will get to heaven. Some will dispute 
this, citing the Pauline injunction against relying on the power of works, and the 
sole criterion being belief in the Lord Jesus Christ.331 In practice, however, with 
the issuing of indulgences (a practice which has not yet completely disappeared 
in the Roman Catholic Church, witness the issuing of indulgences for visiting 
Rome during the Great Jubilee of the Year 2000332), the distinction between 
venal and mortal sins, and, in the first place, believing in Jesus as the Messiah as 
promoted by the Church as a prerequisite (extra ecclessiam nula salus) 
Christianity has certainly given the impression that there are things that one must 
do and others that one must not do, if one wants to get to Heaven. 
The primary issue – how does one get to Heaven -- having been dealt with in 
Scripture and commentaries on it, most commentators have concentrated on the 
question of what Heaven is like, how is it organised, how do the inhabitants 
spend their time, and other questions of that nature. 
Much of the early work draws on the work of the neo-Platonists, especially 
Philo of Alexandria, creating a world much like the Greek Elysian Fields. In 
Philo’s vision, for example, death “restores the soul to its original pre-birth 
state.(…) the true philosopher’s soul survives bodily death and assumes ‘a higher 
existence immortal and incorporeal. (…) In heaven, the soul joins the incorporeal 
inhabitants of the divine world, the angels. In certain cases, it advances even 
higher and lives in the world of ideas. If it moves even higher, it can live with the 
Deity itself.”333 
As Christianity developed, however, the New Testament “eliminated the notion 
of compensation (…) [heaven became] the promise that Christians would be 
permitted to experience the divine fully.”334 This had the result that, in contrast 
with the Jewish focus on living in the world, “the followers of Jesus rejected the 
world and focused their eyes on a future with God alone.”335 
What that future consisted of has shifted somewhat over the centuries, In the 
vision presented by the writer of Revelation, Heaven is rather like a constant 
liturgy, the ultimate in God-focus, with the assembled denizens of heaven 
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standing before the Throne of God in a perpetual act of worship,336 with one’s 
place in the throne room dependent on one’s level of purity, twenty-four elders at 
the front, followed in descending order to the multitude of men and women at the 
back.337 
The next stage of the development, represented by Irenaeus of Lyons, looked 
to Heaven to compensate for losses suffered during the first centuries of 
persecution, when the goodness of the world was withheld from the Christians by 
oppressive imperial forces.338 
An alternate view was presented by, for example, the young Augustine of 
Hippo, who foresaw a continuation of the ascetic life,339 and still another view, 
developed by the elder Augustine as the threat to Christianity declined, saw it as 
an ecclesiastical community which was “more mundane, more human and less 
theocentric’.340 
With the fall of the Western Empire, and the development of the medieval 
world over a millennium and the beginnings of cities, heaven changed again, 
becoming an idealised metropolis, with beautiful buildings and  lovely roadworks. 
In keeping with the world developing around them, writers envisioned the 
heavenly Jerusalem, seven castles in the immediate area and some smaller 
fortresses round about341  
“The popular medieval image of heaven included an urban and courtly 
leisured class, preoccupied with splendour, from beautiful clothes to magnificent 
architecture to splendid festivities. Worldly splendour was enhanced, glorified and 
made permanent. All with a clearly theocentric focus, however, retaining the 
‘liturgical focus of the book of Revelation.’342 
The rise of Scholasticism brought a new emphasis, and it became common 
now to wonder about the physical position of Heaven in the universe and the 
implications for that on the activities that took place there. 
Drawing heavily on Aristotle, the Scholasticians conceived a universe “made 
of concentric spheres and levels” 
The innermost region, consisting of “hell inside the Earth,” gave way to 
progressive and increasingly perfect spheres leading to the outermost sphere, 
the firmament, beyond which lay heaven, divided into two levels. On the first 
                                            
336  Ibid., pp. 39-41 
337  Ibid., pp 42-43 
338  Ibid., p. 47. 
339  Ibid., p.48 
340  Ibid., p. 68. 
341  Ibid., p. 74. 
342  Ibid., p. 78. 
inter-religious dialogue 
 151
level, lived the angels and the blessed. At the uppermost level, however, dwelt 
the Holy Trinity.343 
For Thomas Aquinas, this heaven was a place of extreme inaction, movement 
being an indication and promoter of ‘both death and decay.’344 
Over the centuries, however, others disagreed. Some saw heaven as a 
continuation of the godly works that were carried out on Earth. Still others as a 
place for reunion with loved ones, either lovers, spouses or children. Throughout 
these various heavens, and those which followed, a great deal of attention was 
paid to the degree to which the saints would interact with one another and with 
God. Questions of the relations with children, spouses, parents and others, as 
well as with God, Jesus and Mary, occupied the attentions of the theorists, 
academics, churchmen and laymen, to a great extent 
These themes continued through the Reformation, Counter-Reformation, and 
into the modern, hyper-schismatic times, extending in to the point where some 
believers have created heavens for their dearly departed household pets. 
At the time of the dawn of Modernism in Europe, with René Descartes, 
Immanuel Kant, Friederich Schleiermacher and others leading the charge and 
coinciding with the explosion of scientific knowledge in astronomy, genetics, 
archaeology, and so forth, the theologians’ view of heaven began to change 
somewhat. 
Detailed exposés of day-to-day celestial activities began to be less 
emphasised, and questions of whether one would encounter one’s parents, 
children, friends and siblings began to take a back seat, inasmuch as they could 
not in any event be proved. Beliefs concerning the afterlife have been reduced “to 
a minimum in the hope of developing a more rational and hence a more 
acceptable and believable heaven.”345 
Combined with a growing distaste and disbelief even among laypeople, 
theologians were faced with the quandary of how Heaven should be dealt with. 
Some opted for a symbolist solution, finding the “meaning of Christianity [not] on 
the surface of theological language to be easily read, but […] deep within 
traditional religious images. To unlock the meaning of those symbols, though a 
difficult task, is the mark of true spiritual understanding.”346 
                                            
343  Ibid., p. 82. 
344  Ibid., p. 84. 
345  Ibid., p. 323. 
346  Ibid., p. 327. 
The limits of an ethic-centric 
 152
Others, beginning especially in the late 1800s and early 1900s, developed a 
more radical approach. Led by Walter Rauschenbusch, they developed what has 
become known as the Social Gospel. 
The American Rauschenbusch felt that Christians “should concern themselves 
with the society in which they lived. […] For Rauschenbusch and other activists in 
the Social Gospel movement, the Kingdom of God was not an idealised life in 
heaven but a reality which should be accomplished on Earth.”347 
Perfection was therefore, “not an individual goal accomplished after life but a 
social goal to be achieved on this earth. Heaven was not a reality of after death, 
but the symbol of a perfected world here and now.”348 
The proponents of both the Social Gospel and the more traditional 
eschatological heaven have been in my view rightly criticised from a theological 
perspective as supporting a non-Biblical separation of Heaven and Earth. 
From both a pre-Christian Jewish perspective and an early Christian 
perspective, such a division does justice neither to the messianic expectation or 
to Christ’s Kingdom of Heaven, which is at hand. 
In an article in the theological periodical Concilium349 in 1979, Christian 
Duquoc analyses the historical development of the separation and concludes that 
maintaining belief in that separation is to be “unfaithful to the orientation of the 
New Testament.”350 
Duquoc places the cause of the separation in the failure of the Christianisation 
of the Roman Empire, and the later collapse of that empire, which seemed to 
indicate that the promised Kingdom was not at hand.351 
Furthermore, the elevation of the Church to the pre-eminent position within the 
Empire, first as official religion, later as Earthly potentate, served those who were 
able to exploit that position for their own ends.352 
The result was the “expulsion of heaven, which ultimately acquired no more 
than a moral relationship to the Earth. Heaven became an object of individual 
reward that no longer had a connection with temporal existence.”353  
One way of dealing with this separation was the creation of a “sphere in which 
human domination arose.”354 Heaven, then, became the antithesis of Earth. That 
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later became apparent in the Social Gospel, where humans were deemed 
responsible for creating heaven on Earth, but that that had little or nothing to do 
with heaven as such.  
Those who were dissatisfied with what the Social Gospel implied also 
developed theologies, including process theology in the United States, and the 
work of the former Dominican Jacques Pohier. 
Duquoc criticises these and other theologies for turning heaven into the 
opposite of Earth. He finds in them, however, an intuitive understanding of an 
important point: “that God’s blessing begins here and now, and that the world 
here and now is given to humanity to serve as the place in which mankind can 
develop its happiness.”355 
The Heaven of Islam shares some similarities with that Christian view. Sura 
2:29 of the Koran states, for example, that Allah created the Earth and then 
created seven Heavens in the sky.356 
The prophet Mohammed is said to have visited Heaven (referenced only once, 
in Sura 17:1 of the Koran, but expounded extensively in the commentary on the 
Koran, the Hadith – specifically in Mishkatu ’l-Masabih), being  taken by the angel 
Gabriel first to the temple at Jerusalem and then through the seven stages of 
heaven, where he meets, in ascending order, Adam; John and Jesus; Joseph; 
Enoch; Aaron; Moses; and Abraham. 
Some modern Muslim commentators, though, have expanded the numbers of 
heavens, as Jannah, exponentially, with everyone getting the Jannah that is 
appropriate to their level of spiritual development in Islam357 and their desires.358 
For some that might mean simply “purely the closeness of Allah. For them a 
different type of Jannah is promised in the Holy Koran. (…) That is the highest 
type of Jannah.”359 
As to what goes on there, Islam is – all protestations from critics that it will be 
focussed on sex with virgins and young boys, and eating grapes notwithstanding 
– purposefully vague. According to many commentators, modern and classical, 
everything is allegory, mathal in Arabic, and many Koran verses discussing 
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Figure 2: Simple view of the division of Heaven and Earth. 
heaven, and hell for that matter, are said to include the word mathal to indicate 
that it is allegory.360 
Out of the images from Christianity, Judaism and Islam, then, we have models 
that share two elements: 
1. A hierarchical Reality including various degrees of purity and 
development 
2. Communication and interaction among those degrees. 
In all three of those religions, there are stories of inhabitants of one level 
travelling to another. Angels regularly make the crossing, to communicate to free 
Paul from prison, for example, to bind the mouth of the lions when Daniel was 
placed among them, to take Mohammed to the seven heavens. 
The Reality that lies behind that concept can be conceived in a multitude of 
ways. 
The simplest and most common is a simple division between the Heavens and 
the Earth.361 Figure 2 illustrates that most simple of models. 
 
The implication of that is that there is a clear distinction between the two parts 
of the reality, but that there is some communication and movement possible 
between them. That would, of course, only be possible if they shared a common 
Reality. 
Another way of looking at 
it, however, shows that the 
physical universe is enclosed 
in and is therefore part of 
Heaven, as shown in Figure 
3. 
 
Even the newest 
theories in the world of 
physics take nothing away from that model, and even if it turns out that there are 
a near-infinite number of universes making up the multiverse (see Figure 4), it 
would still fall under the model shown in Figure 3, (next page) with a slight 
variation. 
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Other, similar, models are possible, but they all 
contain within them that element of a shared Reality that, 
from a religious perspective, transcends the simply 
physical and envelops it or is in communication with it in 
some way. 
It is that that can provide us 
with a starting point for giving the 
inter-religious dialogue a 
theological dimension and purpose 
without requiring the religions to 
surrender what is most dear to 
them. 
It is important for the various 
religions to emphasise that the 
Reality that includes the Earth also 
includes the Heavens. Any ‘going to’ involved with Heavens 
must therefore only be a transfer from one part of the 
Reality to another. If that is so, then it is incumbent upon us 
to not put off until that transfer takes place the conduct that 
will be expected of us when we get there. 
Because there is no ‘there.’ ‘There’ is also ‘here.’ An 
analogy of how that could be is provided by Hazrat Mirza Tahir Ahmad during a 
speech he made in London in 1984. 
“Like in one space, the waves are coexisting, the television waves are 
coexisting with each other and the radio waves, and with heat waves, and they’re 
not interfering with each other, and they don’t know each other’s value. Yet the 
space allotted to each of them is the same. (…) When you begin to understand 
things of this nature, you begin to project this into a future, which is even finer in 
concept than the human imagination can ever reach.”362  
There is, however, great disagreement among the religions as to what Heaven 
is, what will go on there, and what is required to get there. One element, 
however, that seems beyond dispute is that, whatever the details, it is the home 
of YHWH, Allah, God, gods, the One, etc., and therefore also the locus of all 
Truth and all Good. And, as shown above, it is part of our Reality. That gives, I 
believe a good starting point for the next phase of the inter-religious dialogue: 
what conduct is appropriate for the residents of the Heavens that we all now are? 
                                            
362  Speech by the late Hazrat Mirza Tahir Ahmad, in the London Mosque, 18 July, 1984. Available 
from http://www.askislam.com/Concepts/Heaven/Answer_161.html (2004). 
Figure 4: A multiverse 
view of the heavenly -
earthly Reality. 
Figure 3: The Earth 
as a sub-set of the 
heavenly Reality. 
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There are, of course, serious and significant dogmatic differences among and 
within the religions as to what heaven is and signifies. Discussing those will be a 
sign of whether it is even possible to hold a true dialogue in the spirit of David 
Bohm. 
Adopting that line of inquiry and dialogue allows us to go to the heart of the 
core business of the religions, without requiring anyone to surrender his 
uniqueness. The transformation that Bohm requires of real dialogue will arise out 
of the new consciousness and awareness. Those who believe that the other 
religions are in error will not be forced to abandon their beliefs and accept that all 
religions are equal, but will be required to look more towards themselves and see 
how they should themselves behave. Over time, that may lead to a 
transformation of relations among religions, among believers, and, by extension, 
achieve many of the objectives of the current dialogue and have additional ones, 
as well. 
That is the emphasis of this approach. I become less interested in what the 
Other should do, and very concerned about what I should do. Can I, as a citizen 
of Heaven, deny others of my fellow Citizens rights to housing, food, life, or 
medicine? Can I impose my political will or use my economic strength to bend 
others to my bidding? 
Is that fitting for the Citizen of Heaven that I believe myself to be? 
This is not the same as the Social Gospel, for several reasons. 
In the first place, the Social Gospel, as indicated by its name, was a strictly 
Christian affair. I am calling for the expansion of this principle to all religions, 
major and minor by whatever metre-stick one chooses to measures. 
In the second place, though the fruits of such an approach may resemble the 
Social Gospel in the exterior phenomenon, that is not its goal. The goal is to 
achieve a sea-change in the believers, rather than exclusively being focused on 
doing good works, though they would undoubtedly result. From an interior 
perspective, it constitutes a paradigm shift in terms of how believers see 
themselves and others. 
And thirdly, the purpose is not, as one Social Gospel proponent hoped, to 
initiate the beginning of the Messianic time, but to begin to act now as if that time 
were already upon us in some way, which it is. 
The phenomenological model for this attitude can be found, perhaps ironically 
for some, in the armed forces of the modern Western world. 
Most of the modern armed forces have a concept either called Conduct 
Unbecoming, or reflecting the same ideas, which are: 
Behaviours and attitudes which others expect of me and which I expect of 
myself, simply because I am a Member of the armed forces. 
inter-religious dialogue 
 157
In the U.S. Army, for example, it is covered under U.S. Code Title 10, Subtitle 
A, Part II, Chapter 47, Subchapter X (The Uniform Code of Military Justice), 
Section 933, Article 133: 
Conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman  
Any commissioned officer, cadet, or midshipman who is 
convicted of conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman 
shall be punished as a court-martial may direct. 
Just what ‘conduct unbecoming’ means is not specified the U.S. or other 
military code, but is taught and, usually, internalised throughout the military 
career. The basic premise is that officers, and, to a lesser extent, Other Ranks, 
are expected to conduct themselves in a manner appropriate to their status as a 
serviceman. So, too, should it be with the religions. My relations with the Other 
should not only reflect his characteristics, but my own.  
Police forces, which may be considered paramilitary in organisation and 
operating principles, also have similar codes. 
The Police Act of the Canadian province of British Columbia, for example, sets 
out a category of offence known as ‘discreditable conduct.’ 
Discreditable conduct 363 
5 For the purposes of section 4 (1) (a), a police officer commits 
the disciplinary default of discreditable conduct if  
(a) the police officer, while on duty, acts in a disorderly manner 
or in a manner that is  
(i) prejudicial to the maintenance of discipline in the municipal 
police department with which the police officer is employed, or  
(ii) likely to discredit the reputation of the municipal police 
department with which the police officer is employed,  
(b) the police officer's conduct, while on duty, is oppressive or 
abusive to any person,  
(c) the police officer contravenes a provision of the Act, a 
regulation, rule or guideline made under the Act, or does not 
comply with a standing order of the municipal police 
department with which the police officer is employed,  
                                            
363  B.C. Reg. 205/98, O.C. 725/98, Deposited June 11, 1998 effective July 1, 1998, Police Act, 
Code of Professional Conduct Regulation 
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(d) the police officer withholds or suppresses a complaint or 
report against any other officer,  
(e) the police officer fails to report to an officer whose duty it is 
to receive the report, or to Crown counsel, any information or 
evidence, either for or against any prisoner or defendant, that 
is material to an alleged offence under an enactment of British 
Columbia or Canada, or  
(f) the police officer suppresses, tampers with or fails to 
disclose to an investigating officer, or to the discipline authority 
of a respondent, information that is material to a proceeding or 
potential proceeding under Part 9 of the Act.  
The idea of behaviour that is based on religious beliefs is hardly new. The 613 
commandments and directives of the Torah serve that purpose for Judaism. For 
Christians, the Sermon on the Mount, in conjunction with other statements of 
Jesus and the epistle writers serves. 
For Hindus, the Bhagavad-Gita can be considered a good starting point. 
Other groups, too, have similar codes of conduct that are required simply 
because of one’s own status. 
The Pashtun of Afghanistan, for example, have a code known as Pashtunwali, 
described as an “indigenous honour code and religion of the ethnic Afghan 
people.”364 
Pashtunwali consists of a number of elements, based around four key 
concepts: 
Melmastia (Hospitality): To show hospitality to all visitors, 
regardless of who they are, their ethnic, religious, or national 
background, without hope of remuneration or favour.  
Badal (Justice): To seek justice over time or over space to 
avenge a wrong. This applies to injustices committed 
yesterday or 1000 years ago if the wrong-doer still exists.  
Nanawatay (Settlement): Nanawatay derives from the verb “to 
go in” and is used when the vanquished party is prepared to go 
in to the house or hujra of the victors and ask forgiveness.  
                                            
364  http://encyclopedia.thefreedictionary.com/Pashtunwali (2004) 
inter-religious dialogue 
 159
Nang (Honour): Nang is composed of the various points below 
that a tribesman must observe to ensure his honour, and that 
of his family, is upheld. 365 
Islam has the Five Pillars of faith, prayer, alms, fasting, pilgrimage, which all 
Muslims are expected to adhere to. 
Other types of groups also have such principles. The Boy Scouts, for example, 
have both an oath and a law. 
Scout Oath 
On my honour I will do my best 
To do my duty to God and my country 
and to obey the Scout Law; 
To help other people at all times; 
To keep myself physically strong, 
Mentally awake, and morally straight.  
Scout Law 
A scout is trustworthy, helpful, courteous, kind, obedient, 
cheerful, thrifty, brave, clean, and reverent. 
The idea of a code of conduct, a code of honour, is therefore not new. What is 
new is to apply the same principle to the transcendent Reality that surrounds us. 
An important question for the participants in inter-religious dialogue, then,  based 
on the fact that we share the heavenly Reality, by whatever name we call it, is 
how such a citizen of Heaven should conduct himself, solely on the basis of the 
fact that (s)he is a citizen, or at least an inhabitant, of Heaven.  
For one thing is certain. For believers, there is only one Reality, and though 
we may dispute the Other’s vision of it, it does not change the fact that there can 
only be the one. Separate from the question of God, Allah, Krishna, is the 
question of the believer, and by extension, of all humanity, in this part of the 
Heavenly realm. 
The solution thus formulated, while it may seem a radical departure, is in fact 
already present in most, if not all, of the extant religious traditions. 
In its most common form, it will be found in prayer, which are directed to, in 
the case of the Christian, the living and present Christ. It is the present that is of 
most concern here. Charismatic Christians take that presence even further, and 
believe that they are in fact filled with the Holy Spirit during prayer and worship. It 
doesn’t get much closer than that. 
                                            
365  Ibid. 
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In interpreting the word "place” – “makom" in the story of Moses wanting to 
see God on Mount Zion, Jewish teacher Rashi366  said that it should be read to 
mean “I encompass the world; the world does not encompass Me (Bereshit 
Rabba 68:9: Shemot Rabba 45:6).” That is further extrapolated to mean “that 
God is always nearby; there is no corner of the cosmos that is bereft of God’s 
presence.”367  
It is also reflected in the names of some Jewish synagogues: Emmanuel – 
God is with us.  
The Buddha believed that his enlightenment put him in touch with the One. 
Most often it will be found in the mystical traditions which plead for developing 
an immediate, that is to say, unmediated, connection with the Divine.   
Mystics and mysticism have led a precarious existence in many of the 
religions that now participate in the inter-religious dialogue. Outside the structure 
and discipline of the establishment, they believe they are in direct communication 
with the Divine, with Heaven, with no intervention needed by other Earthly 
agencies. 
That they are often looked at somewhat askance by members of the 
establishment is often criticised as fear by that establishment of losing control, as 
a matter of power. The other side to the issue, though, is that mystics are 
operating without the checks and balances that, in the Christian context, were 
imposed by the Pauline letters368 and may teach things that do not occur in the 
Scriptures and may be considered heretical within the organised Church, 
especially when that teaching is based on a claim of higher authority. And that 
happens regularly. The fact that some mystics, some purported mystics, and 
others have preached other things than an unmediated access to God and 
Heaven does not, however, necessarily void all of their insights. Either in 
Christianity or in other faiths. 
Another, perhaps more important, way of looking at this position is to try to 
view it from the point of view of – from a Christian/Jewish perspective – God in 
the Heavens. From that perspective, there really is only one Reality, for He has 
created the so-called visible universe within His Divine Reality. Any separation of 
the two spheres must therefore, be applicable only from the perspective of 
humanity’s limited field of vision and then when viewed only from our perceived 
reality. Support for this view can be found in both Hebrew and Christian scripture. 
                                            
366  Rabbi Shlomo Yitzchaki, 1040-1105 CE  
367  See Chancellor Ismar Schorsch, Ki Tissa/Shabbat Parah 5761, Exodus 30:11 - 34:35, March 
17, 2001 http://learn.jtsa.edu/topics/parashah/5761/kitissa.shtml (2004). 
368  1 John 4:1 
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 See, for example: 
Genesis 1:1 Genesis 14:19  Genesis 14:22 
Genesis 24:3 Exodus 9:29  Deuteronomy 4:39 
Zechariah 5:9 Acts 7:49  Acts 17:24 
 
The same logic must also apply whether the Divine is Allah, Ahura Mazda, 
Krishna or the 28 levels of ‘heaven’ and 6 levels of existence in the Buddhist 
samsara, or circle of existence. 
So the idea of a Heaven that is an inseparable part of this Earth is not all that 
outlandish or far-fetched. In fact, it should be considered part of the orthodox 
package of beliefs in many religions. If we were to more consciously 
acknowledge it, we could provide a real impetus to the inter-religious dialogue 
which currently seems to be flagging. 
Lessing proposed a commonality of humanity based on that humanity. What I 
plead for here is a commonality of humanity based on the common religious 
values that derive from our common origin, presence and future in the Heaven 
which we now know only through a glass, darkly. 
In terms of implementation, the Declaration Toward a Global Ethic by the 
Council for a Parliament of World Religions can provide a good starting point, 
though for this purpose it should be reformulated positively rather than negatively 
as it currently is.369 
Rather than being necessary only to stave off all manner of ills that humans, 
by commission or omission, are responsible for, we should be striving for 
identifying the conduct that is becoming to Citizens of Heaven. That also removes 
a built-in problem with the Declaration as it stands, which is that, hypothetically if 
                                            
369  This is not to deny the value of the Declaration as it stands; quite the contrary. It was, however, 
never intended to serve as a common dogma or religious basis for all the religions. The 
introduction states quite clearly that it was not intended as a religious document. Its purpose in 
its current form was to create an ethic for all people, religious and non-religious. In that, it is 
highly successful. One of the issues, however, is that it appears to be a declaration of the 
common ground of religions, and therefore a suitable starting place for inter-religious dialogue 
and others have modelled their motivations and declarations on it or on the philosophy behind it. 
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not in reality, there could come a moment when it is no longer necessary in its a 
negative formulation because the problems it was designed to resolve have been 
resolved. The environment has been taken care of, illness, poverty and war are 
no more, and so on. 
With a positive formulation, it would never reach its conclusion, because we 
imperfect humans must always strive to achieve perfection, but we shall never 
achieve it. Certainly not in this iteration of the Heavenly Reality anyway. 
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Epilogue 
It is a truism to state that people tend to create religions in their own images. 
The religions of ancient Egypt and Mesopotamia, for example, clearly reflected 
the complex hierarchical nature of their ruling structures with a strong emphasis 
on infighting among the gods (among whose numbers were counted the 
earthbound kings and Pharaohs) and the importance of the naturally occurring 
patterns of flood and drought and manmade disasters such as military invasion 
as expressions of divine benevolence or wrath.  
Pre-agricultural societies tend(ed) to place even more emphasis on natural 
forces controlled perhaps by wood spirits, rain spirits, drought spirits, etc. 
So, too, with the development of urban society in the Ancient Near East and 
Europe did the divinities take on characteristics of kings, with dedicated court 
heralds and messengers in the forms of angels (hence the name). 
And I, who live in a world and a universe that, from an Enlightenment, Western 
perspective, is seen to be One, regardless of the smaller national and political 
(and planetary?) divisions that separate us, am also guilty of following that 
pattern, seeing a single Celestial unity that transcends the religious differences 
that so brightly colour our world. 
While I fully accept the charge and by this study am giving my testimony in 
answer of it, I believe that the solution that I propose cannot simply be dismissed 
by pointing out that peculiarity of its inspiration.   
I look forward to passionate debate with colleague researchers on the points I 
have made and the conclusions I have reached. It may be that others, from a 
different hermeneutic starting point, cannot even follow the logic I propose. 
Others may disagree strongly for other reasons. The ensuing dialogue will 
certainly be lively. 
Derek Suchard 
2005 
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Annex 1: Declaration  
Toward a Global Code of Conduct 
A reworking of the Declaration of a Global Ethic 
from the World’s Parliament of Religions 1993 
The religious communities of the world through inspiration, insight or 
revelation, recognise and acknowledge that the Earth and the visible Universe 
are but a small but inseparable part of the total Reality which is the seat and 
source of the Holiness from which we draw and derive our salvation and which is 
our ultimate goal.  
We further acknowledge that our condition as residents of that place of 
Holiness obliges us to conduct ourselves in the present in a manner befitting our 
status and that we heretofore have erroneously thought and believed was 
reserved for a time after our Earthly death. 
That we have thus far collectively failed to live up to that obligation is 
evidenced by the fact that hundreds of millions of human beings on our planet 
increasingly suffer from unemployment, poverty, hunger, and the destruction of 
their families. Hope for a lasting peace among nations slips away from us. There 
are tensions between the sexes and generations. Children die, kill, and are killed. 
More and more countries are shaken by corruption in politics and business. It is 
increasingly difficult to live together peacefully in our cities because of social, 
racial, and ethnic conflicts, the abuse of drugs, organized crime, and even 
anarchy. Even neighbours often live in fear of one another. Out planet continues 
to be ruthlessly plundered. A collapse of the ecosystem threatens us. 
Time and again we see leaders and members of religions incite aggression, 
fanaticism, hate, and xenophobia - even inspire and legitimate violent and bloody 
conflicts. Religion often is misused for purely power-political goals, including war. 
We are filled with shame and disgust. 
Even if that were not the case, however, it would be no less incumbent upon 
us to conduct ourselves in a manner appropriate to our Celestial status. 
We believe that the precepts and practices of the world’s religions offer a 
consensus for a code of conduct that can apply to believers in their conduct 
among themselves and in their conduct toward non-believers, who are no less 
fellow Citizens of the One Reality.  
WE BELIEVE 
That, inasmuch as all have a responsibility for a liveable world, and that 
involvement for the sake of human rights, freedom, justice, peace and the 
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preservation of the Earth is an obligation appropriate to our station, regardless of 
our different religious and cultural traditions; 
That we as religious women and men who base our lives on an Ultimate 
Reality and draw spiritual power and hope therefrom in trust, in prayer or 
meditation, in word or silence have a very special responsibility for the welfare of 
all humanity and of each individual. 
At no point in its history has humanity possessed, as it does today, sufficient 
economic, cultural and spiritual resources to introduce a better global order. It is 
incumbent upon us to apply those resources to the building of a better world. Our 
time has experienced greater technological progress than ever existed before, 
and yet we are faced with the fact that world-wide poverty, hunger, death of 
children, unemployment, misery and the destruction of nature have not abated 
but rather to some extent increased. Many peoples are threatened with economic 
ruin, social disarray, political marginalisation and national collapse. 
In such a critical situation humanity needs not only political programs and 
actions, but also a vision of a peaceful living together of peoples, ethnic and 
ethical groupings, and religions; it needs hopes, goals, ideals, standards. But 
these have slipped from the hands of people all over the world. It is a 
responsibility of the religions, despite their frequent historical failures, to 
demonstrate that such hopes, ideals and standards can be grounded, guarded 
and lived. This is especially true in the modern world: whether a state guarantees 
freedom of conscience and religion, pays lip-service to those principles, or 
explicitly rejects such individual freedoms, each individual is nonetheless 
personally responsible to act according to values, convictions and norms which 
are valid for all humans regardless of their social origin, skin colour, language or 
religion. 
We are convinced of the fundamental unity of the human family, both on Earth 
and in the context of the Ultimate Reality in which we willingly or unwillingly 
share. We wish to formally proclaim the full realization of the intrinsic dignity of 
the human person, of inalienable freedom, of the equality in principle of all 
humans, and the necessary solidarity of all humans with one  another. 
We have learned that the realization of justice in our societies and in ourselves 
depends on the insight and readiness to act justly; that action in the favour of 
rights presumes a consciousness of duty arising from both the head and heart of 
women and men; 
That rights without morality internalized within us cannot long endure. 
By a Global Code of Conduct, we do not mean the imposition of a single set of 
the beliefs and principles of one religion above the others, but a fundamental 
consensus of binding values, unconditional standards and personal attitudes 
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arising from different visions, insights and revelations of the shared Ultimate 
Reality. 
The Fundamental Demand: Every Human Being Must Treat Every Other Human 
Being Humanely 
Although we are aware that our various religions and ethical traditions often 
offer very different bases for what is helpful and what is unhelpful for men and 
women, what is right and what is wrong, what is good and what is evil and we do 
not wish to gloss over or ignore the serious differences among the individual 
religions, those differences should not hinder us from proclaiming publicly those 
things which we already hold in common now, to which we jointly feel obliged, 
each on the basis of our own religious or ethical grounds. 
We all know that now as before all over the world women and men are treated 
inhumanely: They are robbed of their freedom and their opportunities; their 
human rights are trampled under foot; their human dignity is disregarded. But 
might does not make right! In the face of all inhumanity our religions and ethical 
convictions demand that every human being treat every other human being 
humanely! 
That means that every human being -- without distinction of sex, age, race, 
skin colour, language, religion, political view, or national or social origin -- 
possesses an inalienable and untouchable dignity. And everyone, individuals as 
well as the state, is therefore obliged to exercise and to honour that dignity and 
guarantee its effective protection. Humans must always be the subjects of rights, 
must be ends, never mere means, never objects of commercialization and 
industrialization in economics, politics and media, in research institutes and 
industrial undertakings. Furthermore, no human being in our age, no social class, 
no influential interest group, no power cartel nor any state stands "beyond good 
and evil." No, all men and women, as beings with reason and conscience, are 
obliged to behave in a genuinely human, not inhuman, fashion, to do good and 
avoid evil! 
That each human being is worthy of receiving such treatment is a direct 
reflection of the fact that each human is worthy and capable of and responsible 
for granting it. This is reflected in the so-called Golden Rule which is present in 
many of our religions and has been maintained in them for thousands of years: 
What you do not wish done to yourself, do not unto others. More positively 
formulated: What you wish done to yourself, do to others!  
This should be the irrevocable, unconditional norm for all areas of life, for 
family and communities, for races, nations and religions. Self-determination and 
self-realization are thoroughly legitimate -- so long as they are not separated from 
human self-responsibility and global-responsibility, from responsibility for fellow 
humans and nature. Every form of egoism, however, every self-seeking, whether 
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individual or collective, whether in the form of class thinking, racism, nationalism 
or sexism, is to be rejected. For these prevent humans from being authentically 
human and deny the Celestial citizenship to which all are part. 
The Golden Rule implies very concrete standards to which we humans wish to 
and should hold firm when they concern the welfare of either individuals or 
humanity as a whole. There are above all four ancient guidelines for human 
behavior which are found in most of the religions of this world. 
 
Four Irrevocable Directives 
1. Toward a Culture of Non-violence and Respect for Life 
In the great ancient religious and ethical traditions of humankind we find the 
teaching: You shall not kill! Or in positive terms: Have respect for life! Concretely 
that means that no one has the right to torture, injure, and certainly not to kill, any 
other human being and does have the obligation to put an end to such practices 
when they are encountered. And no people, no race, no religion has the right to 
hate, to discriminate, and certainly not to exile or to liquidate a "foreign" minority 
which is different in behaviour, different in belief. 
Young people should therefore learn already at home and in school that 
violence may not be a means of settling differences with others. Only thus can a 
culture of non-violence be created. All people have a right to life, bodily integrity 
and the development of personality insofar as they do not injure the rights of 
others. Of course wherever there are people there will be conflicts. Such 
conflicts, however, are to be resolved without violence. This is true for states as 
well as for individuals, for political power-holders should always commit 
themselves first of all to non-violent solutions within the framework of an 
international order of peace -- which itself has need of protection and defence 
against perpetrators of violence. Armament is a mistaken path; disarmament is a 
commandment of the hour. There is no survival for humanity without peace! 
A human person is infinitely precious and must be unconditionally protected. 
But likewise the lives of animals and plants which inhabit this planet with us 
deserve protection, preservation and care. As human beings we also have 
responsibility for the air, water and soil precisely with a view to future 
generations. The dominance of humanity over nature and the cosmos is not to be 
propagated, but rather living in harmony with nature and the cosmos is to be 
cultivated. We speak for a respect for life, for all life. 
To be authentically human in the spirit of our great religions and ethical 
traditions means that in public as well as private life we must not be ruthless and 
brutal but rather concerned for others and ready to help. Every people, every 
race, every religion must show tolerance, respect, indeed, high appreciation for 
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every other. Minorities -- whether they be racial, ethnic or religious -- need and 
are entitled to our protection and our support. 
 
2. Toward a Culture of Solidarity and a Just Economic Order 
In the great ancient religious and ethical traditions of humankind we find the 
teaching: You shall not steal! Or in positive terms: Deal honestly! And, in fact, no 
humans have the right to rob or dispossess -- in any manner -- other humans or 
the commonweal. Conversely, no humans have the right to use their possessions 
without concern for the needs of society. Where extreme poverty reigns, theft will 
time and again occur for the sake of survival, if indeed complete helplessness 
and overwhelming despair have not set in. And where power and wealth is 
accumulated ruthlessly, feelings of envy, resentment, and yes, deadly hate 
inevitably will well up in the disadvantaged. This leads all too easily to a diabolic 
circle of violence and counter-violence. There is no global peace without a global 
order in justice! 
Therefore young people should learn already at home and in school that 
property, be it ever so small, carries with it an obligation and that its use should at 
the same time serve the commonweal. Only thus can a just economic order be 
built up. But if the plight of the poorest billions of humans, particularly women and 
children, is to be improved, the structures of the world economy must be 
fundamentally altered. Individual good deeds and assistance projects, 
indispensable as they are, are not sufficient. The participation of all states and 
the authority of international organizations are needed to arrive at a just 
arrangement. 
Wherever those in positions of power threaten to repress those under their 
control, institutions threaten persons, might oppresses right, resistance -- 
whenever possible, non-violent -- is called for. 
To be authentically human in the spirit of our great religions and ethical 
traditions in today's world means the following: 
Instead of misusing economic and political power in ruthless battles for 
domination, we must utilize them for service to humanity: In a spirit of 
compassion with those who suffer and with special care for the poor, 
handicapped, aged, refugees, the lonely. 
Instead of thinking only of power and unlimited power-politics in the 
unavoidable competitive struggles, a mutual respect, a reasonable balance of 
interests, an attempt at mediation and consideration should prevail. 
Instead of an unquenchable greed for money, prestige and consumption, once 
again a sense of moderation and modesty should reign! For in greed humans 
lose their "soul," their inner freedom, and thus that which makes them human. 
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3. Toward a Culture of Tolerance and a Life in Truthfulness 
In the great ancient religious and ethical traditions of humankind we find the 
teaching: You shall not lie! Or in positive terms: Speak the truth! In fact, no 
woman or man, no institution, no state or church or religious community has the 
right to speak untruth to other humans. This is especially true for: 
The mass media, to whom the right of freedom of the press and freedom of 
reporting for the sake of truth is assured and to whom the office of guardian is 
thus granted: They do not stand above morality, but remain duty bound to human 
dignity, human rights and fundamental values; they are duty bound to objectivity, 
fairness and the preservation of personal dignity and have no right to intrude into 
the private human sphere, to manipulate public opinion, or distort reality. 
Artists and scientists, to whom artistic and academic freedom is assured: They 
are not dispensed from general ethical standards and must serve the truth in 
sincerity. 
Politicians who, if they lie in the faces of their people, have frittered away their 
credibility and do not deserve to be reelected. 
Young people should learn already at home and in school to think, speak and 
act in truthfulness. All humans have a right to the truth. They have a right to 
necessary information and education in order to be able to make decisions that 
will be formative for their lives. Without an ethical fundamental orientation they 
will hardly be able to distinguish the important from the unimportant in the daily 
flood of information today. Ethical standards will help them to discern when facts 
are twisted, interests are veiled, tendencies are played up and opinions 
absolutized. 
To be authentically human in the spirit of our great religions and ethical 
traditions in today's world means the following: 
Instead of dishonesty, dissembling and opportunistic adaptation to life, 
cultivate the spirit of truthfulness also in the daily relationships between fellow 
humans; 
instead of spreading ideological or partisan half- truths, seek the truth ever 
anew in incorruptible sincerity; instead of confusing freedom with arbitrariness 
and pluralism with indifference, hold truth high; 
instead of chasing after opportunism, serve in trustworthiness and constancy 
the truth once found. 
 
4. Toward a Culture of Equal Rights, and Partnership Between Men and 
Women 
In the great ancient religious and ethical traditions of humankind we find the 
teaching: You shall not commit sexual immorality! Or in positive terms: Respect 
and love one another! Concretely that means: No one has the right to degrade 
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another to a mere sex object, to lead her to him to or hold her or him in sexual 
dependency. Sexual exploitation is to be condemned as one of the worst forms of 
human degradation. Wherever -- even in the name of a religious conviction -- the 
domination of one sex over the other is preached and sexual exploitation is 
tolerated, wherever prostitution is fostered or children are misused, there 
resistance is commanded. 
Young women and men should learn already at home and in school that 
sexuality is fundamentally not a negative-destructive or exploitative but a creative 
force. Its function as a life-affirming shaper of community can be brought to bear 
all the more as it is lived out with responsibility for one's own happiness and that 
of one's partner. The relationship between men and women does indeed have a 
sexual dimension, but human fulfillment is not identical with sexual happiness. 
Sexuality should be an expression and reinforcement of a love relationship lived 
as partners. Conversely, however, some religious traditions know the ideal of a 
voluntary renunciation of the full use of sexuality; this renunciation can also be an 
expression of identity and meaningful fulfillment. 
The socially institutionalized form of marriage, which despite all its cultural and 
religious variety is characterized by love, loyalty and permanence, aims at, and 
should guarantee, security and mutual support to the husband, wife and children, 
and secure their rights. It is in marriage that the relationship between a woman 
and a man should be characterized not by a patronizing behavior or exploitation, 
but by love, partnership and trustworthiness. All lands and cultures should 
develop economic and social relationships which will make possible marriage and 
family worthy of human beings, especially for older people. Parents should not 
exploit children, nor children parents; rather their relationship should reflect 
mutual respect, appreciation and concern. 
To be authentically human in the spirit of our great religious and ethical 
traditions in today's world means the following: 
Instead of patriarchal domination or degradation, which are the expression of 
violence and engender counter-violence, mutual respect, partnership, 
understanding and tolerance; 
Instead of any form of sexual possessive lust or sexual misuse, mutual 
concern, tolerance, readiness for reconciliation, love. Only what has already been 
lived on the level of personal and familial relationships can be practised on the 
level of nations and religions. 
 
To maintain our own dignity 
When we know what conduct is expected of us, not because of standards 
imposed by others, but because of what we know our condition to be, and fail to 
act accordingly, or worse, to consciously act contrary to those precepts, we 
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diminish and lose respect for ourselves. The consequence of that is that we lose 
respect for others. It is therefore incumbent upon us to constantly monitor our 
own conduct and correct ourselves. It is also our responsibility to, in an 
atmosphere of respect and concern for the Other, to point out to that Other when 
(s)he fails to meet the standard that is appropriate for him or her.  
 
A Transformation of Consciousness 
All historical experience demonstrates the following: Our earth cannot be 
changed unless in the not too distant future an alteration in the consciousness of 
individuals is achieved. This has already been seen in areas such as war and 
peace or economy and ecology. And it is precisely for this alteration in inner 
orientation, in the entire mentality, in the "heart," that the religions bear 
responsibility in a special way. Here we remain aware, however, that a universal 
consensus on many disputed individual ethical questions (from bio- and sexual 
ethics through mass media and scientific ethics to economic and political ethics) 
will be difficult to attain. Nevertheless, even for many questions still disputed, 
differentiated solutions should be attainable in the spirit of the fundamental 
principles jointly developed here. 
In many areas of life a new consciousness of ethical responsibility has already 
arisen. Therefore, we would be especially pleased it if as many as possible 
national or international professional organisations, such as those for physicians, 
scientists, business people, journalists, and politicians, would compose up-to-
date codes of conduct, and are pleased that so many already have. 
Above all, we would welcome it if individual religions also would formulate their 
very specific expressions of codes of conduct: What they on the basis of their 
faith tradition have to say, for example, about the value of self and of the Other, 
the meaning of life and death, the enduring of suffering and the forgiveness of 
guilt, about selfless sacrifice and the necessity of renunciation, compassion and 
joy. All these will be compatible with a Global Code of Conduct; indeed can 
deepen it, make it more specific and concrete. 
On the basis of our religious convictions we commit ourselves to a common 
Global Code of Conduct and call upon all women and men of good will to make 
this Declaration their own. 
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Nederlandse Samenvatting 
Dit proefschrift poogt een antwoord te vinden op de vraag of de huidige 
interreligieuze dialoog een theologische component heeft of zich alleen 
met ethische kwesties bezig houdt. 
Allereerst wordt de historische ontwikkeling van de dialoog geschetst 
vanaf 1893, het waarin het Wereldparlement der Religies werd gehouden 
in Chicago (VS). Het motief achter dit congres was om één front van 
gelovigen van allerlei godsdiensten te vormen tegen de niet-religieuzen. Al 
is dit congres min of meer in vergetelheid geraakt, het heeft wel geleidt tot 
een toename in aandacht op de universiteiten voor de steeds pluriformere 
wereld en tot de totstandkoming van allerlei organisaties die relaties met 
andere religies hoog in het vaandel hebben staan. 
De ontwikkeling van verschillende van deze organisaties, waaronder de 
Wereldraad van Kerken, het Wereldcongres der Religies alsmede 
verschillende bijeenkomsten van de Conferentie voor Wereldmissie, wordt 
behandeld om de langzame verandering in het isolement van het 
Christendom tegenover de andere religies in kaart te brengen. 
Belangrijke bijdragen van onder meer Karl Barth (die stelde dat het 
Christendom geen religie was) en Hendrik Kraemer, de schrijver van het 
gezaghebbende boek De Christelijke Boodschap in een niet-christelijke 
Wereld, worden bediscussieerd. 
Ook de invloed op de interreligieuze dialoog van de twee wereldoorlogen 
van de 20ste eeuw, het einde van het kolonialisme en de totstandkoming 
van de jongste golf vluchtelingen en niet-westerse immigranten naar 
voornamelijk Europa wordt behandeld. 
Vervolgens wordt een viertal posities omtrent interreligieuze relaties 
behandeld, met voor ieder een apart hoofdstuk. 
De christelijke Apologeten komen als eerste aan bod. Hun tweeledige 
strijd om enerzijds vernietiging door de Romeinse autoriteiten te 
voorkomen, en anderzijds hun missie om de boodschap van de Kerk te 
verkondigen, zorgde ervoor dat zij een precair bestaan leiden met een 
voornamelijk verdedigende houding tegenover de buitenwereld. Zowel de 
relaties tussen de Christenen en de Joden als tussen de Christenen en de 
Staatsgodsdienst van het Romeinse Rijk worden bekeken. 
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Wat de relaties met de Joden betreft, wordt de Dialoog met Trypho de 
Jood, door Justinus Martelaar (geschreven rond het jaar 160) 
bediscussieerd. Volgens Justinus hebben de Joden de Tenach verkeerd 
gelezen, niet inziend dat het een vooraankondiging van Jezus was. De 
Tenach is dus nu van de Christenen, die het hebben verdiend, en niet 
meer van de Joden. Hier is van dialoog geen sprake. Justinus wil alleen 
bekeren. 
Een tweede groep die aangevallen werd waren de Gnostici, afvalligen die 
de boodschap van Christus een andere wending wilden geven en op een 
andere manier wilden interpreteren. De voornaamste criticus van de 
Gnostici was Iraenus wiens boek Tegen Ketterij het gezaghebbendste 
werk was. Er was volgens Iraenus niets heiligs aan het Gnosticisme, en 
dus ook geen dialoog, alleen polemiek. 
Wat de Romeinen betreft waren de Apologeten veel milder. Niet over de 
inhoud – de heidenen waren immers verdoemd – maar over de 
presentatie. De Apologia van Justinus Martelaar waarin hij zowel probeert 
de machthebbers te vriend te houden alsook te laten zien dat de 
Christenen goede staatsburgers waren, wordt als voorbeeld 
bediscussieerd.  
De anonieme Brief aan Diognetus laat de andere kant van de zaak zien. 
Deze brief is een duidelijke poging om Diognetus te bekeren, zonder dat 
de schrijver open staat voor een vergelijkbare beweging richting 
Diognetus. Het Christendom is de Waarheid, en iedereen dient zich te 
bekeren. 
Dit hoofdstuk wordt afgesloten met de conclusie dat de 
toenaderingspogingen van het werk van Apologeten niet als model voor 
dialoog kunnen dienen omdat zij geen elementen van dialoog in zich 
hebben. 
In Hoofdstuk IV wordt De Collationes van Petrus Abelardus onder de loep 
genomen. 
Dit boek, wat het verslag van een droom over een dispuut tussen een 
filosoof (wellicht Moslim) een Jood en een Christen zou zijn, gaat uit van 
de wens van een Jood en een filosoof om de beste religie uit te kiezen. In 
feite is het meer een dispuut tussen de filosoof enerzijds en de Jood en de 
Christen anderzijds. Het komt erop neer dat voor Abelardus het geloof van 
de Christenen, naast de openbaring, ook het meest rationele geloof is. De 
filosoof dient zich dus te bekeren, als logisch gevolg daarvan. 
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Deze discussie heeft meer weg van een dialoog. Eerst gaat de Jood in 
discussie met de filosoof, daarna de Christen met de filosoof. Het gebrek 
aan dialogische aspecten ligt erin dat de Christen helemaal niet open staat 
voor de meningen van de anderen. De anderen moeten gewoon inzien dat 
het Christendom het beste, het rationeelste is. Wel is er een tweedeling 
naar voren gekomen: de gelovigen – de Jood en de Christen – tegenover 
de ongelovige filosoof. 
Wegens zijn missiegerichte karakter heeft deze dialoog weinig te bieden in 
het kader van de huidige dialoog. 
De volgende schrijver die aan de orde komt is Kardinaal Nicolas Cusanus 
en zijn boek De Pace Fidei ( Over de vrede van het geloof). In reactie op 
de verovering door de Turken van Constantinopel, een gebeurtenis die 
een echo lijkt te vinden in de aanvallen op de VS door Al-Ka'ida in 2001 en 
daarna,, schrijft Cusanus zijn boek met de bedoeling een omgeving te 
creëren waarin alle gelovigen zonder oorlog met elkaar kunnen leven. De 
setting is een visie waarin de schrijver wordt getransporteerd naar de 
hemel om een congres van vertegenwoordigers van alle religies bij te 
wonen. Onder leiding van Het Woord, Petrus en Paulus, wordt er flink 
gediscussieerd, met als uiteindelijke bedoeling te laten zien dat, hoewel de 
andere religies iets van het Heilige in zich hebben, het Christendom 
erboven uit stijgt en het dichtste bij de Waarheid staat. De toehoorders zijn 
echter niet met elkaar in discussie maar wonen een hoorcollege bij. Er is 
geen onderlinge interactie en dus geen dialoog.  
In Hoofdstuk VI komt het werk van Gotthold Ephraim Lessing ter 
discussie, met de nadruk op zijn toneelstuk Nathan de Wijze. Lessings 
probleem was de relatie tussen de grotere Duitse en Europese 
samenleving enerzijds en de Joodse gemeenschap anderzijds. Hij zag dat 
de Joden in Europa geen deel hadden aan de Verlichting tot dan toe en 
dat wilde hij ter sprake brengen. Dat deed hij door middel van een 
toneelstuk waarin vertegenwoordigers van het Christendom, het 
Jodendom en de Islam samen hun relatie moeten uitwerken. Lessing 
houdt het publiek twee spiegels voor. De ene door middel van een parabel 
van ringen, waarin de conclusie wordt getrokken dat niemand in staat is de 
echte Waarheid te kennen tot het einde der tijden. Men moet zich dus 
afzijdig houden van alle waarheidsclaims. Zijn tweede spiegel houdt hij 
voor in de echte interactie tussen de partners. Daarin wordt de conclusie 
getrokken dat men met elkaar moet omgaan op basis van een gedeelde 
humaniteit, los van de geloofskwesties. 
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Na de verschillende schrijvers te hebben doorlopen, wordt er een 
metadialoog over dialoog geïnitieerd. Er wordt eerst gekeken naar 
verschillende dialoogmodellen die vandaag de dag in omloop zijn onder 
de interreligieuze dialoog partners. 
Modellen van Raimon Panikkar, John Hick, Paul Knitter, Kardinaal 
Ratzinger (nu Paus Benedictus XVI), Leonard Swidler, de Katholieke Kerk, 
de Wereldraad van Kerken, Dorothee Sölle, en verschillende universiteiten 
en theologische hogescholen worden bekeken vanuit het perspectief van 
de praktijk van de interreligieuze dialoog zoals die tegenwoordig wordt 
gevoerd. 
Daarna wordt er een poging gedaan om de schrijvers uit het eerste deel 
binnen een van de modellen te plaatsen om te kijken of die schrijvers iets 
gemeen hebben met de dialoogvoerders van vandaag. De conclusie wordt 
getrokken dat het model van Lessing het dichtst bij de echte dialoog staat. 
Vier voorbeelden van lopende dialoog worden daarna bekeken: de 
Wereldraad van Kerken, de Council for a Parliament of World Religions, 
het Koninklijke Instituut voor Interreligieuze Studies (Jordanië), en het 
Edward B. Brueggeman Centrum voor Dialoog (VS). 
Ook worden verschillende fora voor dialoog bediscussieerd om de 
gedeelde elementen te isoleren. 
De conclusie wordt getrokken dat de gemene deler van de verschillende 
soorten dialoog is dat zij allemaal te maken hebben met ethische 
vraagstukken en de moeilijke, onverenigbare theologische kwesties links 
laten liggen omwille van de praktijk. 
De casus van de Hindoes en Moslims van India wordt geanalyseerd aan 
de hand van onderzoek van Ashutosh Varshney van de Universiteit van 
Michigan (VS) om te kijken hoe deze gemeenschappen in de praktijk de 
ethische kwesties al dan niet oplossen en wat de relatie hiervan is met de 
interreligieuze dialoog. De conclusie wordt getrokken dat de successen, 
voor zover er van succes mag worden gesproken, niet als resultaat van 
interreligieuze dialoog komen, maar van een goed georganiseerde ‘civil 
society’ waarin leden van goede wil uit de verschillende gemeenschappen, 
in hun dagelijks leven en bij sociale gebeurtenissen regelmatig in contact 
met elkaar komen. Om die ethische kwesties op te lossen blijkt 
interreligieuze dialoog dus helemaal overbodig. 
In Hoofdstuk X wordt het begrip ‘dialoog’ zelf onder de loep genomen. Wat 
is het en zou het ooit kunnen bijdragen aan oplossingen voor de 
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praktische kwesties die de aanleiding zijn voor vele interreligieuze 
dialogen? Voornamelijk aan de hand van de theorieën van David Bohm, 
wordt de dialoog geanalyseerd om te kijken hoe het werkt en wat de 
relatie is met religie. Volgens Bohms theorie kan dialoog alleen slagen 
wanneer de partners bereid zijn om van hun verschillende werkelijkheden 
een nieuwe werkelijkheid te maken die de werkelijkheid van elke partner 
overstijgt. Bohm stelt grenzen aan zowel wetenschappelijke als religieuze 
dialoog omdat zij allebei met ultieme waarheden worstelen. Voorbij een 
bepaald punt kan men niet komen. Interreligieuze dialoog die tot de kern 
van de waarheden gaat kan dus niet, aldus Bohm. 
In Hoofdstuk XI wordt een aantal mogelijke theologische doeleinden voor 
interreligieuze dialoog geponeerd. Zij zijn: 
1. Er bestaat geen theologische doeleinde. 
2. Het doeleinde is om alle gelovigen te helpen realiseren dat er geen 
echt waar geloof bestaat (alle religies hebben het mis). 
3. Het doeleinde is om de gelovigen van andere religies de ene ware 
Godsdienst te doen erkennen. 
4. Het doeleinde is om alle gelovigen te doen erkennen dat de 
verschillende geloven deel uit maken van de ene ware Godsdienst. 
5. Het doeleinde is om alle gelovigen te doen erkennen dat er nog geen 
bestaand geloof is dat het Ware is, maar dat de mensheid er naar 
onder weg is en dat de dialoog deel is van die reis. 
6. Het doeleinde is om de totstandkoming van een verenigde 
wereldgodsdienst te realiseren. 
7. Anders, nog onbekend. 
Deze mogelijkheden worden voor de spiegel van de huidige dialoog 
gehouden om te kijken of er aanknopingspunten zijn. De conclusie wordt 
getrokken dat maar één van deze, de zevende, voldoet aan de eisen van 
de huidige dialoog. Het logische gevolg daarvan is dat de huidige dialoog 
geen theologische basis heeft die als gemeenschappelijk gezien kan 
worden onder de dialoogpartners. 
Hiermee is de hoofdvraag van deze dissertatie beantwoord. Ik wil echter 
nog een mogelijkheid voorstellen, die naar ik meen aan zowel de 
bedoelingen van de huidige dialoog tegemoetkomt én een theologische 
basis geeft voor de dialoog in de toekomst. 
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Ik constateer dat de dogmatische moeilijkheden tussen de geloven hen 
afschrikken van echt theologisch bezig te zijn. Zij zijn, als het ware, 
aardegebonden. Door modellen van de hemel, vanuit verschillende 
godsdiensten gezien, erbij te betrekken, wil ik echter de ruimte creëren om 
die aardgebondenheid te doorbreken. 
Ik merk op dat alle religies een hemel, een paradijs, een hiernamaals 
hebben dat a) beter is dan de huidige wereld en b) onlosmakelijk 
verbonden is met deze wereld. 
Aan de hand van Christelijke, Joodse en Islamitische teksten en 
commentatoren laat ik zien dat het zichtbare heelal nu al deel uit maakt 
van de hemel. Alle inwoners zijn dus al in de hemel, al zal hun gedaante 
en status nog wijzigen in de toekomst na de dood. Als inwoner van de 
hemel, is het dus nodig dat zij zich, los van hun dogmatische 
achtergronden, gedragen tegenover hun medehemelbewoners op een 
manier die consistent is met hun status. Dat geeft dus een gedeelde 
theologische basis voor hun onderlinge relaties en de interreligieuze 
dialoog: om de betekenis van “nu al in de hemel zijn” te verkennen. Op 
basis daarvan bekijk ik een aantal gedragscodes om te laten zien dat het 
idee van gedrag op basis van wie men is, al lang geaccepteerd is. 
Ik besluit met een herschrijving van de “Declaration Toward a Global 
Ethic” van Hans Küng vanuit het perspectief van het gedrag dat men van 
een ingezetene van de hemelen mag verwachten. 
 
Derek Suchard 
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